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Executive Summary 
In 2009 Rwanda introduced 9 Years Basic Education (9YBE) and progress on access to 
primary education in recent years has been highly impressive.  However, the challenges still 
faced by the Rwandan education system remain significant.  These include the need to 
ensure adequate funding, improvements in quality and ensuring great equity.  One key part 
of responding to these challenges requires an efficient and fair school funding system.  
School funding comes from either public or private sources – for example, parental 
contributions. These parental contributions can either be for indirect costs of schooling, 
such uniforms, or for direct costs in the form of financial payments to schools.   
This research assesses the impact on school funding of the direct financial parental 
contributions in two contrasting Rwandan Districts – one in a relatively better off urban area 
and one in a poorer rural area.  It demonstrates a clear difference between the two areas. In 
the wealthier area parental contributions more than double schools non-salary spending. In 
contrast, in the rural area, voluntary parental contributions have a marginal impact on 
school budgets.  
These findings raise issues about both equity of funding and whether the Rwandan schools 
system is helping to achieve greater equality of opportunity.  The research suggests that 
schools with pupils with more need are actually worse funded than schools with pupils with 
less need.  This acts against achieving greater equality of opportunity.  
It is important that the issue of school illegally turning pupils away because their parents do 
not make a financial contribution – something for which we find some evidence – is 
addressed. However, more fundamentally, the Rwandan government should develop a 
more targeted state funding system, with more funding being allocated to schools which 
have the highest levels of need and least ability to attract additional parental contributions.  
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 1. Context and Background  
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
This section discusses the context and background for this research.  Initially it discusses the 
progress Rwanda has made in expanding access to basic education in recent years, before 
assessing the major challenges still faced by the Rwandan schools system.  Finally, the 
section explains the Rwandan school funding system at the time this research was 
conducted.    
  
 
1.2. Recent Trends in Rwandan Basic Education  
Consistent with the majority of other Low Income Countries (LICs) Rwanda abolished legal 
user charges, or fees, and replaced them with public funding (whether raised from domestic 
sources such as taxation or received via ODA) in the early 2000s.  In Rwanda’s case school 
fees were made illegal in 2003 (World Bank, 2011).  In theory the shortfall in revenue for 
schools was made up for through the introduction of a Capitation Grant (CG), which 
allocated funding to schools on a simple per-pupil basis.     
Following the abolition of school fees and the introduction of public funding, the last decade 
has witnessed large increase in primary school enrolment.  Chart 1, below, which uses 
Rwandan Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) administrative data, shows how in 2003 the net 
enrolment rate (NER) in the first year of primary school (P1) increased dramatically after 
fees were abolished.  This high level of initial access to primary school is confirmed by data 
from the Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey or, in French, Enquête Intégrale sur 
les Conditions de Vie des ménages (EICV): this shows that between 2005/6 and 2010/11 the 
primary school net enrolment rate increased from 86.6% to 91.7%1.   
 
                                                          
1
 While only produced every five years, the EICV data is considered more reliable. 
 Source: MINEDUC EMIS administrative data.   
 
These increases in primary enrolment rates have yet to fully feed through into primary 
completion rates, or progression to lower secondary school.  As chart 2 shows, again using 
MINEDUC administrative data, completion rates have increased to over 70%, but net 
enrolment rates for lower secondary school (S1-S3) remain relatively low. This low net 
enrolment rate has previously been the result of a lack of supply of lower secondary places.  
Indeed, the P6 exams were explicitly used to restrict entry to the next phase of the system 
by setting a ‘pass grade’.  This has, however, changed with the introduction by the Rwandan 
government of the Nine Years Basic Education policy (9YBE), which offers free and, in 
theory, compulsory S1-S3 as well as primary schooling to all children.  Another possible 
explanation for the low net enrolment rate in secondary school, which does still apply, is a 
recent increase in repetition rates and, as a result, the growth in the number of ‘over-age’ 
pupils2.  
 
                                                          
2
 The 2010/11 EICV survey shows a significant increase stating that: “In 2005/06 for every five children aged 7 
to 12 there was one over 12 years old attending primary school. In 2010/11 for every two children aged 7 to 12 
there is one over 12 years old attending primary school.” (NISR 2012) 
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Chart 1. Net Enrolment Rates in Rwandan Primary Schools 
 Source: MINEDUC administrative data. 
Note: The transition rate from primary to secondary may be higher than the net enrolment rate shown above, 
as a result of the large number of overage pupils who do count in the P6 competion figures, but not in the NER 
for secondary school.  
 
 
1.3. Challenges for Rwandan Basic Education  
 
1.3.1. The Fiscal Challenge 
Rwanda is a LIC, with the latest GDP per head being just US$5853 and it continues to rely 
heavily on ODA, which amounted to US$1.03bn in 2010, or approximately 50% of the 
government’s budget4. This means that in cash terms, levels of spending on education in 
Rwanda remain low.  One way of looking at this is to compare levels of funding with those 
that researchers have estimated to be necessary to deliver an ‘essential learning package’, 
or the minimum level of ‘inputs’ to provide a minimum quality education system (UNICEF 
2008).   
These assessments are based on assuming a set of minimum ‘inputs’ – infrastructure, text 
books and so on – and then costing these. There is some debate about the validity of using 
such input-based minimum learning packages.  Some suggest that the issue is less how 
much is spent and more how money is spent (Hanushek 1997; Burtless 1996).  Others argue 
that basic education standards will vary across countries and the costs of achieving these 
standards will vary by student (Baker and Green 2008). Yet the validity of such measures is 
supported by other research. There is an evidence base that underpins a focus on a basic set 
of inputs: for example Fuller and Clarke (1994) assessed more than 100 studies assessing the 
impact of various inputs into schooling – or ‘production functions’ – and found that there 
                                                          
3
 See IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2011 
4
 Based on DAC and MINECOFIN data.  
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Chart 2: Primary completion and lower secondary net 
enrolment rate (%) 
P6 completion 
S1 enrolment  
were significant and consistent effects for some teacher qualities, textbooks and time spent 
by pupils each day learning.  These findings are supported by more recent work by Glewwe 
et al (2011). Furthermore, others argue that while how funding is spent matters, a minimum 
level of financial resources or a spending floor is, never-the-less, important for ensuring that 
students have access to a minimum standard of resources and materials (Vegas and Petrow 
2008; Roza 2010).  
The existing research suggests that public funding in Rwanda is not sufficient to provide the 
minimum level of education inputs.  The chart below demonstrates this using work by 
Bruns, Mignat and Rakatomalala (2003).  This suggests that non-teaching costs for schools 
should amount to around 33% of the budget and that a ‘minimum level of inputs’ should be 
US$16-19 per year.  They also suggest that a more demanding ‘desirable level of inputs’ 
should be US$33–37.  In chart 3, these two levels are contrasted with the value of the 
Rwandan CG.   
 
 
Source: MINEDUC CG of RF3,500 and Bruns, Mignat and Rakatomalala (2003). 
Note: These figures are in 2002 prices and have not been updated for inflation.  
 
Comparative data also shows that the level of per-pupil spending on education in Rwanda is 
lower than for some countries with a similar GDP per capita.  The chart below displays the 
levels of public spending per pupil in primary school as a percentage of GDP per capita and 
then plots this against the level of GDP per capita in that country.  Rwanda spends 
moderately more per pupil than some countries, including DR Congo, Malawi and Uganda.  
However, it remains behind a larger number of other Sub-Saharan countries, such as 
Tanzania, Ethiopia, Senegal and Gambia, all of whom have a similar GDP per capita.  
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Chart 3: 'Desireable' and 'Minimum' levels of Non-salary Spending 
in Primary Schools Compared with Rwandan Capitation Grant 
 Source: Author’s analysis of UNESCO statistics. 
 
The Government of Rwanda has increased spending on education in cash terms, and plans 
further increases (MINEDUC 2010).  These increases have tended, however, to be in line 
with levels of economic growth and the overall prioritisation given to education spending 
has not significant changed in recent years.  The percentage of GDP allocated to the total 
education budget was 4.3% in 2007 and 4.7% in 20115.  There has been a disappointing fall 
in the percentage of the total government budget that has been allocated to education, 
from 19% in 2007 to 16.9% in 20116. Focusing on primary schooling, spending per pupil as a 
percentage of GDP per capita has fallen from 9% in 2007 to 7.3% in 2011.  Furthermore 
there has been a substantial fall in the percentage of the education budget being allocated 
to primary education – from 46% in 2007 to 34.3% in 20117 - because of the increased 
spending on secondary.   
In the medium term the pressures on funding for primary education will increase.  This is 
because of the expansion of the system in lower secondary, on the back of the introduction 
of 9YBE and also the more recent introduction of 12 Years Basic Education (12YBE). The 
specific policy adopted for 12YBE – an entitlement to all pupils who graduate from 9YBE to a 
                                                          
5
 Based on UNESCO UIS statistics 
 
6
 One contributory factor which should be borne in mind here is the fact that the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, 
Malaria and TB appeared on the government balance sheet between 2007 and 2011. 
 
7
 After the recent Government of Rwanda budget MINEDUC data suggests that the proportion of the 
education budget being allocated to primary schools will increase in 2012/13 from 38% to 39%, although taken 
together primary and lower secondary (the full 9YBE phase) will reduce from 65% to 57%.  
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further three years of learning will make it difficult to constrain future costs.  Comparative 
analysis has shown how considerable the cost implications of expanding post-basic 
education can be (Mignat et al 2010).8 
This pressure on the education budget is linked to a further challenge: ensuring quality.  The 
inability to combine expansions in educational access with improvements in learning 
outcomes, or expansion leading to poorer quality, is increasingly well documented 
(Brookings 2011, Pritchett forthcoming, Fiske and Ladd 2008). Evidence from the East 
African region on literacy and numeracy early in primary school is worrying. For example, in 
Uganda 90% of P3 pupils have been found unable to read an English story set at P2 levels of 
difficulty (UWEZO, 2011).  There is similar evidence in Rwanda itself also suggest poor 
learning outcomes for primary school pupils (Independent Commission for Aid Impact 2012; De 
Stefano and Rafaingita 2011). The Rwandan government has piloted the Learning Assessment 
in Rwandan Schools (LARS) programme, which assesses pupils’ levels of literacy and 
numeracy at the end of P3.  However, it remains behind some other East African countries 
and other nations around the world in systematically measuring learning outcomes in order 
to either assess the performance of the schools system as a whole (for example, through 
being a member of an internationally comparable survey) or the performance of specific 
schools or areas (though rigorous and valid external assessments of performance, which can 
be used to drive school improvement).   
 
1.3.2. The Inequality Challenge   
The increase in primary school enrolment has occurred amongst all income groups and in all 
regions.  This represents a major success.  But does it, on its own, mean that the schools 
system is providing greater equality of opportunity?  
Looking first at different measures of enrolment, there is evidence of inequalities, but – for 
primary education – they are relatively narrow and appear to be narrowing further.  This is 
shown in the chart below.   
 
                                                          
8
 The wider international context on adequacy of funding for basic education in developing nations is similar to 
the Rwandan predicament: UNESCO (2010) report that there is a funding gap of US$24bn per annum (in 2007 
prices) when considering basic education goals, as set out in MDG2 and MDG3, alone. In the case of Rwanda, 
again from a 2007 base, they estimate that spending on teachers will need to increase by over 200% by 2015. 
 Source: EICV 2005/06 and EICV 2010/11. 
 
However, looking beyond the NERs there are larger inequalities between different regions 
and income groups.  This can be seen when looking at enrolment figures for secondary 
education, as set out in chart 6 below.  This chart shows data on net secondary school 
attendance for 2005/6 and 2010/11 broken down by rural compared with urban areas and 
also for different incomes quintiles.  It shows, for example, that the Net Attendance Rate 
(NAR) for secondary schools was over four times higher for the highest income quintile than 
it is for the lowest quintile in 2010/11. This represents a narrowing of the gap between 
these two income groups compared with 2005/06, but still a wide difference9.   
 
 
Source: EICV 2005/06 and EICV 2010/11. 
                                                          
9
 The picture for higher education is one of even greater gaps, and a widening of these between 2005/06 and 
2010/11.  In 2005/6 3.8% of children from the fifth income quintile attended higher education compared with 
0.1% of the bottom quintile.  By 2010/11 this had increased to 8.2% for the top quintile, but remained static 
for the bottom quintile.   
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1.4. Conceptualising Education Funding 
 
These two major challenges facing the Rwandan education system both point towards the 
importance of ensuring that the funding system for primary education is both efficient and 
equitable.  First, given the considerable pressures on funding it is important to know that 
primary school funding is being allocated so as to have the maximum impact on improving 
the quality of basic education for all young Rwandans.  Second, given that there is some 
evidence for unequal access to education it is important to ask whether school funding is 
well targeted at those young Rwandans in most need.  
Education funding can be understood as having three main elements. These are set out in 
Figure 1 and are: (i) public funding direct to school; (ii) private contributions to the running 
costs of the school – direct private contributions; and (iii) private contributions to the 
indirect costs of education. In figure 1 examples of the types of funding or what the money 
would be spent on are given for each of these categories.   
 
Figure 1: Three Blocks of Funding for Education  
 
Source: Author’s own conceptualization. Examples of direct private contributions are taken from Katten and 
Burnett (2004) 
 
This study is interested in the first and second boxes – public funding and ‘direct’ private 
funding provided to schools.  In the two sections below each of these is discussed in more 
detail.   
 
1.4.1. Public Funding for Rwandan Primary/9YBE Schools  
•Capitation Grant  
•Teachers' salaries 
•Text books  
1. PUBLIC FUNDING FOR 
SCHOOL RUNNING 
COSTS 
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•Uniform 
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•Transport  costs 
3. PRIVATE FUNDING OF 
INDIRECT COSTS 
The diagramme below sets out the structure of public funding in Rwanda at the time this 
research was carried out. 10   
There are two main sources of public funding.  The first is the Capitation Grant (CG), which is 
paid direct from the Ministry of Finance (MINECOFIN) to head teachers.  This has two 
elements: the first is paid on a simple per pupil basis, at a rate of RWF3,500 per annum and 
the second is RWF12,500 per month per teacher11.  This latter element of the CG is formally 
allocated as a ‘teachers’ bonus’ payable based on performance, but in practice is paid to all 
teachers as an addition to their salaries (Transparency International 2012).  The system is 
administered by the district (a unit of Rwandan local government, of which there are 30 
across the country12), which assesses how many pupils and teachers there are.  Whereas 
head teachers have to pass on the teachers’ bonus to teachers, they have relative autonomy 
over how the remainder of the CG is allocated. There is guidance, which states that 50% of 
the CG should be allocated to school materials such as books, 35% goes to school 
maintenance and 15% to teacher training, but this is not necessarily followed closely by 
head teachers who appear to make decisions on spending which reflect their schools needs 
and circumstances (Transparency International 2012). 
The second main stream of funding is for teachers’ salaries. It is paid direct from MINECOFIN 
to teachers, again based on data and monitoring at the district level.  Classroom teachers’ 
salaries in primary schools are the same for all teachers: that is a total of RWF45,000 per 
month (made up of RWF32,500 per-month, paid direct from MINECOFIN, plus the additional 
RWF12,500 paid through the CG).  In 2011 there were also other streams of spending, which 
are directed through the MINEDUC budget.  These include funding for textbooks and 
maintenance or construction.  Furthermore there are some small streams of funding which 
are allocated to districts, including for construction. However, there are no significant 
budget lines targeted at particular pupils, schools or areas.   
Overall this means that the public funding system in Rwanda is ‘flat’ – that is it is explicitly 
designed to ensure that each pupil, regardless of where they live or their family background 
and circumstances, receives the same level of public funding.  This is shown in the diagram 
below, in which the two darker boxes show that school budgets and teachers’ salaries have 
no targeted elements13.   
 
 
  
                                                          
10
 From 2012 onwards MINEDUC are shifting the teachers’ bonus element of the CG (RWF12,500 per teacher, 
per month) direct into teachers’ salaries, which are paid direct to teachers.  This will leave the RWF3,500 per 
pupil payment as the CG over which head teachers have some discretion.  
11
 All prices are given as Rwandan Franks (RWF) unless otherwise stated.  £1 = RWF940  
12
 The level of government below the district is the ‘sector’: this is also referred to at times in this paper.  
13
 It is possible that the funding is slightly regressive if teacher pupil ratios are slightly lower in urban areas 
than in rural areas.  
Figure 2: Public Funding for Rwandan Schools  
 
Central government: Consolidated Fund Account: MINECOFIN, but held in the National Bank of Rwanda.   
This includes a holding account for Education Budget Support funded from taxation and also from GBS 
and SBS from Donors.   
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Including a mix of (a) primary schools (P1 – P6) 
(b) full 9YBE schools P1-S3 and (c) lower 
secondary schools (S1-S3).   
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1.4.2. Non-Public Funding for Rwandan Primary/9YBE Schools  
 
The previous section discussed public funding for Rwandan schools.  However, to develop a 
full account of schools funding, it is necessary to also include other sources of funding, 
including private contributions from parents and guardians.   
The total private costs of education, in boxes 2 and 3 in figure 1 above, can be substantial.  
The World Bank estimate that in 2005 overall private household spending on education in 
Rwanda, from primary school through to higher education, amounted to around 42% of 
total spending on education.  This represented an increase of 13ppts when compared with 
2000.  Looking specifically at primary education the share of spending which was by 
households increased from 19% in 2000 to 22% in 2008 (World Bank 2011, table 6.2).  
This increase in the contribution of parents to education spending could be due to increases 
in spending on ‘indirect costs’ (box 3 in figure 1).  The evidence from other African countries 
suggests that these costs can indeed be large (Petrauskis and Nkunika 2006; World Bank 
2004; Carr-Hall 2010) and the World Bank analysis of Rwanda is consistent with this: 45% of 
parental spending was on uniforms and just under 25% on ‘school supplies’.  However, 
another part of the story is the potential continuation of parental contributions to the direct 
running costs of schools14.  This form of contribution could take the form, for example, of a 
voluntary contribution to the school via the Parental Teachers Association (PTA).   
There is existing evidence that such financial contributions made in Rwanda.  Transparency 
International Rwanda (2012) found that 64% of respondents (which included parents, 
teachers and head teachers) acknowledged the existence of parental contributions direct to 
the running costs of schools.  This research also found that the majority of respondents 
(66.2%) thought parents should pay extra contributions and that there was little evidence 
that schools excluded pupils over parents’ failure to pay contributions (88.8% stated they 
did not know of pupils being excluded in this way).15  
While there is evidence that parental contributions are made in Rwanda, there is little 
understanding of either their significance or the implications of their existence for equality 
of opportunity.   
 
  
                                                          
14
 This paper uses the term ‘parental contributions’ to refer to contributions by anyone with parental 
responsibilities.  In the case of orphans or children not living with their parents, this meant a guardian rather 
than the parent.  Indeed, in the fieldwork the term “parent or guardian” was used, given the potentially high 
number of orphans or children living away from their parents.  
15
 The last point is important and one on which this research comes to a different conclusion.   
 
2. Rationale and Research Questions  
 
2.1. Rationale for Study  
 
As set out in section 1, despite considerable expansions in access to basic education in 
Rwanda, the system faces significant challenges.  The two core challenges highlighted were, 
first, providing adequate funding to provide a minimum quality of education and, second, 
the risk that the schools system was not promoting greater equality of opportunity.  The 
core rationale for this study is to help understand how private contributions to education, 
and in particular direct private contributions to the running costs of schools, relate to these 
two challenges.   The current understanding of the public funding system in Rwanda is good 
(Transparency International 2012; World Bank 2011).  But the understanding of private 
funding and its implications for the overall fiscal sustainability of the schools system and for 
equality of opportunity is more limited.  This project seeks to fill this gap in the research.   
 
2.2. Research Questions  
 
The research aims to address the following questions.   
 Are private contributions necessary to achieve adequate school funding in Rwanda?  
 
 When accounting for public and private contributions to the funding of schools what 
are the implications for equity of funding between schools in different areas, in 
particular for schools in remote and poorer rural areas compared with better off 
urban areas? 
 
 Assuming there is evidence of significant parental contributions, what are the policy 
implications?   
 
  
3. Literature Review  
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
In this section the existing literature on school funding and parental contributions is 
discussed.  It is divided into two sub-sections. The first assesses the theoretical literature on 
private contributions to schooling: this is mainly focused on debates about ‘cost-sharing’.  
The second focuses on the existing empirical evidence from developing countries on the 
continuation of parental contributions to schooling, even after the abolition of formal ‘fees’. 
 
3.2. Theoretical Debates: Cost-Sharing in Education  
 
‘Cost-sharing’ refers to the situation when public services, including schooling, are funded 
through a combination of public and private contributions. This happens formally when a 
service receives public funding, but is also legally allowed to charge fees (Katton and Burnett 
2004). However, in situations where private contributions continue despite formal ‘fees’ 
being illegal, many of the same theoretical debates are relevant. In such circumstances, 
although there is a different legal framework, there is a de facto continuation of ‘cost 
sharing’ – below we refer to this as ‘informal cost sharing’.    
 
What are the key debates about cost sharing in education?   
 
The first point to make is that there are strong arguments for at least some public funding 
for basic education.  There are academics, such as Tooley (2009), who argue for purely 
privately funded schooling.  They argue that in a developing world context, where publically 
funded education has consistently failed to provide schooling either at all, or at a basic level 
of quality, fully privately funded schools are desirable.  In countries with high degrees of 
state failure some research confirms that this purely privately funded model of low cost 
private schools can have advantages – for example, reduced teacher absenteeism (HDRC 
2012).   However, in cases where governance is more effective this argument is weaker.  In 
such contexts, of which Rwanda is a good example, some very strong theoretical arguments 
for public funding of education do apply.   
 
First, investment in education has wider benefits than the economic returns to the 
individual, in the form of higher salaries.  Because of the existence of positive externalities – 
such as wider take up of new technologies – there are wider economic benefits for society 
as a whole (Romer 1990; Harmon et al 2000; McMahon 1999; Oketch 2006).  This means 
that, even assuming an individual or family were able to fully calculate the potential returns 
to education, they would rationally under-invest in schooling – they would only take into 
account their private returns and not the potential returns to society as a whole. On top of 
these positive economic externalities, there is good evidence that society as whole benefits 
in non-economic forms. A number of studies find that increased education has a positive 
impact on a range of social outcomes, such as reducing fertility rates, reducing child 
mortality and improved governance and democracy (Watkins, 2010; Herz and Sperling, 
2004; Subbarao and Rainey, 1995).  While these wider benefits should not be overstated 
and there can be negative externalities (Hirsch 1978; Carr-Hill and Linnott 2002), the 
evidence for substantial positive social externalities is strong.   
 
The second reason for government investment in education is that the ‘market’ for 
education suffers from a number of failures: people may lack of clear information on the 
returns to education, they may lack access to credit or place greater value of the short term 
than the distant prospect of long-term returns (Barr 2004).   There are also powerful equity 
arguments. Where schools are privately funded some parents will be able to afford 
education, while others will not.  Lewin (2007) argues that purely privately funded schools 
are untenable as they would require the poorest households to spend approximately half of 
their income on education.  This is supported by some empirical evidence which suggests 
that low cost private schools are more likely to be attended by pupils from slightly better-off 
households, than the poorest (Härmä 2010). 
 
Taken together these arguments present a robust case for public spending on education. 
However, do they mean that either formal or informal cost sharing is undesirable?  There 
are both theoretical and pragmatic arguments which have been made for cost sharing.  
 
3.2.1. Private Benefits Justifying Private Contributions?  
 
One theoretical argument simply flips the point made above about education’s wider 
benefits for society on its head: yes, there are benefits to society as a whole, but there are 
also benefits for individuals in the form of improved labour market returns. This can be used 
to justify requiring individuals, or their families, to contribute to the cost of education 
(Maliyamkono and Ogbo 1999).   
 
3.2.2. Contributions and ‘Ownership’ 
 
Another concerns the nature of the relationship between service users and public services. 
In a developing world context, it is argued that purely publically funded schools could 
potentially reduce the demands and sense of ownership over schools that parents feel. This 
is because in developing countries narrow tax bases, where many parents will not be in the 
income tax system, give parents less of a stake in public services.  In contrast, it is argued, 
there can be higher expectations in countries with broader tax bases where taxpayers are 
concerned about how effectively public money is spent (PSI 2006, Jimenez and Lockheed 
1996). Others make a similar point when they have argued that fees can improve schools 
accountability to parents (World Bank 2003; World Bank/UNICEF 2009).   This argument 
reflects work by economists like Thaler (1980, 1990) which suggests that where users of 
services “buy” something they are more likely to value it more highly.  
 
3.2.3. Pro-Poor Fees?  
 
Others have argued that where private parental contributions are combined with sufficient 
public funding this also makes it possible that equity concerns can be addressed.  Thobani 
(1984) argues that fees, if they ensure that quality of the education system is improved and 
if set at a level which does not deter some pupils, can be pro-poor.  Thobani argues that it is 
pupils from low-income backgrounds who benefit most from a better funded system which 
successfully improves learning outcomes. Birdsall (1987) makes a similar point, arguing that 
there may be some scope for increasing fees without reducing enrollment if the additional 
revenue is used to cross-subsidise the poor.   
 
However, some empirical evidence suggests that achieving such a pro-poor outcome, 
though possible in principle, is challenging in practice (Petrauskis and Nkunika 2006, Kattan 
2006).  There are two aspects to these arguments: first that at the aggregate national level 
higher fees will reduce access and, closely related to this, higher fees will affect enrolment 
and progression rates for particular groups.   
 
In the case of the former some would also point out that in Sub-Saharan Africa when formal 
fees were reintroduced, in the 1980s, there was a decline in the Gross Enrolment Rates 
(GERs) from 80 percent in 1980 to 72 percent in 1992 (World Bank/UNICEF 2009).  Research 
which looks beyond the macro level trends has also suggested that fees act as a barrier to 
either initial access or progression at school.  In Tanzania, in 2001, parents stated that fees 
were the main reason for non-attendance at school (Oxfam 2001) and Tembo and Ndhlovu 
(2005) suggested that 45% of school drop-outs could be accounted for because of non-
payment of school fees.  More empirical analysis, from Kenya, has also suggested that non-
attendance reflects levels of fees (Mukudi 2004). 
 
Turning to the impact on specific groups, work like Birdsall’s (1987) is not based on a 
comprehensive understanding of the impact of fees on different groups – for example, 
those from the poorest households or girls (Katten and Burnett 2004). This line of argument 
suggests that any change in the cost of education will have a disproportionate impact on 
such pupils – in other words the price elasticity of demand for schools will be higher for 
these groups.  The World Bank (2001) found this to be the case for girls vis-à-vis boys in all 
developing world regions; Glewwe (1989), working in Peru, found it to be the case for 
poorer rural households compared with wealthier urban dwellers and Deolalikar (1997), 
focusing just on household income, came to similar conclusions.   
 
3.2.4. Pragmatic Arguments for Cost-Sharing  
 
Finally, there are some more pragmatic arguments for allowing informal cost sharing.  One 
is that it will allow for a higher total level of spending on basic education than relying only 
on public funding.  Section 1.3.1 noted the significant funding challenge faced by Rwanda 
and how, at present, public funding is insufficient to cover some definitions of minimal 
levels funding (Bruns, Mignat and Rakatomalala 2003).  Another practical issue is the 
inability of governments to abolish informal fees, even in an authoritarian state.  Parents do 
not legally have to make contributions, but they may freely decide that this is how they 
want to spend their money.  If this is the case then the issue facing policy makers would be 
less “do we allow parental contributions or not?” and more “what form of parental 
contributions should we allow and how can the policy framework ensure that they are fair?” 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Empirical Evidence on Parental Contributions  
 
The existing empirical evidence suggests that the continuation of parental contributions, or 
informal fees, after the introduction of free basic education is commonplace in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
 
Fairly comprehensive assessments, by Bentaouett (2006) Kattan and Burnett (2004) and 
Katten (2006) found that fees remained prevalent in countries which had formally abolished 
school fees.  Kattan and Burnett, for example, surveyed 79 countries and found that in 97% 
of these fees were levied.  This included many countries which adopted more than one form 
of fee, including PTA contributions, textbook fees and compulsory uniforms.  In Africa, they 
found that “community contributions” and PTA contributions were the most common form 
of fee (81% of African countries surveyed). When this analysis was updated, based on 2005 
data (Kattan 2006) there was some evidence of a trend away from charging fees, 
particularly in the case of text book and uniform charges, but also for PTA levies.  However, 
overall a large number of countries retained some form of fees: of a slightly different sample 
of countries, only 16 of 93 countries were found to have no user fees at all.  Furthermore, 
the report noted a gap between official policy positions and policy implementation, stating 
that:  
 
“The survey also finds that fees continue to be collected unofficially in 
many countries where there has been a formal policy of fee abolition. 
According to survey results, 18 countries no longer charge tuition fees, yet 
only 5 of these countries have widely implemented fee elimination 
policies.” (Kattan 2006, p26) 
 
In another comparative analysis Transparency International (2010) also found widespread 
continuation of parental contributions despite the abolition of fees.  In a survey of seven 
African countries (Ghana, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Niger, Uganda, Senegal and Morocco) 
they found that 44% of parents reported paying ‘registration fees’.  Their research also 
suggested that the levels of the fees remained significant enough to create a “major hurdle 
for a large minority of the population”: the average fee being levied was reported to be just 
over US$4 per annum16.  
 
While less comprehensive, other recent work supports these findings: the World Bank 
(2009) found that in Ethiopia parental contributions were encouraged and substantial; in 
Ghana parents contributed to specific projects, but pupils were not allowed to be turned 
away if their parents did not contribute; in Kenya parents contribute, particularly to 
construction; and in Mozambique, while again pupils cannot be turned away, parents are 
expected to contribute (World Bank/UNICEF 2009).  A study of 12 Francophone countries 
found that, in 2002, on average close to one-third of primary school teachers were paid by 
parents.  This ranged from 4% in Niger to 68% in Chad (Mingat 2004).  Furthermore, a series 
of country specific studies come to similar conclusions (see, for example, Petrauskis and 
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 Transparency International was particularly concerned to assess whether the illegal levying of fees was an 
example of corruption.  They concluded that it was not clearwhether continuation of fees was for personal 
gain or simply because of either confusion about the legal position on fees and/or the fact that CGs remained 
insufficient to support a minimum quality of educational provision (Transparency International 2010).  
Nkunika in Zambia; Action Aid, 2011 in Nigeria and Tanzania; World Bank, 2005, for DR 
Congo).    
 
One further point emerges from the existing literature: the nature and purpose of parental 
contributions differs from country to country.  The World Bank/UNICEF (2009) and Kattan 
and Burnett (2004) both identify a wide range of contributions in their comparative analysis.  
The table below, taken from Katten (2006) illustrates this diversity.  Based on the 2005 
survey of 93 countries, it shows that significant proportions of education systems were still 
levying five forms of fees: tuition fees – direct payments to the school; textbook charges; 
uniform fees; PTA contributions and ‘other’ school related activities.  
 
Table 1: Range of ‘Parental Contributions’ or Fees in 2005 World Bank Survey  
 Percentage of Countries in 
Survey 
Number of these countries 
that collect fees unofficially 
Tuition fees 25 7 
Textbook charges 25 2 
Uniform fees 35 9 
PTA contributions 69 28 
Other school activities  36 15 
Source: World Bank Survey 2005 
Note: Focusing on East Africa in particular, the World Bank survey found that 30% of countries had tuition fees, 
50% text book fees; 30% uniforms; 70% ‘other’ fees and 90% PTA and community fees. In Africa as a whole, 
PTA and community contributions were levied in 23 of the 34 countries. 
 
This diversity of forms of fees between countries can also be seen in some research 
examining within country differences. Action Aid (2011), in a study covering Nigeria and 
Tanzania, found a wide range of purposes for parental contributions within each country. 
They concluded that a “great deal of variation across schools, Districts and states was 
observed in terms of the amount of levies charged and for what”.   
 
So the picture is complicated.  However, one potential common theme to emerge, and one 
which is reflected in table 1, is that many countries retain some form of PTA or community 
contribution. What is more, there is some evidence that in many countries parental 
contributions and de facto fees are allocated towards the payment of teachers’ salaries. 
Minget (2004) found that in Francophone countries, parents paying for teachers, whether in 
poorly funded public schools or in community schools which emerge in the absence of state 
provision, was common.  In Cameroon, in 2002 (two years after the abolition of official 
school fees), around a quarter of primary school teachers were paid for by parents in 2002 
(World Bank/Pôle de Dakar 2003, reported in Mignat 2004). 
 
There has been far less research on the within country variation in the level of fees and 
implications of this for equity and equality of opportunity. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Equity in School Funding  
 
3.4.1. Concepts of Equity and Equality of Opportunity 
There are two broad conceptions of equity in relation to school funding and each of these is 
distinct from a concept of equality of opportunity.   
 
Taking ‘equity’ first: one definition of equity is ‘horizontal equity’ which stresses the need to 
treat similar people, or pupils in the case of schools, the same17.  The second definition is 
‘vertical equity’ which encompasses the need to treat different pupils differently.  Thinking 
in terms of school funding the former implies the same level of funding for pupils who are 
regarded as the same and the latter require different levels of funding for groups of pupils 
which are considered to have differential levels of need (Toutkoushian and Michael 2007; 
Berne and Stiefel 1984).  The former definition of equity has tended to be seen as 
inadequate in debates about school funding. The pertinent point here is that equal school – 
horizontal equity – funding per-pupil is not necessarily genuinely equitable.  As Hirth and 
Eiler (2005) put it: 
 
“The difference between equity and equality leads to profound differences 
in the definition of the problems to be addressed and the remedies 
available for their solution. In school finance the term equitable has come 
to refer to funding based on the needs of children. Spending the same 
number of dollars on each student is a form of equality, but it may not be 
equitable; some students necessitate greater expenditures.” 
 
This is why in debates about equity and school funding it is vertical equity which has tended 
to be the policy objective (Ooberbeek and Patrinos 2008). This is especially important given 
the evidence that increased funding can make a greater difference for pupils from low 
income households (Baker and Green 2008).  One definition of vertical equity would be to 
simply allocate higher levels of funding to pupils from groups which have been shown to 
perform worse at school – for example, those from lower income households. This would 
satisfy the requirements of a ‘thin’ version of horizontal equity.  However, a more 
demanding goal would be for the school funding system to be targeted in such a way that it 
enables the achievement of equality of opportunity.  This would be achieved where the 
educational and later life-chances for pupils are equal for all groups of pupils – whatever 
their gender, household income and so on (Miller 2005).    
 
Achieving such equality of opportunity is, in most national contexts, extremely challenging 
given the myriad of ways in which intergenerational disadvantage and/or privilege are 
reproduced (Miller 2005, Blanden 2005).  One highly conservative estimate, by UNESCO 
(2010) is that the necessary funding for more marginalised groups of pupils should be 
approximately 33% higher than for other pupils.  This is based on research by Chen and 
Mulkeen (2008) and Mulkeen (2009) which makes estimates of the potential cost of teacher 
incentives and other areas of spending necessary to bring marginalised pupils a ‘good 
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 Above the Rwandan funding system was described as ‘flat’.  This is the same as saying that it is based on the 
principle of horizontal equity.  
quality’ education.  UNESCO, however, accept that the evidence base is ‘sparse’ and the 
additional costs could be considerably higher. It is also clear that additional funding on its 
own is insufficient: it must also be linked to the right set of reforms and allocated towards 
aspects of schooling known to affect learning outcomes (UNESCO 2010).  
 
A less demanding principle against which school funding systems could be judged would be 
that they do not work to accentuate inherited privileges and disadvantages.  This may not 
sound like a particularly lofty objective, but one of the potential implications of the 
widespread continuation of school fees highlighted in section 3.3 combined with public 
funding which is flat is that even this goal may be challenging for policy makers to achieve.  
 
3.4.2. School Funding Systems  
The different concepts of equity discussed above have important implications for school 
funding systems.  In the final section of the literature review debates about policy options 
for school funding systems are discussed.  
In their most simple form school funding formula exist in the majority of formal education 
systems with at least partial public funding18.  Even where funding is allocated – as it is 
Rwanda – on a simple per pupil basis, this represents a form of formula funding, or an 
‘agreed set of criteria for allocating resources to school, which are impartially applied to 
each school’  (Caldwell, Levačić and Ross 1999).  This form of funding system, as was noted 
above, reflects the concept of equity which has been labeled horizontal, or the ‘the equal 
treatment of equals’.  But school funding systems which reflect the vertical concept of 
equity, with the ‘different treatment of difference’ target greater funding at some areas, 
schools or pupils than others.   
Most typically, many education systems around the world target additional public funding in 
order to better reflect levels of need and to compensate for underlying disadvantage 
(Fazekas 2012; Levačić and Ross 1999).  This tends to be the case with more mature systems 
in the developed world, but also happens in developing world countries (Fazekas, 2012 
discusses Sri Lanka and Carr-Hill, 2005, discusses Nepal where children in mountainous 
areas receive more than those in the valleys who received more than those in the plains 
near India). While in a mature education system in a high resource environment 
complicated funding formula, which seek to accurately target funding based on need, are 
possible, in the developing world system of targeted may need to be more straightforward 
to administer.    
There are a number of key decisions which shape the form that targeting of public funding 
might take (based on Levačić and Ross 1999 and Fazekas 2012):  
 At what level to target: the pupil, the school or the area?   
 On what basis to target: poverty, prior attainment or gender and ethnicity?  
 How to allocated/spend additional funding: linked to specific input, or discretionary 
spend for schools?  
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 Other potential methods of allocating public funding include requiring schools to bid for funding; basing 
allocations on historical patterns or simply allowing official – whether bureaucratic or political – discretion 
(Knight 1993).    
 How much to target: what proportion of the available capitation money should be 
used to ‘correct’ for disadvantage? 
In section 6, on the policy implications of this research, these questions are used to frame 
the discussion of potential implications for the school funding system. It is also important to 
bear in mind that it can be difficult practically and political to put in place a targeted funding 
system.  In part this is because of the need or accurate administrative information in order 
to reduce scope for arbitrary and biased allocations made by officials with large degrees of 
discretion (Glennerster 1999). This is less likely to be available in developing world 
countries.  But introducing funding formula is also uncertain and risky, including politically 
risky as it can create ‘losers’ with some pupils receiving less funding (Swanson and King 
1997). 
These two factors explain why the experience of more mature education systems is that 
funding formulae are introduced gradually over time.  Levačić and Ross (1999) helpfully 
distinguish between first generation, second generation and third generation formula: a first 
generation system is simply one which seeks to achieve horizontal equity with all pupils 
receiving the same level of funding and a third generation system targets funding at need in 
a highly sophisticated way where the amount of additional funding provided is linked to an 
assessment of the additional cost of educating poorer or more vulnerable pupils.  In 
between, however, is the second generation funding system, which Levačić and Ross (1999) 
describe in the quote below.  The important point here is that school systems need to move 
through the second generation phase before developing more mature and sophisticated 
systems: 
“The additional money per student delivered by these second generation 
formulae for supplementary educational need was not based on any 
analysis of the costs of educating students with particular learning needs 
to given levels of attainment.  The formulae were used to distribute a 
politically determined sum of money to schools according to their 
concentration of disadvantage.” 
One final point about the design of school funding systems is that it is clear that simply 
increasing spending in certain areas, on specific schools or particular pupils is not sufficient 
to improve their learning outcomes, and achieve greater equality of opportunity.  Just as 
there is evidence that overall funding for education systems does not neatly correlate with 
educational quality (see section 1.3.1 for a full discussion), there is also evidence that simply 
spending more on particular groups will not necessarily improve their learning outcomes 
(UNESCO, 2010 reference Duru-Bellat, 2009 in relation to the French system). 
 
 
  
4. Research Methodology  
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This section sets out the details of the methods adopted, including how the districts and 
schools were selected, who the interviewees were and the process for carrying out the 
research.   
 
4.2. Elite Interviews  
 
At an early stage in the process a series of elite interviews were carried out. These 
interviews were unstructured, with open ended questions.  They were held with 
stakeholders in the Rwandan government and amongst development partners.  Rwandan 
government officials included four from MINEDUC and one from MINECOFIN.  Donors 
included DfID and UNICEF, the lead international partners on education policy.  The core 
aims of these discussions were to ensure that any previous research which related to this 
projects research question was identified and taken into account and to develop a full 
understanding of the policy context.   
 
Elite interviews were noted at the time and written up afterwards.  All meetings were 
however agreed to be on a confidential basis with no comments attributable in order to 
maximize the validity of the responses.   
 
 
4.3. Primary Data Collection   
 
4.3.1. Purposive Sampling 
 
At the heart of the project was primary research carried out in two Rwandan districts.  
Because the research was primarily interested in equity in the Rwandan education system 
the sampling technique used to select the schools was purposive. In other words, the 
sampling was designed deliberately to select areas which represented different experiences 
in the Rwandan education system.  To achieve this two of the thirty Rwandan districts were 
identified based on a series of socio-economic factors such as levels of poverty, average 
incomes and employment rates.   This led to the identification of one comparatively better 
off area, Kicukiru, and one poorer area, which was in a remote rural area in the Southern 
Province of Rwanda.  This was Nyaruguru. The map below shows where these two Districts 
are located in Rwanda, and the accompanying table shows how the districts perform on a 
series of indicators.   
 
Map 1: The Districts: Kicukiro is in Kigali and Nyaruguru in Southern Province 
 
Source: RNIS  
 
 
Table 2: Comparative statistics for Kicukiro and Nyaruguru 
 Kicukiro  Nyaruguru  
No education (men)  4.6  23.4  
No Education (women)  9.5  26.1  
4+ hours of child labour a day  9.6  21.7  
Women’s literacy rate  46.1  12.4  
Employment in agriculture  12.7  67.2  
Poverty  8-20% * 60-75%  
Secondary Attendance Rate  28.5  12.1  
Source: DHS, 2010; EICV 2010/11  
Notes: * Based on EICV 2010/11 analysis, which has only been presented as ranges by NISR at the time of 
writing.   
 
 
Within these Districts a system of random sampling was used to select thirty primary 
schools.  In Nyaruguru this entailed selection of every second or third school on an 
alphabetical list of the primary schools in the area.  In Kicukiru there were 31 public schools 
in total: all were surveyed, but one was for pupils with special needs and so was excluded 
from the analysis19.   
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 In the case of Nyaruguru, the geographical distribution of the schools was assessed to ensure that a 
disproportionate number of schools were not selected from one part of the District. 
4.3.2. Interviewees  
 
The list of interviewees was developed to ensure a full understanding of the issues at each 
school and the district level.  At the district level this meant:  
 
 District education officials with lead responsibility for schools.  District officials had 
access to key administrative data on the CG, spending levels per-school, pupil 
numbers and so-on.   
 
 Education focused NGOs.  The key interest in interviewing NGOs was to assess 
information on the level and form of support they offered.  It was also thought that 
NGOs would provide more accurate answers to questions on sensitive issues around 
de facto fees.  
 
In each school the following key informants were interviewed.  
 
 The head teacher.  Heads were a key interviewee as they had large amounts of 
information, including details on the school (pupil numbers, teacher numbers and so 
on) and also school funding (including public and private sources of funding).  
 
 One classroom teacher20.  The main purpose in interviewing a classroom teacher was 
to gain additional insight into measures of quality in the different schools.   
 
 A representative of the parent body.  Most of these the parents were member of the 
PTA (26 out of 30 in both Nyaruguru and Kicukiro). They had a vital perspective on 
parental contributions and relationships between schools and parents.     
    
 
4.3.3. Research Tools – Interview Design21 
 
The interviews adopted a mix of approaches reflecting differential prior knowledge of the 
issues and the complexity of subject (Richardson et al 1965; De Vaus 1986; Newby 2010).  
Where appropriate questions were closed and structured.  This was the case, for example, 
with many of the factual questions about levels of funding and also with questions intended 
to gauge attitudes towards parental contributions to schools.  However, at times more open 
ended semi-structured questions were used.  This was particularly the case where the 
research was gathering detailed responses on the nature of the parental contributions.  
Rather than restricting responses to pre-defined categories, this approach allowed for a 
fuller exploration of the issues.  This was important given the lack of prior research in this 
area (Newby 2010).    
 
Finally, for questions to head teachers and district officials that required detailed statistical 
responses handouts were used.  These were given to interviewees to complete in their own 
                                                          
20
 Both the parents and teachers questioned were identified by the head teacher while research assistants 
were at each school.  
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 Annex 2 has copies of the final version of all the questionnaires.   
time, allowing them, for example, to draw on school accounts. This also kept the survey 
down to an acceptable length.   
   
 
4.3.4. Research Tools – School Profile22  
 
In each school ‘school profiles’ were recorded.  These were completed by research 
assistants based on their observations while at the schools.  The categories included the 
quality of the learning environment, whether the school had electricity, the condition of 
toilets and the level of teachers’ and head teachers’ English.  The school profile’s main 
purpose was to gain greater insight into differences in quality of schooling in the two 
districts. 
 
4.3.5. Research Tools – Development and Translation  
 
The questionnaires, school profile and a fieldwork guide, including clear instructions on how 
best to conduct the interviews, were first drafted in English.  Comments on this draft were 
received from colleagues and development partners.  The questionnaire was then 
translated into Kinyarwanda.  A training session was held with the research assistants to 
explain the project’s focus and background and to talk through the research tools23.   
 
4.3.6. Pilot Survey24  
 
A pilot survey was conducted in each of the two districts.  In each case, two schools were 
surveyed and district officials questioned.  The aim of the pilot was to test the 
appropriateness of the questionnaire design and also the understanding of the school 
funding system.  It was also important to identify new issues which the elite interviews and 
literature review had not revealed.  The following key lessons were gained from the pilot:  
 
 The length of the questionnaires, particularly for Head teachers was problematic.  
While respondents completed the interview it sometimes took over an hour, which 
risked reducing the validity.  As a result some questions were dropped and some 
important financial information was collected through hand-outs which respondents 
took away to complete in their own time.  
 
 Questions on the level and nature of parental contribution were unhelpfully 
structured and closed.  Because there were a wide variety of practices, a less 
structured set of questions was more appropriate.   
 
4.4. Ethics  
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 Annex 3 has a copy of the school profile used by research assistants.  
23
 As many of the Research Assistants either had children in primary school or had knowledge of the Rwandan 
education system themselves, it was also useful to ask for their feedback on the content of the questionnaires.  
A series of relatively small, but important, changes were made. 
24
 The findings from the pilot survey were reported in an interim IPAR report.  
Given that many of the respondents were government employees (the district officials, 
teachers and head teachers) all interviewees were guaranteed anonymity.  This was to help 
ensure that they had the confidence to speak honestly.  This was particularly the case with 
head teachers and district officials, but also with parents and classroom teachers given that 
the issue of parental contributions was controversial.  Ahead of each interview a consent 
form was read out to respondents, to which they were asked to agree25.   
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 See annex 1 for a copy of the informed consent statement. 
5. Presentation and Interpretation of Data  
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
This section presents the findings of the research.  It starts by presenting a brief summary of 
the overall story to emerge.  This helps to provide a framework for thinking about the 
subsequent presentation of the data.  It then looks in detail at the results on each issue, 
including a brief discussion of findings. 
 
5.2.   Overall Story   
 
The overall picture that emerges from the research is as follows:  
 
 There are large differences in the levels of financial parental contributions being 
made to schools in the two districts surveyed.  In Kicukiro the average (mean) total 
parental contribution to schools is approximately 10 times that in Nyaruguru.   
 
 The form of the contribution differs between and within areas, but PTA contributions 
dominate, particularly in Kicukiro.  
 
 There is good evidence of lower contributions being expected of poorer parents, but 
this was not uniform practice. Many NGOs also target their support on the most 
deprived within an area, but counter-intuitively there is significantly greater NGO 
activity in Kicukiro.  
 
 There is conflicting evidence on non-payment of parental contributions affecting 
pupil attendance: parents say that schools sometimes refuse entry in the event of 
non-payment, but head teachers say not.  Some NGOs also report implications for 
access of non-payment. 
 
 Parental contributions make a significant difference to the overall school budgets in 
Kicukiro, doubling the budget over which head teachers have control.  In contrast 
the low level of parental contributions have little impact on the overall school 
budgets in Nyaruguru.   
 
 This additional revenue for schools in Kicukiro is mainly allocated towards workforce 
costs and in particular higher teachers’ salaries.    
 
 This is reflected, not just in terms of the average salary received in Kicukiro 
compared with Nyaruguru, but also in terms of other factors such as head teachers 
being able to employ teachers with more experience and/or higher levels of 
proficiency in English.  
 
 Attitudes towards parental contributions were generally supportive from all groups, 
including representatives of the parent body interviewed.   
 
 5.3. Differences in Levels of Parental Contributions  
 
The level of parental contributions to schools varies significantly between Kicukiro and 
Nyaruguru.  Table 3 presents figures based on the ‘headline’ contribution level given by 
head teachers. As we shall see below this does not account for possible exemptions and 
lower contributions for some groups.  Based on these figures the average (mean) level of 
parental contributions in Kicukiro is given as more than 8 times higher than in Nyaruguru – a 
ratio that is greater when looking at the median contribution.  The range shows that in both 
districts there were schools that said they did not have any parental contributions, but in 
Kicukiro this was only the case with one school, whereas in Nyaruguru it was the case with 
10 schools.   
 
 
Table 3: Level of Parental Contribution (all figures in RWF, per term) 
 Kicukiro (n=24)  Nyaruguru (n=28) 
Mean  3,272 (s=2596) 390 (s=1140) 
Range  0 – 13,000 0 - 6,000 
Median 3,000 50 
Source: Head teachers survey [Q13] “Is there a set amount (of parental contributions) that all/the majority of 
parents/guardians are expected to contribute?”   
Notes: The Nyaruguru mean figure is significantly affected by one outlier result (RWF 6,000), which if excluded 
reduces the mean to RWF 181.  Two factors which might artificially reduce the figure for Nyaruguru are (i) a 
failure of head teachers to include any parental contributions made via the district, rather than the school – 
which, as we set out below, seemed to be prevalent in Nyaruguru and (ii) the fact that some head teachers 
who stated that there were no parental contributions in answer to this question alluded to contributions in 
answer to subsequent questions. The large overall difference is, however, clear.  
 
The overall pattern is confirmed by answers given by parents to the same question.  Chart 7 
below shows a larger difference between the two districts.  The mean annual parental 
contribution is just under nine times more in Kicukiro than it is in Nyaruguru.   
 
 
Source: Parents survey [Q16] “Is there a set amount (of parental contributions) that all/the majority of 
parents/guardians are expected to contribute?” 
RWF 0.00 
RWF 2,000.00 
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Chart 7: Parental Contirbution to Schools (per 
annum)  
Note:  For Kicukiro n= 24 and for Nyaruguru N=26. The standard deviation for Kicukiro is RWF7,552 and for 
Nyaruguru it is RWF1,832.  
 
Looking at these headline figures is important – they may, for example, affect the 
perception of affordability for parents. However, to gain a better sense of the overall impact 
of parental contributions on school funding it is better to look at the aggregate amount of 
parental contributions received by schools. This is because this amount accounts for the fact 
that in many schools there is a range of payments, with some parents only being required to 
pay less, or none at all (something examined in more detail in section 5.5).  Chart 8, below, 
shows the mean and median value of overall payments per school per year, as reported by 
parents.   Again, the difference is large.  Indeed it is larger than in response to both the 
questions analysed above with the mean value in Kicukiro approximately 13 times that of 
Nyaruguru.  This is partly accounted for by differences in the average school size.  However, 
even when you take this into account the average per pupil levels of funding received from 
parental contributions are approximately 10 times larger in Kicukiro than in Nyaruguru26.  
The difference between this figure and that in chart 7, above, is likely to reflect a larger 
proportion of parents being exempt from making payments in the rural area27. 
 
  
Source: Parents survey [Q25] How much did parents contribute in total to the school budget in the last year?   
Note: For Kicukiro N=18 and for Nyaruguru N=26. The standard deviation for Kicukiro is RWF6,211,619 and for 
Nyaruguru it was RWF608,591.  
 
 
The survey also asked parents whether they thought that the level of the parental 
contribution had increased, decreased or stayed the same over both the previous five and 
ten years.  This is parents’ perceptions and relies on them recalling contribution levels, so 
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 Dividing the average overall value of the parental contributions to each school by the average school size in 
each district gives a per pupil funding figure of RWF4,467 in Kicukiro and RWF447 in Nyaruguru.   
 
27
 The interviews with NGOs corroborate the findings presented in this section.  In Kicukiro the level of 
parental contributions (given as ranging from RWF2-15,000 per term). In Nyaruguru some NGOs (3) stated that 
there are no financial parental contributions and where others were aware of contributions the values 
corresponded with those given by other respondents – ranging from RWF500 to RWF1,000 per term. 
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may be unreliable.  A large majority of parents were PTA chairs which may increase the 
likelihood that they had some knowledge of the recent trends, but even so, these results 
should be taken as merely indicative.  The chart below shows the response. There is a clear 
difference, with a large majority of parents in Kicukiro stating that there had been an 
increase.  In contrast fewer in Nyaruguru thought that this was the case.  It is interesting to 
note that Rwanda abolished formal fees in 2003, which was less than ten years ago. While 
the risk of error is high here, this implies that the current level of parental contributions in 
Kicukiro may be higher than it was before fees were abolished.     
 
 
Source: Parents survey [Q26 and 27] “Do you know how much all parental contributions from parents at your 
school added up to in the last year?  If so how much was it?  Do you think that this is more, less, or about the 
same amount as five years ago? Do you think that this is more, less, or about the same as ten years ago?”  
Notes: For Kicukiro n=28 for five years ago and n=26 for ten years ago.  For Nyaruguru n=30 for five years ago 
and n=26 for ten years ago. 
 
5.4. Different Forms of Contribution  
 
The chart below shows that there is a range of different forms that parental contributions 
can take. These include PTA payments, ‘insurance’ payments and also payments direct to 
district or sector.  There are also differences in the type of payments made between the two 
districts: in Kicukiro parents are more likely to make contributions through the PCT (over 
95% of schools). In contrast, in the Nyaruguru the payments that do exist are more likely to 
be made through the district – only just over 25% make a contribution through the PTA, but 
over 45% make a payment to the district, rather than the school – or in the form of an 
insurance payment28.   
 
Some of the parental contributions are not intended to improve school quality. While the 
PTA payments and payments to the district were for school improvement, this was not the 
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 This finding about the range of different forms of parental contribution, and the different patterns between 
these Rwandan Districts reflects the cross-country comparative analysis by Kattan and Burnett (2004) 
discussed in section 3.3.  
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case for insurance payments or for school food payments (which make up the majority of 
the ‘other’ payments in Nyaruguru in chart 10).  This implies that in Nyaruguru a large 
proportion of the payments reported were not actually intended to be directly for school 
improvement.  In contrast, in Kicukiro a larger proportion of the contributions reported 
were to be spent on core school services and school improvement.     
 
 
Source: Head teachers survey [Q12] “We are interested in how parents (or guardians, for example in the case 
of orphans) contribute financially to the school through financial contributions.  What are the different ways in 
which parents make financial contributions to the running costs of a school?  Can you indicate which of the 
below apply to your school?” Respondents were given a list of options.  
Notes: (i) The “other” category includes mainly school food in the rural area.  (ii) these results, from the head 
teachers’ survey, are consistent with those from the survey of parents [Q15] which found that almost three 
times as many Kicukiro schools asked for parental contributions and 50% more parents in Nyaruguru made a 
contribution direct to the District.  For Kicukiro n=30  and for Nyaruguru n=30. 
 
 
Chart 10 tallies the incidence of each form of payment, but does not capture the relative 
importance of the different forms of payments to the overall parental contribution. The 
average values of each type of payment differ greatly as shown in the table below. This 
shows that PTA contributions are paid in most Kicukiro schools and that the average value is 
significantly higher than that for other forms of payment. In contrast PTA contributions are 
only recorded in three Nyaruguru schools and the average value is much lower.   
 
Table 4: Average Value of Different Forms of Parental Contribution  
 Kicukiro (n=27)  Nyaruguru (n= 25) 
No. of 
schools 
Average 
value (RWF) 
No. of 
schools  
Average 
value (RWF) 
PTA payment  23  9,713 3 4,833 
Insurance  3 266.7 11 336 
District  0  3 500 
Direct to teachers  1 3,000 1 1,000 
No contribution  0  7  
Source: Parents survey [Q16]  
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Linked to this story of different types of parental contribution, the data suggests differences 
in the decision making process in setting the level of parental contributions.  Chart 11, 
below, shows that in Kicukiro decisions about the level of parental contribution are more 
likely to be made by the ‘general assembly’, which includes all parents, or the PTA.  In 
contrast in the rural area the decision is more likely to be made by the District or there is 
more likely to be no contribution recorded at all.   
 
 
Source: Parents survey [Q17] “If there is a standard amount which is contributed by parents and guardians: 
who decides how to set this amount?  Is it the Parents Teacher Association?  If not who does decide what level 
the parental contribution should be?”  
Notes: For Kicukiro n=30 and for Nyaruguru n=28 
 
 
It is clear that in the two areas the role that parents play in funding schools is very different.  
However, is there any reason to believe that this translates into parents playing a different 
role in the governance and decision making in schools?  Overall, all schools had PTAs and 
relatively active parent bodies (generally meeting either termly or weekly, with Kicukiro‘s 
schools being slightly more likely to meet weekly) and in almost all schools (26 in Kicukiro 
and 25 in Nyaruguru) parents have been involved in helping with construction or 
maintenance at the school.   
 
There was, however, some limited evidence that the parent body had more influence over 
decisions in the school in Kicukiro than in Nyaruguru, as a result of making larger financial 
contribution.  Table 5 below reflects answers to an open-ended question on parents’ role in 
school decision making in relation to the spending of the parental contributions.  In some 
schools (10) in Nyaruguru there is no influence since there is no recorded parental 
contribution.  Where there are contributions in Nyaruguru, the level of influence over their 
allocation seems to be less than is the case in Kicukiro with many more schools making 
decision through the parents’ assembly.  This is an area which may warrant further research.  
 
 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
Chart 11: Who Decides the Level of Parental 
Contribution?  
Kicukiru 
Nyaruguru 
Table 5: Parents’ influence over allocation of parental contributions   
 Kicukiro Nyaruguru  
Parents decide (e.g. through general 
assembly).  
11 2 
Parents and school decide jointly (including 
parental ‘sign off’ or PTA decision).  
8 8 
Parents audit spending or are consulted on 
how to spend  
7 
 
6 
School decides 
  
2 0 
No parental contribution 
 
0 10 
Source: Parents Survey [Q23] “What influence do parents have over their own contributions to the school 
budget?”  
 
 
5.5. Conceptualising the Parental Role in School Funding  
 
Figure 3, below, draws this discussion together by mapping the different forms that non-
public sources of funding, including parental contributions, can take in Rwandan primary 
school. When assessed along-side figure 2, on page 15, it provides a comprehensive 
mapping of primary school funding.  
 
Parents either contribute through the PTA, give direct to the school or make payments 
through the district.  NGOs (whose role is discussed in more detail in section 5.7 below) 
either fund schools direct, or provide funds to parents who then use them to make the 
parental contribution.  In Kicukiro the vast majority of contributions come in the form of 
PTA contributions.  In contrast, in Nyaruguru, the picture is much more varied and levels of 
contribution far lower. The box marked “total salary”, in contrast to that in figure 2, now 
captures all the different contributions that make up the total teachers’ salaries.  In contrast 
to the same box in Figure 2 it now includes the contribution from parents.  Likewise, the box 
labeled “Total School Funding” now includes parental contributions as well as the different 
sources of public funding.  
Figure 3: Implications of Parental Contributions for School Finances in Rwanda   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic education schools  
Including a mix of (a) primary schools (P1 – P6) 
(b) full 9YBE schools P1-S3 and (c) lower 
secondary schools (S1-S3).   
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5.6. Patterns of Differential Payments and Targeted Support 
 
The research also sought to understand whether poorer parents were given specific support 
in managing any parental contributions. The overall picture was complicated, with a range 
of different forms of targeted support in place, but little consistency. There were two ways 
in which the poorest parents are supported: the first is that schools will ask for lower 
contributions from certain groups and the second is that NGOs target their support at 
poorer pupils.  Each is taken in turn below.  
 
5.6.1. Differential payments  
 
Asking for differential rates of payment was reported in approximately a third of schools in 
each district.  Table 6 shows this, with the Nyaruguru data also showing the number of 
schools where there was no parental contribution.   
  
Table 6: Are Parental Contributions the Same?  
 Same for all 
parents  
Different rates  No contributions  Missing  
Kicukiro   11 12 0 7 
Nyaruguru 8 11 10  1 
Source: Parents survey [Q18] “Do all parents/guardians pay the same amount to the school, or do some 
parents – for example those who cannot afford as much - only contribute less?”  
 
Some schools gave details of the differential contributions they asked parents for.  Some 
examples are shown in the two tables below.  Where the proportion of pupils contributing 
the different levels was given, this is shown in brackets.  In general the generosity of 
targeting appears to be greater in Kicukiro than in Nyaruguru – with the lowest rate being, 
on average, a smaller proportion of the highest rate.  However, this needs to be set against 
the evidence that some schools do not seem to be offering differential rates and in 
Nyaruguru the highest rates are significantly lower.  
 
Table 7a: Examples of Differential Payments: Kicukiro (RWF per term) 
 School 1 School 2 School 3 School 4 School 5 School 6 
Lowest  1500 1000 (25%) 0 3000 5000 5000 
Highest  8000 2000 (75%) 26000 36000 18000 15000 
Average  2000  13000 20000 7000 5000 
Source: Parents survey [Q1] “If some parents or guardians contribute less than others, we are interested in 
some more detail.  Firstly, how much do different parents contribute?” Parents were given a table to fill out 
with lowest, highest and average contributions all asked for.  
 
Table 7b: Examples of Differential Payments: Nyaruguru (RWF per term) 
 School 1 School 2 School 3 School 4 School 5 School 6 School 7 
Lowest  0 200 150 500  500 150 
Highest  500 500 700 1000 2000 
(90%) 
1500 300 
Average  250  300 500  1000 200 
Source: Parents survey [Q1] As above for Table 7a. 
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5.6.2. Targeted NGO support29  
 
The second form of targeted support for the poorest parents comes through the action of 
local and national NGOs.  Not all NGOs reported targeting support; some stated that they 
supported all pupils.  However, there was good evidence that a significant number of NGOs   
focused their support on particular pupils. The table below lists the different forms of 
targeting which were mentioned by NGOs. It is noteworthy that the most common form of 
targeting was ‘through local government’.  This meant that NGOs were asking the sector or 
district officials which families they should target, based on the Ubudehe poverty categories 
(see MINELOC 2008 for further details).  In the words of two respondents:  
 
“We provide them with school materials, uniforms and money depending 
on how much the school charges … it’s the local authorities that select the 
beneficiaries, we collaborate with official in charge of social affairs at 
sector level.” (NGO, Kicukiro) 
 
“The amount of money depends on school cost … before parents used to 
come and beg and we  would sponsor the child, but nowadays we work 
with churches, (local authority) sectors because they are the ones who 
know which children have problems. The criteria are: HIV/AIDS infected 
child, an orphan, child with HIV/AIDS infected parents, street children. But 
it’s the churches and sector authorities that select children with those 
criteria.”  (NGO, Kicukiro) 
 
Table 8: Approaches to Targeting of NGO Support  
 Kicukiro  Nyaruguru  
Through local government*  7 3 
OVCs 2 1 
Street children  2 - 
Foster care  1 - 
Disabilities  1 - 
HIV-AIDS 2 1 
Support all  - 2 
Source: NGOs survey [Q15] “Can you describe how your organisation helps the poorest households with the 
costs of schooling?  Follow up questions include (i) which financial costs do you help parents with, for example, 
the cost of uniforms? Or the cost of making a contribution to the PTA? (ii) How much do you spend on 
supporting the poorest households with the costs of schooling? and (iii) how do they identity the parents who 
need support?” 
Notes: As will be discussed further below, some of this support from NGOs was for the payment of the PTA 
contribution, but it also included a range of forms of support including – most commonly – buying of uniforms.  
For Kicukiro n=21  and for Nyaruguru n=8.  * When respondents mentioned local government, they tended 
also to talk about the Ubudehe Community Poverty Categories which are used in Rwandan to identify the 
poorest groups in society.     
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 The full role of NGOs is discussed in more detail in section 5.7. 
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5.7. Implications for Pupils of Parents not Contributing  
 
The research also asked head teachers, parents and NGOs what the implications were for 
pupils when parents did not make financial contributions, including for attendance. The 
context here is that it is illegal in Rwanda for schools to refuse entry to any pupil. The 
different interviewees gave different answers.30   
 
5.7.1. Implications for access?  
 
Head teachers were the most likely to say that there were no implications for pupils of 
parents not making a contribution.  Table 9 shows that of the 30 head teachers in Kicukiro, 
24 said that there were no consequences for pupils.  In Nyaruguru head teachers’ responses 
were more evenly divided with seven saying that there was an impact and nine saying there 
was not.  Perhaps not surprisingly, in both areas some head teachers focused on the impacts 
on the school of non-payment, rather than the impact on the pupils (six in Kicukiro and 10 in 
Nyaruguru ).  They were concerned that when parents do not make the contribution this 
makes it harder to adequately pay teachers and ensure sufficient quality of provision.  In the 
words of one respondent:  
 
“[when] parents don’t pay money as agreed upon before, teachers fail to 
their bonus”  (Head teacher, Kicukiro) 
 
In contrast, parents are significantly more likely to report consequences for pupil 
attendance, in the event of non-payment. In Kicukiro the results shown in table 9 contrast 
sharply with those for head teachers.   The results from NGOs are more mixed.  In Kicukiro 
the proportion reporting that there are impacts on children’s attendance falls between that 
of head teachers and parents. In Nyaruguru no NGO reported implications for parents.   
 
Table 9: Implications of Parents not Making Contributions 
 Head teachers  Parents  NGOs 
Kicukiro  Nyaruguru Kicukiro Nyaruguru Kicukiro Nyaruguru 
No consequence  24 9 3 7 5 5 
Impact on attendance  0 7 27 13 6 0 
Other impact on 
child*** 
- 2 - 4* 13** 0 
No fees  1 7 0 10 - - 
Missing  5 7 0 0 - - 
Source: Head teachers survey [Q19]; Parents Survey [Q21]; NGO’s survey [Q21] All asked “What are the 
consequences of parents not making the financial contribution to the school?” 
Notes: * Some parents reported more than one type of consequence at the same school, which accounts for 
this column totaling over 30.  ** Again some NGOs listed a number of impacts on pupils, which are discussed in 
more detail below.  *** Other implications mentioned included (i) not being able to eat school meals [reported 
by parents in Nyaruguru (ii) no receiving the end of year report card (reported by NGOs in Kicukiro in 
particular) and (iii) non being entered for exams (reported by NGOs).  
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 This research focused on whether pupils were denied access to school because their parents had not made 
contributions.  It did not assess the related issue of whether the existence of parental contributions acted as a 
deterrent to parents sending their children to school in the first place.   
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Some of the qualitative findings from Kicukiro are interesting and recognize that there are 
official efforts to enforce the legal requirements on schools not to refuse entry to schools.  
Positively there is an awareness that excluding pupils is controversial:  
 
“In meetings I hear efforts to warn headmasters that they should not 
refuse entry31 to any student just because of not paying teachers' bonus.”  
(NGO, Kicukiro) 
 
“Officially, no child is refused entry to school, but the school puts pressure 
on parent by all means, and the child brings the parent. I can’t know the 
exact number because those we sponsor, don’t have those problems.” 
(NGO, Kicukiro) 
 
 
5.7.2. Permanent or Temporary Exclusion?  
 
The interviews did not probe the impact on attendance in more detail.  There is a difference 
between the impact being temporary and one which leads to permanent dropping out of 
pupils. While a temporary exclusion can still be damaging to a child’s education, it is, of 
course, less problematic than long-term exclusions.  Head teachers described a situation 
where parents were given the opportunity to pay.  In the words of one:  
 
“When a student fails to pay, they send her/him home and immediately 
bring the parent to explain why he did not pay to head master.”  (Head 
teacher, Nyaruguru)  
 
However, this research did not gain any more detailed understanding of how many 
instances of non-payment led to pupils being withdrawn from school for long-periods, or 
not returning to school at all.  
  
 
5.8. NGO activity  
 
This section addresses two questions about the role of NGOs.  The first concerns the 
distribution of NGO activity between the two districts?  Is it evenly distributed, or is it 
focused more in either Kicukiro or Nyaruguru? The second issue concerns the nature of NGO 
activities and exactly how they are supporting pupils.  
 
5.8.1. Distribution of NGO Activity 
 
There were more NGOs active in Kicukiro than in Nyaruguru and these NGOs provided 
significantly greater level of financial support.    
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 The original translation for “refused attendance” was “chased out”.  “Refused attendance” has been used 
because it is a more neutral term and does not imply some form of aggressive act by the head teacher, 
although it is possible that ‘chased out’ does reflect what happens in some instances, with pupils who turn up 
to school not having made contributions being refused entry and aggressively removed from the school 
premesis. 
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Head teachers mentioned 49 NGOs which provided some form of support for schools in 
Kicukiro, which was more than double the 21 mentioned in Nyaruguru [Q20].  The survey 
also asked how many pupils were directly supported by NGOs: in Kicukiro the total was 
5,111, which was 16% of all pupils, and in Nyaruguru the total was 3,606, which was 14% of 
all pupils.   The table below sets out the overall level of funding that head teachers’ reported 
receiving from NGOs in 2011.  The differences are large with the total level of funding from 
NGOs reported by head teachers in Kicukiro being approximately 10 times that in 
Nyaruguru. The scale of the difference between the average levels of contribution is 
somewhat less, due to the differential response rate, although it is possible that in some 
cases non-response implied little of no additional funding was received from NGOs.   
 
Table 10: Levels of Funding given to Schools by NGOs (RWF) * 
 Kikukiro ** Nyaruguru  
Total  48,355,040 4,936,100 
Mean  2,197,956 308,506 
Median  1,083,000 181,500 
No response (of 30 schools) *** 6 13 
Source: Head teachers survey [Q20].  
Notes: * Because this table includes the level of funding received by head teachers, it is likely that it does not 
include the funding that NGOs provide direct to parents.  In some schools all parents were asked to contribute 
the same amount, but NGOs then targeted their support via the parent.  This is reflected in this quote from a 
Kicukiro NGO: “The amount paid by parents in all categories is the same. The PTA fixes the amount to be paid 
by all parents regardless of their economic status. But regarding our organization, we apply the local 
authority’s categories to select vulnerable children.”  ** In the case of Kicukiro a series of outliers are excluded 
from the analysis. It is likely that they were for one-off capital projects.  *** Non-response could be taken to 
mean that there was zero NGO contribution. Indeed, in a subsequent question to head teachers [Q43] 17 
schools in Nyaruguru stated that they did not receive any financial support from NGOs.  
 
The difference in the level of NGO activity was corroborated by responses by answers to the 
parents survey [Q22]. This found that in 27 of 30 schools in Kicukiro parents were reported 
to receive support from NGOs, whereas in Nyaruguru the number was 19. The average 
number of parents per school reported as being supported was 133 in Kicukiro compared 
with 108 on Nyaruguru. 
 
5.8.2. Nature of NGO Activity  
 
In section 5.5 above, the nature of targeting – and the links in some, but not all, cases to the 
Ubudehe system of community poverty categories – was discussed.  From the qualitative 
data we can also gain a better understanding of the nature of the NGO support 
[NGOQ10/11]. Below are some findings from Kicukiro   
 
 As well as direct financial support for schools, NGOs provide a range of other 
support.  Some of this was financial, but in a way which did not directly benefit the 
school – for example, funding medical insurance fees.  But mostly it came in the form 
of in-kind support, including providing learning materials and uniforms.  
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 Where there are significant financial contributions from NGOs these tend to be for 
‘teacher bonus’, or an addition to teachers’ salaries (11 NGOs in Kicukiro). 
 
 Where there were payments to schools they tended to be through PTAs.  For 
example, one respondent stated ““We provide money through parents PTA and it’s 
the one that decides how it’s spent together with the school. The amount depends on 
the children we sponsor …  and we pay equal amounts to all children from p.1 to p.6.” 
(NGO, Kicukiro)  
 
 There was some limited evidence of changes in behavior of NGOs as a result of the 
introduction of 9YBE – in one case in Kicukiro an NGO mentioned stopping paying for 
teachers’ bonuses and in another case an NGO mentioned that parents increasingly 
resists paying financial contributions because they believe education should be free. 
  
In Nyaruguru the responses from NGOs were less comprehensive.   Of those which mention 
financial support for schools, the teachers’ bonus payment is mentioned (by two NGOs).  
But NGOs are more likely to be providing non-financial forms of support, including support 
from providing school meals, providing learning materials, uniforms and support for school 
transport.  There was also one mention of paying more to school for P6 pupils:  
 
“There is money paid through parents’ general assembly. We pay equal 
amounts in all classes except extra RWF500 paid for pupils in P5 and P6. 
It’s for teachers’ bonus.”  (NGO, Nyaruguru) 
 
 
5.9. Impact of Parental Contributions on School Budgets  
 
Section 5.3 highlighted the large differences in the levels of parental contributions to 
schools in the two districts.  The section on NGOs suggested that any additional support to 
schools direct from NGOs would introduce a further skew towards Kicukiro over Nyaruguru. 
In this section we look at what impact this additional private funding, over and above the 
formal public funding, has on school budgets.  Is it marginal, even in Kicukiro? Or does it 
have a significant impact?    
 
Head teachers provided revenue data for the last three years, broken down into different 
sources including government CG, parental contributions, NGO donations and local 
government spending.  They also provided information on what these different sources of 
funding were allocated towards within the school budget.  Below the key findings from the 
analysis are shown, starting with the headline findings from the 2010 revenue data.   
 
Table 11 gives a sense of the relative scale of private contributions, mainly parental 
contributions, but also those from NGOs.  It does this by comparing them with the overall 
value of the CG and also with overall levels of funding received by the school for the budgets 
over which head teachers have some control32.  It shows that in Kicukiro parental 
contributions are large when compared with the value of the CG.  On average, across the 29 
                                                          
32
 In other words, this does not include direct funding of teachers’ salaries. 
47 
 
schools for which data was available, the total value of parental contributions represented 
150% of the CG (row 1). In other words, on average, parental contributions comfortably 
more than doubled schools’ budgets. In Nyaruguru, in contrast, the parental contributions 
represented only 4% of the CG. When NGO funding is added to parental contributions and 
also compared with the CG the percentage is slightly higher. The final two rows then look at 
parental contributions and then NGO funding and parental contributions as a percentage of 
total school funding (again excluding teachers salary payments made direct to teachers’ 
bank accounts).  This also shows a large difference between the two districts.  
 
Table 11: Private Funding in Relation to Public and Overall School Funding (2010) 
 Kicukiro  Nyaruguru 
Parental contribution as % of CG funding  150 (mean) 
111 (median) 
4  
0  
Non-government spending (parents and NGOs) 
as a % of CG funding  
162  
129  
10 
0 
Parental contributions as % of overall school 
funding * 
48 
52 
3 
0 
Non-government (parents and NGOs) funding 
as % of overall funding *  
53  
56 
8  
0  
Source: Head teachers survey [Q42] derived from financial data received from head teachers.  
Notes: (i) Funding which was clearly entirely for one-off capital spending has been excluded.  Two schools in 
Kicukiro have been excluded from the analysis because of lack of information.  In one school the per-pupil 
numbers have been derived from the CG funding. All schools are included for Nyaruguru.  (ii) The 
questionnaire asked for the full value of the CG, including the amount allocated for the teachers’ bonus, which 
means that this should be included in the overall budget.  This means that, if anything, the overall size of the 
budget over which head teachers’ have control is overstated in these figures and the relative importance of 
parental contributions could be higher.  * Excluding teachers’ salaries paid direct to teachers.  
 
The charts below show the data in the last two rows of table 11 graphically. The first chart 
displays an ‘average school budget’ in Kicukiro.  It reiterates the large impact that the 
parental contributions have on this budget.  The second chart demonstrates how, in 
contrast, the impact on the budget in Nyaruguru is marginal.  
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Source: Head teachers survey [Q42] Derived from financial data provided by head teachers.  
 
 
 
Source: Head teachers survey [Q42] Derived from financial data provided by head teachers. 
 
 
Table 12 presents similar information.  However, instead of using percentages of the CG or 
of the overall school budget it presents the average cash value of different sources of 
revenue in per pupil terms.  This confirms that there are large differences between the two 
districts and these differences have a large impact on the average total per pupil funding. In 
Nyaruguru the average (mean) total per pupil funding, when you include the CG and non-
public/private contributions, is RWF4,325.  This contrasts with RWF12,226 in Kicukiro.  
 
Table 12: Per Pupil Spending from Different Sources (RWF per annum) 
 Kicukiro Nyaruguru  
Parental contributions per child p.a. 7,161 (mean) 
4,396 (median) 
187 
0 
Non-government (parents and NGOs) 
funding per child p.a.  
7,746  
4,421 
415  
0  
Total funding per child p.a. (CG and 
parental contribution and NGOs) 
12,226  
8,506  
4,325 
4,029  
Source: Head teachers survey [Q42] 
Notes: (i) Funding which was clearly entirely for one-off capital spending has been excluded.  Two schools in 
Kicukiro have been excluded from the analysis because of lack of information.  (ii) In one school the per-pupil 
numbers have been derived from the CG funding.  (iii) In these figures the spending on teachers’ salaries has 
been excluded from the analysis. The justification for this is that the analysis focuses on the discretionary 
budget that head teachers and schools have some control over.   
 
 
The chart below shows the trends in average annual per-pupil funding received by head 
teachers from all sources and the trend in parental contributions between 2008 and 2010.  
It suggests that the gap between Nyaruguru and Kicukiro has widened over the last three 
years (comparing the top line and the third line down).  It also suggests that this is 
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92% 
Chart 13: Significance of Parental Contributions 
for Head Teachers’ Budgets: Nyaruguru 
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accounted for almost entirely by an increase in the level of parental contributions in 
Kicukiro, as shown in the second line down.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Head teachers survey [Q42]  
 
 
Thus far the analysis has focused on head teachers’ budgets and not on the overall spending 
on the school, which also includes teachers’ salaries. The rationale for this is that it is this 
budget over which schools have some discretion.  However, in order to assess the overall 
significance of parental contributions to total school funding, below a similar analysis is 
presented including spending on teachers’ salaries.  This reduces the proportion of the 
budget contributed by parents in Kicukiro from almost 50% to 34%: however, this remains a 
significant proportion of the overall school budget.  In the case of Nyaruguru the impact of 
parental contributions on schools funding is even more marginal, representing only 1% of 
schools funding. 
 
 
Parental 
contribution 
34% 
Other non-govt 
(NGO) 
3% 
Capitation grant 
21% 
Teachers' 
Salaries 
42% 
Chart 15: Significance of Parental Contirbutions 
for Total School Budgets: Kicukiru 
RWF 0 
RWF 2,000 
RWF 4,000 
RWF 6,000 
RWF 8,000 
RWF 10,000 
RWF 12,000 
RWF 14,000 
2008 2009 2010 
Chart 14: Trends in Per-Pupil Funding (total and parental 
contributions) 
Kicukiru Total  
Kicikiru Parental Cont. 
Nyaruguru Total  
Nyaruguru Parental 
Cont. 
50 
 
Source: Head teachers survey [Q42] Derived from financial data provided by head teachers. 
Note: Teachers’ salaries have been calculated by multiplying the number of teachers RWF32,500 p.m.  
 
 
Source: Head teachers survey [Q42] Derived from financial data provided by head teachers.  
 
 
5.10. Parental Contributions and Teachers’ Salaries  
 
The table below sets out how head teachers said they were allocating the different sources 
of revenue that they received.  It shows that in Kicukiro the CG tended to be allocated to 
‘school activities’, training and infrastructure/maintenance.  In contrast the parental 
contribution was more likely to be allocated to paying a ‘teachers’ bonus’.  This was the case 
in 27 schools, compared with just four in Nyaruguru.  
 
 
Table 13: Allocation of Different Sources of Revenue in Kicukiro (29 schools) 
 “School 
Activities”  
Teachers’ 
bonus 
Training Learning 
materials  
Maintena
nce  
Other* 
CG 
 
27 6 21 3 30 2 
Parental 
contribution  
2 27   3 5 
Churches, NGOs 
etc 
1 6   3 2 
Other  
 
 1  1   
Source: Head teachers survey [Q42] 
Note:  * ’Other’ included: school uniform, insurance, examination papers and paying admin staff. 
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Table 14: Allocation of Different Sources of Revenue in Nyaruguru (30 of schools) 
 ‘School 
Activities’ 
Teachers’ 
bonus 
Training Learning 
materials  
Maintena
nce  
Other* 
CG 
 
16 1 16 15 23 7 
Parental 
contribution  
1 4   1 7 
Churches, NGOs 
etc 
    2 2 
Other  
 
    2  
Source: Head teachers survey [Q42] 
Note: * ‘Others’ for parents included: Clothes for the poor, transport [x2], food/catering [x3], agriculture, 
sports, insurance.  For NGOs it included agriculture.   
 
This tendency to allocate the parental contribution in Kicukiro towards teachers is reflected 
in the average salary reported by classroom teachers and head teachers themselves.  
Classroom teachers reported that their average salaries were just under RWF70,000 per 
month (RWF69,135) in Kicukiro and just over RWF30,000 per month (RWF31,742) in 
Nyaruguru. This is broadly reflected in the figures reported by head teachers, which are 
shown in the chart below.  Head teachers were asked to give information on the lowest and 
also the average salary of classroom teachers in their school.  The chart shows the average 
(mean) ‘average salary’ and ‘lowest salary’ for all the schools in each district.  It shows that 
according to head teachers the average salary paid was just under RFW70,000 per month in 
Kicukiro and almost exactly RFW40,000 per month in Nyaruguru.   
 
 
Source:  Head teachers survey [Q40] “What do you estimate to be the average total salary for classroom 
teachers at your school?” [Q41] “What is the minimum salary for a classroom teacher at your school?”  
Note: For Kicukiro n=30  and for Nyaruguru n=29. 
 
 
5.11. Implications for Educational Quality? 
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The research also made a number of assessments of aspects of the quality of education 
provided in each districts.  Are the differences in overall funding, created by the differential 
levels of parental contributions, leading to variation in the districts performance on some 
key measures?  While we cannot attribute cause and effect here because there are many 
other factors which may impact on each district’s ability to provide good schooling, it is 
likely that funding is an important factor.  Because we find that a large proportion of 
parental contributions in Kicukiro are allocated to ‘teachers’ bonuses’ this section starts 
with measures of teacher quality, before discussing other aspects of quality.  
 
 
5.11.1. Implications for Teacher Quality?  
 
There are non-financial incentives for teachers to work in urban areas, such as Kicukiro.  The 
quality of life may be higher, facilities better and so on (Bennell and Ntagaramba 2008).  
However, it is also possible that different salary levels provide an additional incentive for 
teachers to move to urban areas.  This should make it easier for schools in these districts to 
recruit from a larger pool of applicants.  This research confirms that there are skews in some 
measure of teacher quality towards the urban area, but it cannot say how much this is due 
to differential salary levels.    
 
The table below shows that – based on this survey’s relatively small sample of teachers – 
Nyaruguru does indeed score more poorly on some potential proxies for teacher quality: 
teachers are less likely to be qualified, more likely to have a second income and likely to be 
younger with less experience.   
 
Table 15: Teaching Workforce Comparison  
 Kikukiru  Nyaruguru 
Proportion of qualified teachers * 95.9% 66.3% 
Average (mean) age  40  33.2 
Average (mean) years in teaching  15.5 9.1 
Percentage with additional incomes  11% 44% 
Sources: Head teachers survey [Q38]; classroom teachers survey [Q5, Q7 and Q14] 
Notes: * In Kicukiro 25 of the 30 schools had 100% of teachers qualified.  There was also one outrider where 
only 63% of teachers where qualified.  If this school was excluded from the analysis then the proportion of 
teachers who were qualified was over 98%.  In Nyaruguru area six schools had all qualified teachers and there 
were four schools where fewer than half the teachers were qualified.  For Kicukiro and for Nyaruguru n=30 for 
the question on qualified teachers. For age and years in schooling for Kicukiro n=28 and for Nyaruguru n=27. 
For the question on additional incomes n=29 for Kicukiro and 30 for Nyaruguru.  
 
This is also reflected when looking at the higher levels of education achieved by teachers in 
the two districts. The chart below shows a slight skew towards higher levels of training 
amongst the sample in Kicukiro, compared with Nyaruguru.  There were a small number of 
teachers who had only received basic education in Nyaruguru area (compared with none in 
Kicukiro) and six in Kicukiro who had been to university, compared with two teachers in 
Nyaruguru.  All these results should only be regarded as indicative as they are based on just 
30 teachers in each district – but they are consistent with more robust existing work 
(Bennell and Ntagaramba 2008).  
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Source: Classroom teachers survey [Q6] “What is your highest level of education?”  
Note: For Kicukiro n=28  and for Nyaruguru n=27.  
 
The research also assessed the levels of fluency in English amongst each head teacher and 
amongst classroom teachers (either based on the interview or on observation in the school).  
This is necessarily subjective in terms of the judgment about levels of English made by 
research assistants, but never-the-less the results are striking.  There are modest levels of 
English in both Districts, but evidence of poor levels of English are higher in Nyaruguru than 
in Kicukiro, particularly amongst classroom teachers.  This is shown in chart 19.   
 
 
Source: School profile.  
Note: For head teachers for Kicukiro n=25 and for Nyaruguru n=25. For classroom teachers for Kicukiro n=30  
and for Nyaruguru n=25.  
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5.11.2. Implications for School Learning Environment? 
 
The picture on the school learning environment is mixed.  On some measures investment in 
school buildings seems to have benefited both districts. But on other measures the 
differences are significant.   Table 16 below shows the results of the ‘school profile’ in 
relation to whether there were sufficient learning materials, whether schools had electricity 
and whether there were sufficient desks.  Nyaruguru schools do worse on all measures, but 
only really significantly worse on whether or not they have electricity.   
 
Table 16: Assessment of Learning Materials, Electricity and Desks  
 Kicukiro Nyaruguru 
 Learning 
Materials  
Electricity  Desks  Learning 
Materials  
Electricity  Desks  
Sufficient / Yes 15 25 27 11 8 18 
Insufficient / No  11 5 3 15 17 8 
Missing  4 0 0 4 5 4 
Source: School profile.  
 
Charts 20, 21 and 22 set out the findings for a series of further school observations.  Here, 
while there is a slight skew towards Kicukiro, the overall picture is more one of similarity.   
 
  
Source: School profile  
Note: For school safety for Kicukiro n=28 and for Nyaruguru n=26. For school toilets for Kicukiro n=27 and for 
Nyaruguru n=26.  On quality of school buildings for Kicukiro n=28 and for Nyaruguru n=26. 
 
 
5.11.3. Class Sizes, Gender Equity and Overage Pupils 
 
On class sizes there appears to be little difference between the two districts.  This is shown 
in chart 23 below.  
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Source: Head teachers survey [Q31]  
 
 
On gender equity there is an interesting difference.  The gender parity index is higher in 
Nyaruguru than it is in Kicukiro.  There are more girls in school in Nyaruguru than there are 
boys with an overall gender parity index of 1.04.  This compares with one of 0.94 in Kicukiro 
[HQ30].  This is shown for all the year groups in chart 24 below.  
 
In Kigali there are lower levels of gender equity for P1 – P5, but there are a greater number 
of boys in P6.  There are a number of possible reasons for this difference, but are there 
potential links to levels of parental contributions?  One hypothesis is that where parents are 
asked to contribute more to primary schooling they are required to make decisions about 
which child’s education to prioritise, and this means focusing more on boys than girls.  In 
contrast where the direct costs of schooling are not as high, as is the case in Nyaruguru, 
parents are not required to make such a decision.  
 
 
Source: Head teachers Survey  
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On overage pupils, the chart below shows the proportion of each year group who, in 2010, 
were reported as ‘not progressing to the next grade’.  It shows that there are slightly higher 
rates of non-progression in Nyaruguru compared with Kicukiro.  This is reflected in the 
figure for the average proportion of pupils per school in each district which were reported 
as being overage: in Kicukiro this figure was 41.6% compared with 53% in Nyaruguru.   
 
 
Source: Head teachers survey  
 
 
 
5.12. Attitudes Towards Parental Contributions  
 
Interviews also asked respondents about their attitudes towards parental financial 
contributions.  Consistent with Transparency International’s findings (Transparency 
International 2012), attitudes towards parents making financial contributions to schools are 
generally positive.   
 
Chart 26 below shows the responses from parents when asked if they agree or disagree with 
four statements.  Even in Nyaruguru where approximately 10 schools do not ask parents to 
make a financial contribution, there is little dissent from the view that making a contribution 
is a good thing, that vulnerable parents receive support or that parental contributions will 
increase parental influence in the school.  The one area where there are some expressed 
concerns is over the affordability of parental contributions, particularly in Nyaruguru.  
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Source: Parents survey [Q24]  
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6. Implications and Recommendations  
 
In this final section the implications of these findings and some potential policy implications 
are discussed. After a brief discussion of the implications for adequacy of primary school 
funding in Rwanda, the section focuses in particular on the implications of the results for 
equity.  The section then discusses some potential policy options which would help ensure 
that the Rwandan education system helped contributed to achieving greater equality of 
opportunity.  
 
We should recall the key research questions were:  
 
 Are private contributions necessary to achieve adequate school funding in Rwanda?  
 
 When accounting for public and private contributions to the funding of schools what 
are the implications for equity of funding between schools in different areas, in 
particular for schools in remote and poorer rural areas compared with better off 
urban areas? 
 
 Assuming there is evidence of significant parental contributions, what are the policy 
implications?   
 
  
6.1. Adequacy of Funding  
 
In the literature review, above, the debate about defining “adequate” levels of funding was 
discussed.  It is hard to set a specific figure for what is an adequate level of funding and it is 
likely to differ from context to context (Baker and Green 2008).  However, the fact that 
spending per primary school pupil as a percentage of GDP is relatively low in Rwanda (chart 
4), seems to be reflected in some of the findings of this research: there was some evidence 
of poor basic infrastructure, in particular levels of electricity, but also toilet facilities (see 
chart 22).  There is good evidence that such basic infrastructure matters for learning 
outcomes (Glewwe et al. 1995 and Glewwe et al. 2011).   There were also concerns about 
teacher quality with levels of English amongst classroom teachers a particular issue.   
 
School administrators and head teachers in both districts appear to have responded to this 
relatively low level of resources by looking to draw on private contributions as much as 
possible. Indeed there appears to be relatively high support for the view that parental 
contributions are desirable (see chart 26). However, perhaps the key finding of this research 
is that the levels of additional revenue it was possible to raise differed widely between the 
two districts.   
 
This suggests that levels of public funding for primary schools remain low and may not be 
adequate to provide a decent level of education, a challenge shared by many other 
developing world countries (UNESCO 2010).  Given the pressures on the future education 
budget created by the introduction of 9YBE and now 12YBE, it will be challenging for 
Rwanda to provide sufficient increases in per pupil funding for primary school pupils to 
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ensure a decent quality of education.  This is one argument for allowing the continuation of 
parental contributions: the combination of private contributions makes it more likely that at 
the aggregate level sufficient funding is provided for the education system.  However, is this 
compatible with a primary education system which provides an equal educational 
opportunity for all pupils’ regardless of where they live or the income of their parents?   
 
 
6.2. Education for All? Access and Enrollment  
 
One potential impact of the existence of parental contributions on equity concerns the 
effect on enrollment and retention.  Put simply, does the existence of parental contributions 
reduce enrollment rates and make drop-outs more likely, or not?  As we saw in the 
literature review, some authors (Birdsall 1987, Thobani 1984) have argued that in theory it 
is possible to either set parental contributions at a rate which would not reduce access or 
structure parental contributions in a such a way, with cross subsidization for the poorest, 
that would not have an impact on quality.   
 
The potential impact of parental contributions on enrollment and retention rates is 
important for Rwanda.  This is because one key policy challenge in the coming years will be 
to achieve 100% initial enrollment in Primary school and completion of a full course of 
Primary education.  If parental contributions in primary school are acting as a deterrent for 
some pupils or are contributing to parents deciding to withdraw their children from school 
then this would be cause for concern.   
 
This research asked parents, head teachers and NGOs about their experiences of pupils 
being turned away from school because their parents did not make the financial 
contribution.  As table 9 reported, the parental interviewees were likely to report that there 
were such implications, which implies that parental contributions do reduce access, at least 
to some degree.  In contrast head teachers and NGOs were less likely to say pupils were 
turned away/excluded based on non-payment of a parental contribution.  On balance it 
seems likely that there are some pupils who are refused entry to the school because their 
parents cannot or decide not to make a contribution, but it is difficult to say how 
widespread these are.   
 
Because there is at a minimum some evidence of pupils being excluded and because this is 
illegal under Rwanda law, there is a strong case for the Rwandan government further 
promoting to parents and schools that free basic education is a legal right for all pupils. 
While schools could still ask for voluntary contributions which is both legal and not 
discouraged as a matter of policy at the moment, non-payment resulting in exclusion is 
illegal and unacceptable. Parents should be given access to some form of clear complaint 
mechanism, potentially at the district level, through which they could highlight illegal and 
poor practice. Complementing this, fines could be put in place where schools are breaking 
the law.  
 
However, to gain a fuller understanding of the impact on attendance of de facto fees, there 
is a case for further research.  This research did not seek to understand in detail how much 
of a factor parental contributions were in parents decisions on whether to send their 
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children to school.  Chart 26 showed that in Nyaruguru there were some concerns about the 
affordability of the, relatively modest, contributions, which may suggest an impact on 
decisions to send children to school in the first place, but this should be set against the 
evidence of some existing targeted support for poorer pupils, which would offset the cost of 
parental contributions (see tables 5, 6, 7 and 8). Related to this, it has not sought to 
understand either what level of parental contribution might affect attendance – the price 
elasticity of demand for primary schooling – or the relative significance of parental 
contributions to access vis-à-vis other possible factors.  These could include ‘supply-side’ 
factors such as the availability and accessibility of schools, including distance to school; poor 
facilities including poor toilets and security; the relevance of the curriculum and perceptions 
of the quality of education.  Alternatively there may be other ‘demand side’ factors, such as 
the opportunity cost of sending children who could be working to school and cultural 
factors.  In order to access this further one option would be to use the EICV to access what 
proportion of household budgets families in different Rwandan Districts are spending on 
primary schooling33.      
 
 
6.3. Education for All? Equity and Quality 
 
The second potential implication of the existence of parental contributions more directly 
concerns their unequal distribution and the implications this has for access to a given level 
of educational opportunity.  In principle one of the core objectives of a school system should 
be to promote greater equality of opportunity.  Given that many pupils will be 
disadvantaged because of their family background (Filmer 2008) one purpose of a public 
funding system should be to correct as far as possible for this pre-existing inequality of 
opportunity.   
 
This research shows that this is not currently happening in Rwandan primary schools.  As 
charts 10 and 11 show, parental contributions are far higher in Kicukiro than in Nyaruguru 
and as charts 12-16 and tables 11 and 12 show, this has a large impact on the budget for 
head teachers, whether assessing the overall budget (including teachers’ salaries) or 
focusing on the budget over which Head teachers’ have some degree of control.  These 
higher budgets in the wealthier district are being used to pay teachers more and more 
competent teachers being concentrated in the wealthier areas.34   
 
So, in summary, when taking into account private and public funding this research 
demonstrates that schools in wealthier areas are better funded than those in areas where 
pupils have greater need.   
 
                                                          
33
 An updating of the World Bank, 2011 work, based on the 2010/11 EICV, for which the data will become 
available later this year would be one option.   
34
 An issue which would warrant further research would be gaining a fuller understanding of the pattern of 
inequality across the country as a whole.  This research purposively sampled two districts to gain an 
understanding of how different experiences were in widely contrasting contexts.  It would also be useful to 
know what level of parental contribution was required, and its impact on schools, across a wider sample of 
Rwandan districts.  This would help gain a fuller understanding of both the extent to which either Nyaruguru or 
Kicukiro were exceptional and also of the overall pattern of unequal funding schools across the country.   
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6.4.  ‘Crack down’ on Parental Contributions?  
 
One possible policy response to the continued existence of voluntary parental contributions 
is for government to seek to go further than simply policing any illegal turning away of 
pupils and seek to ensure that even voluntary contributions are not levied by schools35. This 
could take the form of promoting to parents their right to free education and clarifying that 
this included their right not to make any PTA contribution to schools.  Disincentives, for 
example in the form of fines, could be levied on schools of districts which continued to ask 
even for voluntary contributions.  However, in the light of the discussion above about the 
adequacy of funding for primary education in Rwanda and given the concerns about 
educational quality outlined in section 1.3.1, this approach has considerable downsides. 
While any illegal turning away of pupils must be rigorously policed, seeking to clamp down 
on voluntary contributions seems less plausible or sensible. More promising may be 
accepting that parental contributions occur, but instead seeking to better mitigate the 
potential implications for equity.  The next two sections discuss two broad categories of 
options for doing this. 
 
6.5. Demand Side Policy Implications 
 
The first set of policy options would be focused on the ‘demand side’; in other words they 
would focus on providing support for particular parents, rather than on changing public 
funding systems.  
Most immediately, there is a case for seeking to ensure that existing strategies to support 
the poorest households and children, which seem to be relatively extensive and well 
developed, are as effective as possible.  This research found both that NGOs were providing 
additional support (see table 8) and at least some schools asked for differential rates of 
parental contributions (see tables 5, 6 and 7).   
There is scope for improvement. In the case of the former, however, this research also 
found that NGO activity and levels of support were far higher in Kicukiro than in Nyaruguru 
(see table 11).  There is a good case for seeking to direct NGO support more effectively at 
the areas with the greatest need.  In Rwanda this could be a core objective for the RENCP, 
the Rwandan Education NGO Coordination Platform36.  In the case of the latter – lower 
contributions from poorer families – the research found evidence that some schools were 
asking for lower contributions from poorer parents (see tables 5, 6 and 7).  Yet practice 
appeared to differ considerably.  Assessing in further detail some examples of good practice 
and looking to disseminate these more widely would be one option.   
                                                          
35
 This is distinct from the policy option discussed in 6.2 because it would seek to regulate voluntary 
contributions themselves, rather than schools refusing entry to pupils of parents who do not make the 
contribution.  
36
 The platform already focuses on the co-ordination of the types of NGO activity, but less so on the 
distribution of that activity.  
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There may also be some longer-term demand side policy options.  In some countries, 
particularly in Latin America, Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) have been used to provide 
financial support through the social protection system on the condition that parents send 
their children to school (Schultz 2004, Fiszbein and Schady 2011).  The case for such a policy 
is that it increases household incomes amongst the group who are most likely to be 
deterred from sending their children to school because of any de facto fees. There is some 
evidence that these policies have effectively increased enrolment, but more mixed evidence 
that this has resulted in improvements in learning outcomes (Fiszbein and Schady 2011).  In 
other countries cash transfers, without any attached conditions have been favoured – and 
some have argued that even without conditions around school attendance building up a 
social protection system will help increase school attendance (Baird et al, 2010).  These is 
also a concern that, if targeted, CCTs can be individualistic instruments, which may 
undermine more collectivist in-kind community contributions. 
In Rwanda there may be a case for introducing ‘child payment’ as part of the Rwanda social 
protection system (something Rwanda’s social protection system – the VUP programme – 
does not currently include), but this could only be a long-term objective.  Furthermore while 
it may be desirable for other purposes (not least, targeting poverty reduction strategies at 
households with children) it is not clear that such a major reform would be warranted given 
that the direct evidence that parental contributions are acting as a barrier to access and 
retention for a large group of pupils is lacking.   
One alternative would be highly targeted CCT or CT programmes.  In many CCT programmes 
in Latin America all families below a certain income threshold are targeted and the policy is 
rolled out nationally.  In contrast more targeted CCTs have been used in some countries.  
For example, in Kenya a small programme targeted Orphans and Vulnerable Children, 
making payments conditional on 80% school attendance rates and in Cambodia a policy 
targeted girls making the transition from primary to secondary school (Fiszbein and Schady 
2011).  If there were clear evidence that one particular group was more vulnerable to 
dropping out of school then a similar targeted policy could be considered in Rwanda.   
 
6.6. Policy Implications for Public Funding  
 
As we have seen, the Rwandan school funding system is essentially ‘flat’: that is it achieves 
horizontal equity, but not vertical equity. When accounting for unequal parental 
contributions, the school funding system as a whole, rather than ameliorating it, actually 
exacerbates inequality of opportunity.  For this reason there is a strong case for greater 
targeting of public funding.  As a reminded, the four policy questions which were identified 
in section 3.4.2 were:  
 At what level to target?   
 On what basis to target? 
 How to allocated/spend additional funding?  
 How much to target?  
One option would be to target additional funding at poorer areas – as measured by level of 
poverty – to pay higher teacher salaries.  So on the first three of the questions above this 
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would be targeted at the area level, would be based on measures of poverty37 and it would 
be allocated to teachers’ salaries.  A potential justification for this initial targeting is that this 
research has found clear evidence that the teacher labour market is skewed with higher pay 
for those working in the wealthier area.  There is also evidence that teacher quality is 
important in influencing learning outcomes (McKinsey 2011, Rockoff et al 2009). However, 
there are also arguments against this approach. It may be the case that salary increases will 
increase the motivation of existing teachers in poorer areas, but the key question is whether 
salary increase would affect labour market incentives and effectively attract better, more 
experienced teachers to poorer rural areas? To answer this questions policy makers would 
need to have evidence on two issues. First they would need to understand the relative 
importance of salary levels vis-à-vis other factors, such as access to housing, packages of 
training, opportunities for career advancement and so on.  And secondly, they would need 
to understand what level of salary increase would be needed to shape teachers’ behavior 
when they are deciding where to work. It is, at best, uncertain that a simple increase in 
salaries would lead to better teachers moving to poorer areas. What evidence there is 
suggests that the salary increases need to large to affect the teacher labour market in this 
way (Kelleher, 2008; Mulkeen 2009; Mulkeen and Chen 2010).  
 
An alternative option would be to target funding through by introducing a simple formula 
into the CG, based on poverty measures.  One variant on this option would be to introduce 
an additional payment for each child in the bottom two poverty categories. Another option, 
which might be simpler, would be to allocate an additional payment to schools in areas 
which have a higher proportion of people in the bottom two poverty categories.  In terms of 
the first three questions above this options would be targeted on the level of the pupil or 
area, depending on which was more practically feasible; targeted on the basis of poverty 
levels and allocated to head teachers’ budgets and not earmarked for any particular areas of 
spending.  This would allow schools themselves to decide the best way to allocate funding, 
given their particular circumstances and needs. This might be expected to lead to spending 
on the factors which will make greater difference to the quality of education in that school.  
Initially the value of this additional payment would be relatively low, but it could be 
increased over time as fiscal conditions allow to the point where as a minimum it ensured 
that the additional funding was equal to the average parental contributions paid by better 
off parents.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37
 This could be based on the Ubudehe community poverty categories which are also used by Rwandan local 
government (see table 8 for evidence of their existing use by schools focused NGOs).  
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1: Informed Consent Statement   
 
Below is a copy of the informed consent statement which was read to all survey 
respondents by the research assistants.  
 
 
Good morning/afternoon/evening my name is ---------------I work for the Institute of Policy 
Analysis and Research – Rwanda which is based in Kigali. We are carrying out some research 
funded by the African Capacity Building Foundation into two issues in primary education. 
First the funding of education and second what factors contribute to creating a “good” 
school and a “good” education for children in Rwanda.  We are carrying out this research 
because we want to know more about schools in Rwanda to help the government make 
further improvements. Our research will provide the Government and others with 
information about schools from the perspective of those using them and running them.  IPAR 
is keen to come up with policies and recommendations to help the Rwandan government 
improve education enterprises. Your views will be very important and we would very much 
like you to agree to participate.  We will not write your name on the questionnaire and we 
will write up our research in such a way so you cannot be individually identified. Answering 
our questions will not take up more than an hour at the most of your time. 
 Are you willing to help us by participating in our research? 
 Yes/no 
 Signed -------------------------------------- (IPAR team member)            Date------------------ 
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Annex 2: Questionnaires  
 
 
The following questionnaires, all in Kinyawanda, are presented in this annex:  
 NGOs (p72) 
 Classroom Teachers (p78) 
 District officials (p89) 
 Head Teachers (p103) 
 Parents (p125) 
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GAHUNDA Y’IBIGANIRO 
Insengero, Imiryangoitegamiye kui Letan’amatsinda rusange 
 
GUTANGIRA 
Muzakenera kwisobanuraho nk’abashakashatsi bakorera ikigo cyubushakashatsi kigenga 
IPAR-Rwanda bakora ubushakashatsi buterwa inkunga n’ikigo ny’Africa gishinzwe kongera 
ubushobozi kuri politike y’uburezi.Uzakenera kubasobanurira ko  hari ibintu bibiri ubu 
bushakashatsi buzibandaho - mbere nambere  amafaranga akoreshwa mu amashuli abanza 
n’icya kabiri ireme ry’ uburezi mu amashuli abanza.. 
 
Sobanura ko IPAR-Rwanda yahisemo ahantu habiri mu gihugu bagereranye amakuru 
atandukanye azava aha hantu hatandukanye 
 
Nanone vuga ko twizeye ko ibizava muri ubu bushakashatsi  bizatuma  Leta  igera ku intego  
zayo z’ ireme ry’uburezi kubana bose m’uRwanda 
 
INYANDIKO ISABA KUGIRANA IKIGANIRO. 
 
Mbere yuko utangira  banza usome imvugo-nyandiko isaba uruhushya.  
Mwaramutse/ mwiriweho amazina yange ni ...................................... nkorera  ikigo 
cyubushakashatsi nisesengura rya politiki IPAR-Rwanda gikorera iKigali.Turakora 
ubushakashatsi buterwa inkunga n’ikigo nyafirika gishinzwe kongera ubushobozi.Ubwo 
bushakashatsi burakorwa ku ibintu bibiri mu uburezi bwibanze. Icyambere ni amafaranga 
akoreshwa  mu uburezi bwibanze ikindi ni  ibiki bifite  uruhare  mu ukugira ishuli “ryiza” na 
uburezi “bwiza”  kubana  m’uRwanda. Turakora ubu bushakashatsi kuko dushaka kumenya 
birenzeho  ibyerekeye amashuli m’uRwanda kugirango dufashe Leta kurushaho kuyateza 
imbere. Ubushakashatsi bwacu buzageza kuri Leta n’abandi amakuru ajyanye n’amashuli 
aturutse mu imyumvire y’abayakoresha n’abayakoramo. IPAR ishishikajwe kugaragaza 
ingamba n’inama byafasha guverinoma y’Urwanda guteza imbere ibikorwa by’ uburezi. 
Ibitekerezo byanyu bizaba ari ingirakamaro  ,twanifuzaga cyane ko mwemera kugira 
uruhare.Ntabwo tuzashyira amazina yanyu ku urutonde rw’ibibazwa kandi tuzakora raporo 
yacu ku uburyo utamenyekana . Gusubiza ibibazo byacu ntibiri bugutware igihe kirenze 
isaha..  
 
Ese mwishimiye kudufasha  mugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi? 
 Yego/Oya  
 Umukono -------------------------------------- (Ugize ikipe ya IPAR)           Italiki  ------------------ 
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AMAKURU YEREKERANYE N’UBUYOBOZI 
 
1. Akarango k’itsinda 
 
 
2. Nimero y’ishuli irakenewe (Nimero ikwiye kugaragazwa aha mugihe umuryango 
ubaza ukorana byumwihariko na rimwe muri ya mashuli 30)  
 
 
3. Aho uherereye (ca akaziga hamwe) 
 
i) Kigali 
ii) Icyaro 
 
 
AMAKURU YEREKERANYE N’UBAZA 
 
4. Igitsina (ca akaziga hamwe) 
 
i) Gabo 
ii) Gore 
 
5. Imyaka (Isabukuru baherutse kugira) 
 
 
6. Umwuga wawe ni uwuhe? 
 
 
7. Ese umuryango uhagaraririye witwa ute?  
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8. Ese umuryango muhagarariye ufite abakozi bangahe?   
 
 
9. Ese wasobanura umuryango muhagarariye nk’ umuryango uri k’urwego ruciriritse 
cyangwa nka imwe mu miryango migari iri k’urwego rw’igihugu?  
 
 
AMAKURU AJYANYE N’INKUNGA 
 
10. “turifuza ibabaza ibibazo rusange kubijyanye n’amafaranga atangwa n’abababyeyi 
m’ uburezi mu agace mutuyemo. Ese mwatubwira uburyo butandukanye ababyeyi 
batangamo amafaranga ku igiciro cy’uburezi? Dushishikajwe cyane nokumenya 
amafaranga ababyeyi batanga ku ishuli, Atari nkayo batanga kugura imyenda 
y’ishuli.”  [Amabwiriza agenewe ubaza: n’ingenzi ko ubona amakuru ahagije 
bishoboka k’uburyo inkunga itangwa n’icyo ikoreshwa, uzakenera kubaza birenzeho 
kugirango ubone amakuru menshi bishoboka harimo; 
a) Kumenya niba amafaranga atangwa binyuze mw’ihuriro ry’ababyeyi n’abarimu 
cyangwase ahandi? 
b) Niba amafaranga aba angina kumyaka yose ni ukuvuga niba atangwa cyane 
mumwaka wa 5 n’uwagatandatu? 
c) Niba amafaranga aba agenewe igikorwa runaka urugero “ubwishingizi cyangwa 
agahimbaza musyi k’abarimu”       
11. Mwaduha amakuru arenze kubyerekeye urwego/ agaciro k’amafaranga atangwa 
n’abayeyi?dukeneye nanone agaciro kayo mafaranga kubice bitandukanye – 
urugero, ababyeyi babakene batanga mafaranga make ugereranije n’abandi 
[Amabwiriza agenewe ubaza: n’ingenzi ko ubona amakuru ahagije bishoboka 
k’uburyo inkunga itangwa n’icyo ikoreshwa, uzakenera kubaza birenzeho kugirango 
ubone amakuru menshi bishoboka harimo, urugero, gerageza ubone:  
 
i) Amafaranga asanzwe cyangwa ateganijwe atangwa ni angahe? 
ii) Ikigereranyo cy’amafaranga ababyeyi batanga kuri uru rwego  
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iii) Ni amafaranga angahe atangwa n’ababyeyi bafite amikoro make? 
iv) Nigute muhitamo ababyeyi cyangwa abafasha kurera amafaranga bagomba 
gutanga   
 
12. Ese habaho ngaruka ki iyo atishyuye agahimbazamusyi ko gufasha ishuli?  
 
 
13. Utekereje by’umwihariko ku  amafaranga y’agahimbazamusyi ababyeyi batanga- 
waba warigeze wumva mu ishuli iryo ariryo ryose aho umunyeshuli yangiwe 
kwinjira mu ishuli bitewe nuko umunubyeyiatatanze ayo mafaranga? Niba aribyo , 
mwatubwira umubare wabanyeshuli byagizeho ingaruka?  
 
 
14. Ubu dushishikajwe no kumenya uruhare nyirizina rw’umuryango wanyu..   
 
 
15. Ese mwadusobanurira Can you describe how your organisation helps the poorest 
households with the costs of schooling?  (Amabwiriza agenewe ubaza: n’ingenzi ko 
ubona amakuru ahagije bishoboka.ibibazo bikurikira n’ibi:  
i) Ni mubihe bikorwa muteramo inkunga ababyeyi batishoboye? Urugero, 
kugura imyambaro y’ishuli, cyangwa gutanga umusanzu mwihuriro 
ry’abarimu n’ababyeyi? 
ii) Ni amafaranga angahe akoreshwa m’ugufasha ababyeyi batishoboye 
babatangira  ikiguzi k’ishuli?  
iii) Nigute muhitamo umubyeyi ukeneye gufashwa?)  
 
 
16. Niba hari inkungay’amafaranga itangwa ku imiryango imwe nimwe, waduha 
amakuru arambuye ku ingano y’amafaranga buri muryango ubona?   
 
 
17. Waba uzi inkunga y’amafaranga ihabwa ababyeyi babakene mugace mutuyemo ? 
 
 
18. Dushishikariye kumenya ibitekerezob yawe ku ukuba ababyeyi batanga uruhare 
rw’ amafaranga mu mashuli abanza. Mushobora kugaragaza buryo ki mwemeranya 
cyangwa mutemeranya n’interuro zikurikira. Mushobora guhitamo kwemera 
bikomeye, kwemera bigereranije, kutemera bigereranije no kutemera bikomeye.   
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Ababyeyi kuba bagira uruhare rw’amafaranga mu 
amashuli abanza ni ikintu kiza.  
 
   
Ikigero cy’uruhare rw’ababyeyi kiriho ubu kibonwa na 
benshi mu ababyeyi 
 
   
Hari umubyeyi w’umutindi kuburyo atakwishyura 
amafaranga y’ishuli azafashwa. 
  
   
Kwishyura amafaranga y’ishuli ni byiza kuko biha 
ababyeyi ijambo ku imicungire y’ishuli 
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GAHUNDA Y’IBIGANIRO 
 
Umwarimu w’ishuli 
 
GUTANGIRA  
 
Muzakenera kwisobanuraho nk’abashakashatsi bakorera ikigo cyubushakashatsi kigenga 
IPAR-Rwanda bakora ubushakashatsi buterwa inkunga n’ikigo ny’Africa gishinzwe kongera 
ubushobozi kuri politike y’uburezi.Uzakenera kubasobanurira ko  hari ibintu bibiri ubu 
bushakashatsi buzibandaho - mbere nambere  amafaranga akoreshwa mu amashuli abanza 
n’icya kabiri ireme ry’ uburezi mu amashuli abanza..  
 
Sobanura ko IPAR-Rwanda yahisemo ahantu habiri mu gihugu bagereranye amakuru 
atandukanye azava aha hantu hatandukanye 
 
Nanone vuga ko twizeye ko ibizava muri ubu bushakashatsi  bizatuma  Leta  igera ku intego  
zayo z’ ireme ry’uburezi kubana bose m’uRwanda  
 
GUSABA KUGIRANA IKIGANIRO  
Mbere yuko utangira   banza usome urupapuro rwiBefore you start read out the ‘Informed 
Consent Statement’.  
 
Mwaramutse/ mwiriweho amazina yange ni ...................................... nkorera  ikigo 
cyubushakashatsi nisesengura rya politiki IPAR-Rwanda gikorera iKigali.Turakora 
ubushakashatsi buterwa inkunga n’ikigo nyafirika gishinzwe kongera ubushobozi.Ubwo 
bushakashatsi burakorwa ku ibintu bibiri mu uburezi bwibanze. Icyambere ni amafaranga 
akoreshwa  mu uburezi bwibanze ikindi ni  ibiki bifite  uruhare  mu ukugira ishuli “ryiza” na 
uburezi “bwiza”  kubana  m’uRwanda. Turakora ubu bushakashatsi kuko dushaka kumenya 
birenzeho  ibyerekeye amashuli m’uRwanda kugirango dufashe Leta kurushaho kuyateza 
imbere. Ubushakashatsi bwacu buzageza kuri Leta n’abandi amakuru ajyanye n’amashuli 
aturutse mu imyumvire y’abayakoresha n’abayakoramo. IPAR ishishikajwe kugaragaza 
ingamba n’inama byafasha guverinoma y’Urwanda guteza imbere ibikorwa by’ uburezi. 
Ibitekerezo byanyu bizaba ari ingirakamaro  ,twanifuzaga cyane ko mwemera kugira 
uruhare.Ntabwo tuzashyira amazina yanyu ku urutonde rw’ibibazwa kandi tuzakora raporo 
yacu ku uburyo utamenyekana . Gusubiza ibibazo byacu ntibiri bugutware igihe kirenze 
isaha..  
 
Ese mwishimiye kudufasha  mugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi? 
 Yego/Oya  
 Umukono -------------------------------------- (Ugize ikipe ya IPAR)           Italiki  ------------------ 
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AMAKURU AJYANYE N’UBUYOBOZI  
 
1. Umubare w’ibanga w’itsinda 
 
 
2. Aho uherereye (ca akaziga hamwe) 
i) Kigali 
ii) Icyaro 
 
3. Nimero y’ishuli  
 
--------------------------- 
 
IBIJYANYE N’UBAZWA 
 
4. Igitsina (ca akaziga kuri  kimwe) 
i) Gabo 
ii) Gore 
 
5. Imyaka (isabukuru aherutse kugira) 
 
----------------------------- imyaka 
 
6. Ese ni ikihe cyiciro cy’amashuli gisumba ibindi warangije? (ca akaziga kuri kimwe) 
     
i) impamyabumenyi y’icyiciro cya mbere cy’amashuri yisumbuye       
ii) Amashuli yisumbuye, Ariko Atari kukigo nderabarezi 
iii) Amashuli yisumbuye kukgo nderabarezi  
iv) Amashuli makuru  
v) Ibindi   --------------------------- 
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7. Ugereranije waba umaze imyaka ingahe wigisha? 
 
--------------------------- 
 
(Niba ari abarimu b’umwuga , noneho babaze ikibazo gikurikira. Niba Atari bo jya ku 
ikibazo 9.) 
 
 
8. Waba warigeze ugira  itezambere ry’umwuga rihoraho  rifagusha guteza imbere 
ubumenyi bwawe nk’umwarimu  kuva aho urangirije kwiga ? 
i) Yego  
ii) Oya 
 
9. Niba ari yego, mushobora kutubwira  ubumenyi, amahugurwa, amasomo  wahawe 
nk’umwarimu kuva aho urangirije amashuli.? (Andika birambuye) 
 
 Icyo 
mwahuguwemo 
Byari ryari Byamaze igihe 
kingana iki? 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
 
 
  
3  
 
  
4  
 
  
 
 
10. Ese umushahara ukugeraho ungana iki? 
  
11. Ese wabwira muri make ahantu hatandukanye waba uzi  umushahara wawe 
uturuka? Urugero, Muri Leta, mubabyeyi barerera ku ishuli ryanyu?   
12. Ese mwaba muzi agahimbazamusyi ako ariko kose kagenewe abarimu ku ishuli 
ryanyu? school? 
   
a. Yego           Ninde ukishyura?:   
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b. Oya    
 
(Niba ari “yego” , mubaze ibibazo bibiri bikurikiraho. Niba ari “oya” jya ku) 
  
13. Ese mwaba muzi uwishyura agahimbazamusyi ako ariko kose ka abarimu- urugero 
ese nil eta cyangwa ababyeyi?  (ca akaziga hamwe) 
 
a. Leta 
 
b. Ababyeyi    
 
14. Ese mwaba mufite ahandi mukura amafaranga cyangwa indi mirimo- urugero  
guhinga cyangwa ibikorwa bibyara inyungu ? 
 
15. Utekereje ku abarimu bo ku kigo cyanyu, ni ryari bahura n’ubukererwe 
bw’imishahara ya Leta? (Ca akaziga hamwe) 
 
a. Buri gihe imishahara yishyurwa ikerewe   
 
b. Rimwe na rimwe imishahara yishyurwa ikerewe 
 
c. Biba gake ko imishahara yishyurwa ikerewe   
 
d. Imishahara ntijya yishyurwa ikerewe   
 
16. Ese imishahara yanyu ikererwaho igihe kingana iki? (Ca akaziga hamwe) 
 
a. Iminsi mike   
 
b. Ibyumweru bike   
 
c. Birenga ibyumweru bike   
17. Ese haba hari ukwiyongera kwibitabo kugaragara mubyumba by’amashuli byanyu 
mumwaka ushize?  
18. Ese wumva ukeneye ubundi bufasha n’amahugurwa kugiranga urusheho kwigisha 
neza mucyongereza? Niba aribyo, mwaduha ibitekerezo byanyu kuyindi nkunga 
mwaba mukeneye? 
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AMAKURU AJYANYE N’IREME RY’UBUREZI 
 
19. Dushishikajwe no kumenya imyumvire yanyu ku icyagira “ishuli ryiza” n’ “uburezi 
bwiza” ku abanyeshuli banyu. Mu magambo yanyu, wasobanura ute mu incamake 
uko utekereza ishuli  ryiza  riba rimeze?( iki ni ikibazo gifunguye kandi ntugomba 
gushakisha ibisubizo by’umwihariko , ariko ugomba kwandika niba ashidikanya). 
 
20. Ni izihe mbogamizi z’ingenzi mwatubwira muhura nazo mu ugutanga uburezi bwiza 
ku abanyeshuli?Ese mwadusobanurira impamvu  ibi ari ingenzi? 
 
 imbogamizi ya 1:   -------------------------------- 
 
imbogamizi ya 2:  --------------------------------- 
 
21. Noneho twifuzaga kubabaza  icyo mwakenera cyane cyateza imbere ishuli ryanyu 
rikaba ishuli ryiza. Utekereje ku ibintu bikurikira, mushobora kubitondeka 
mukurikije uko mubona bimeze neza ku ishuli ryanyu muri iki gihe.(1 ni aho wumva 
ko hakewe kongerwa ingufu gake, naho 5 ni aho wumva ko hakewe gushyirwa 
ingufu cyane) 
  
 1.  2. 3. 4. 5. simbi
zi 
Guha abanyeshuli ahantu hatekanye  
bigira 
      
Kugira abarimu bashoboye kwigisha 
neza mucyongereza 
      
Gutanga ibikorwa bitandukanye 
urugero ibibuga n’umwanya wo gukina 
      
Kugira abarimu bumwuga kandi bafite 
ubushake  
      
Kugira abarimu bahembwa bikwiye       
 Kugira ingunga imwe gusa ku umunsi       
Gushyiraho umuco n’umwuka mwiza 
abakobwa bisangamo  
      
Kugira ibitabo byiza bikoreshwa 
nabanyeshuli  
      
Kugira ibikoresho by’ibanze byo 
kwigishirizamo urugero Ibinyabuzi  
      
Kwita cyane ku ugusoma no kwandika       
Kugira umubare muto wa abanyeshuli 
ku umwarimu 
      
Kugira ubuyobozi n’imicungire byiza 
by’ishuli  
      
Kugira ukwigisha gushingiye ku       
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amakuru y’uko buri munyeshuli 
amenya.l  
Kugira ibikoresho by’ibanze, nk’intebe 
z’abanyeshuli zihagije. 
      
Kwigisha integanyanyigisho ngari 
n’amasomo menshi.  
      
Kugira imyigire ishingiye ku 
abanyeshuli.  
 
 
     
Gukorana neza n’ababyeyi n’abaturage       
Aho abanyeshuli bafite amahirwe yo 
gukina no kwidagadura. 
      
 
22. Dushishikajwe no kumenya uko musesengura imikorere no kujyambere by’ishuli 
ryanyu. Ese mushobora gutondeka ibipimo bishoboka bitandukanye by’imikorere 
myiza y’ishuli ryanyu,aho ikingenzi cyane kiza mbere, icyakabiri k’ingenzi kikaza 
k’umwanya wa kabiri, icya gatatu cy’inngenzi kikaza k’umwanya wa gatatu , gutyo 
gutyo.)  
 
 Umwanya 
Amanota y’ibizamini by’umwaka wa 6    
 
 Ese ni abanyeshuli bangahe barangiza umwaka wa 6 bazi neza 
icyongereza n’imibare  
 
Umubare w’abanyeshuli barangiza umwaka wa 3 bazi neza  
ikinyarwanda  
 
 
Igisubizo kiza kijyanye n’ishuli bivuye mu ababyeyi  
 
Ibisubizo byigenzura  biturutse mu ubugenzuzi bw’amashuli ba Leta   
 
Impuzandengo y’ingano y’ishuli abanyeshuli bigishirizwamo.  
 
 Ikigereranyo cy’abanyeshuli barangiza umwaka wa 6 bafite imyaka 12 
no munsi yayo.  
 
 
Ikigereranyo cy’abarimu babifitiye ubumenyi.   
 
 Urutonde rw’ibikorwa,  nk’ibibuga n’amahirwe yo gukina bitangwa 
n’ishuli. 
 
 
 
23. Ese haba hari aho yaba mwe cyangwa undi wo hanze y’ishuli( urugero abayobozi 
bo ku karere cyangwa Leta y’Urwanda) bashyiraho intego ku imikorere y’ishuli? 
Intego imwe yaba ari ukugabanya ingano y’ishuli/ umubare w’abanyeshuli mu 
icyumba. 
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i) Yego  
ii) Oya 
24. Ese mushobora kuduha amakuru arambuye ku icyo intego z’ingenzi aricyo. Byaba 
ari ingirakamaro gushyiramo  amakuru yuzuye ashoboka ku ibice by’imikorere 
y’ishuli intego yibandaho/zibandaho? 
  
Intego Ni nde wanzura 
intego iyo ari yo? 
Ese intego iba igizwe 
nibiki? Urugero. 
Amanota  y’ibizamini, 
ikigereranyo cyo 
gusibira. 
Ni iyihe ntego 
y’umwihariko?(kugera 
kuri x hakoreshejwe y)  
Intego ya1  
 
  
Intego ya 2 
 
   
Intego ya 3  
 
  
Intego ya 4  
 
  
 
25. Ese mwagaragaza buryo ki mwemeranya nizi nteruro zikurikira? Mushobora 
guhitamo kwemera bikomeye, kwemera bigereranije, kutemera bigereranije no 
kutemera bikomeye. 
  N
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Ishuli ryange ryibanda bikomeye ku ugusoma no kwandika( 
mu ikinyarwanda) n’imibare mu umwaka wa 1 – mu umwaka 
wa 3    
   
Abarimu bo ku ishuli ryacu bakungukira mu ukubona 
ibikoresho byo kwigishirizaho bijyanye nigihe –urugero 
“imfashanyigisho” 
   
 Ku ishuli ryacu duha agaciro kwemerera abanyeshuli gukina 
kimwe nko kwiga ibyo mu ishuli  
   
Mu ishuli ryacu, kwibanda ku ugusoma no kwandika ( mu 
icyongereza) n’imibare  byabaye ngombwa cyane mu myaka 
ya vuba.  
   
Andi mashuli nzi aha agaciro kwemerera abana gukina kimwe 
n’andi masomo. 
   
Ubushake n’ubwitange byange bwite ku kazi  birahanitse.    
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Dutekereje  kubarimu kwishuli Rwacu, ubushake 
n’ubwitange  ku akazi byabo birahanitse 
   
Mu ubunararibonye bwange, nagize inkunga ihagije 
kumfasha gutera imbere mu akazi.  
   
Abarimu bahembwa bihagije bibatera gutanga uburezi bwiza 
ku abanyeshuli babo.  
   
Abarimu bange bakeneye andi mahugurwa menshi mu 
Icyongereza. 
   
Abarimu bange bakeneye amahugurwa arenzeho ku  imyigire 
ishingiye k’umunyeshuri.  
   
Isomo ryo kwihangira imirimo ni ingenzi ku ishuli ryange.    
Amahugurwa y’abayobozi b’amashuli yagaragajwe nk’ingenzi 
bihagije.  
   
Ku ishuli ryange ,byinshi mu ibikenerwa n’ishuli 
n’abanyeshuli, muburyo bw’ibitabo, ibikoresho byo 
kwigishirizaho n’ibikorwaremezo bihagije, biraboneka.. 
   
Abarimu barubashywe aho batuye     
 
 
26. Dushishikariye kumenya imyumvire  yawe ku integanyamasomo ya Leta. Kimwe 
n’ibindi bibazo twavuzeho harurguru mushobora kugaragaza buryo ki 
mwemeranya cyangwa mutemeranya n’imvugo zikurikira. Mushobora guhitamo 
kwemera bikomeye, kwemera bigereranije, kutemera bigereranije no kutemera 
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Mfite ubumenyi buhagije  ku integanyamasomo ya Leta 
 
   
Mbona ibikoresho byiza n’amakuru bimfasha kwigisha 
integanyamasomo ya leta 
   
Kugirango nkore akazi kange neza, byatanga ikinyuranyo 
ndamutse mfite imfashanyigisho n’ikidanago byo 
kugenderaho 
   
Mu ishuli ryacu, kwigisha integanyamasomo ya leta 
biragoye kubera ingunga ebyiri. 
   
Integanyamasomo ya leta yibanda bikomeye ku imibare no 
gusoma no kwandika , harimo no mucyongereza. 
   
Nzi neza ibyo abanyeshuli bagombye kuba bize ku umusozo 
w’umwaka wa 3 ubanza. 
   
Nzi neza ibyo abanyeshuli bagombye kuba bize ku umusozo 
w’umwaka wa 3 ubanza. 
   
Integanyamasomo ya Leta iraringaniye kandi ikubiyemo 
urutonde rugari rw’amasomo mu mashuli abanza. 
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27. Dushishikariye kumenya imyumvire yawe ku ibijyanye n’imishahara 
nuduhimbazamusyi tw’abarimu. Kimwe n’ibindi bibazo twavuzeho harurguru 
mushobora kugaragaza buryo ki mwemeranya cyangwa mutemeranya n’imvugo 
zikurikira. Mushobora guhitamo kwemera bikomeye, kwemera bigereranije, 
kutemera bigereranije no kutemera bikomeye 
 
N
d
ab
ye
m
er
a 
 
Si
m
b
ye
m
er
a 
 
Si
m
b
iz
i 
Urwego rw’umushahara w’abarimu ruriho ubu rutuma 
benshi mu barium bashaka kuva mu mwuga  
   
Niyo nakora cyane kandi neza, mfite impungenge ko 
umushahara wange utaziyongera  
   
Nahitamo ko amafaranga leta ishyira mu Umurenge SACCO 
yakoreshwa mu kuzamura umushahara w’abarimu ahubwo 
   
Imishahara y’abarimu ifitanye isano rya bugufi n’imikorere 
y’abarimu mucyumba cy’ ishuli – muyandi magambo, 
abarimu beza bafite amahirwe yo kwiturwa kuzamurirwa 
umushahara. 
   
Igihe umaze uri umwarimu ni ingenzi mu ukugena 
umushahara w’abarimu kuruta kuba uri umwarimu mwiza 
cyangwa utari mwiza. 
   
Byaba bikwiye kwitura abarimu kuzamurirwa umushahara 
bashingiye ku imikorere – abarimu bakora neza bakwiye 
ishimwe k’umushahara. 
   
Byakabaye byiza igice kinini cy’umushahara w’umwarimu 
gihembwe nk’ishimwe ry’imikorere, niyo byavuga igabanuka 
ry’imishahara y’abarimu bamwe. 
   
Byaba ari ikintu kiza igice kinini cyane cy’umushahara 
w’abarimu cyishyuwe nk’ishimwe ry’imikorere ariko 
ntihagire umwarimu ucikanwa.. 
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GAHUNDA Y’IBIGANIRO 
 
Umuyobozi ku karere 
 
GUTANGIRA  
Muzakenera kwisobanuraho nk’abashakashatsi bakorera ikigo cyubushakashatsi kigenga 
IPAR-Rwanda bakora ubushakashatsi buterwa inkunga n’ikigo ny’Africa gishinzwe kongera 
ubushobozi kuri politike y’uburezi.Uzakenera kubasobanurira ko  hari ibintu bibiri ubu 
bushakashatsi buzibandaho - mbere nambere  amafaranga akoreshwa mu amashuli abanza 
n’icya kabiri ireme ry’ uburezi mu amashuli abanza..  
 
Sobanura ko IPAR-Rwanda yahisemo ahantu habiri mu gihugu bagereranye amakuru 
atandukanye azava aha hantu hatandukanye 
 
Nanone vuga ko twizeye ko ibizava muri ubu bushakashatsi  bizatuma  Leta  igera ku intego  
zayo z’ ireme ry’uburezi kubana bose m’uRwanda  
 
GUSABA KUGIRANA IKIGANIRO 
 
Mbere yuko utangira   banza usome urupapuro rwiBefore you start read out the ‘Informed 
Consent Statement’.  
 
Mwaramutse/ mwiriweho amazina yange ni ...................................... nkorera  ikigo 
cyubushakashatsi nisesengura rya politiki IPAR-Rwanda gikorera iKigali.Turakora 
ubushakashatsi buterwa inkunga n’ikigo nyafirika gishinzwe kongera ubushobozi.Ubwo 
bushakashatsi burakorwa ku ibintu bibiri mu uburezi bwibanze. Icyambere ni amafaranga 
akoreshwa  mu uburezi bwibanze ikindi ni  ibiki bifite  uruhare  mu ukugira ishuli “ryiza” na 
uburezi “bwiza”  kubana  m’uRwanda. Turakora ubu bushakashatsi kuko dushaka kumenya 
birenzeho  ibyerekeye amashuli m’uRwanda kugirango dufashe Leta kurushaho kuyateza 
imbere. Ubushakashatsi bwacu buzageza kuri Leta n’abandi amakuru ajyanye n’amashuli 
aturutse mu imyumvire y’abayakoresha n’abayakoramo. IPAR ishishikajwe kugaragaza 
ingamba n’inama byafasha guverinoma y’Urwanda guteza imbere ibikorwa by’ uburezi. 
Ibitekerezo byanyu bizaba ari ingirakamaro  ,twanifuzaga cyane ko mwemera kugira 
uruhare.Ntabwo tuzashyira amazina yanyu ku urutonde rw’ibibazwa kandi tuzakora raporo 
yacu ku uburyo utamenyekana . Gusubiza ibibazo byacu ntibiri bugutware igihe kirenze 
isaha..  
 
Ese mwishimiye kudufasha  mugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi? 
 Yego/Oya  
 Umukono -------------------------------------- (Ugize ikipe ya IPAR)           Italiki  ------------------ 
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AMAKURU AJYANYE N’UBUYOBOZI  
 
1. Umubare w’ibanga w’itsinda 
2. Aho uherereye (ca akaziga hamwe) 
iii) Kigali 
iv) icyaro 
3. Nimero y’ishuli  
 
IBIJYANYE N’UBAZWA 
 
4. Igitsina (ca akaziga kuri  kimwe) 
iii) Gabo 
iv) Gore 
 
5. Imyaka (isabukuru aherutse kugira) 
----------------------------- imyaka 
 
 
6. Ese ni ikihe cyiciro cy’amashuli gisumba ibindi warangije? (ca akaziga kuri 
kimwe) 
     
vi) impamyabumenyi y’icyiciro cya mbere cy’amashuri yisumbuye       
vii) Yarangije amashuli yisumbuye harimo no  kwiga ku ikigo nderabarezi  
viii) Amashuli makuru  
ix) Ibindi  -------------------------------- 
7. Ugereranije waba umaze imyaka ingahe ushinzwe uburezi mu akarere kanyu? 
8. Ese  wigeze ubaho umwarimu? 
i) Yego 
ii) Oya 
9. Ese wigeze ubaho umuyobozi w’ikigo cy’amashuli. 
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i) Yego 
ii) Oya 
10. “ese habahari amashuli abanza yigenga angahe mu akarere kanyu? 
11. “Waba uzi umubare w’abanyeshuli kuva mumwaka wambere  kugerera 
muwagatandatu biga muri ayo mashuli abanza yigenga? 
12. “Ese ababyeyi bafite amikoro ahagije nibo barerera kumashuli abanza yigenga?     
AMAKURU YEREKERANYE N’ISHULI 
 
13. Ku amashuli 30 yose akorerwaho ubushakashatsi dukeneye kubona amakuru 
k’umusaruro  n’amafaranga akoreshwa.Ibi bizakorwa hakoreshejwe 
imbonerahamwe izasigirwa umuyobozi wo ku  akarere kugirango 
ayuzuze.Tugomba kubasobanurira ko  bagomba  kuzuzamo amakuru yuzuye 
bishoboka aho bikenewe banabiganireho n’abakozi bagenzi babo mu karere 
bashobora kuba bafite amakuru arenzeho. Shimangira ko ari ingirakamaro ko 
ibibazo bisubizwa k’uburyo bwuzuye bishoboka.   
(Musobanurire ko hari imbonerahamwe 30  z’amapaji abiri buri imwe – imwe ya buri 
shuli rikorerwamo ubushakashatsi.)   
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IMBONERAHAMWE IGENEWE UMUYOBOZI KU KARERE:  
 
Izina ry’ishuli:   
 
AMAKURU YEREKERANYE N’ABANYESHULI N’ABARIMU 
Muri uyu mwaka w’amashuli, ishuli rifite 
abanyeshuli bangahe muri rusange?  
 
 
Ese muri uyu mwaka w’amashuli, ishuli rifite 
abarimu bangahe? 
 
 
 
AMANOTA Y’IBIZAMINI 
Ese mwatubwira muburyo burambuye  ku amanota abanyeshuli banyu babonye mu 
ikizamini gisoza amashuli abanza mu imyaka 3 ishize?Mwagaragaza umubare 
wabiyandikishije batsinze ibizamini by’umwaka wa gatandatu, harimo umubare wa 
abakobwa n’abahungu.  
 
 
Umwaka Umubare 
w’abahungu 
mu mwaka 
wa6 
Umubare 
w’abakobwa 
mu mwaka 
wa6 
Igiteranyo 
cy’abatsinze  
Umubare 
w’abakobwa 
batinze   
 Umubare 
w’abahungu 
batinze   
2010      
2009      
2008      
 
Niba mubizi, mushobora kutubwira umubare w’abana babonye amanota atandukanye mu 
ibizamini bisoza umwaka w agatandatu. Ukoresheje uburyo bw’ibyiciro 1 – 9 bwatangijwe 
mu 2008.  
 
 Grade 
Year  1 2   3  4 5 6 7 8 9 
2010          
2009          
 
AMAKURU AJYANYE N’AMAFARANGA AKORESHWA. 2010   
Ese mwabonye amafaranga angana iki  Leta 
igenera ibigo atari imishahara y’abarimu?  
 
Ese ni amafaranga angahe leta yateganyirije 
imishahara y’abarimu?   
 
Ese inkunga y’inyongera mwahawe n’akarere  
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ingana iki?  
Ese ishuli ryahawe ibitabo byishyuwe na leta? Niba 
aribyo byaguzwe angahe  hanatangwa ibitabo 
bingahe buri mwaka?  
 
Ese iyi nkunga y’inyongera yari 
iyiki?mwabigaragaza birambuye munerekana 
ayegenewe ibikorwa bitandukanye? ( urugero ayo 
gusana, gufasha imiryango itishoboye nibindi 
 
 
 
 
  
AMAKURU AJYANYE N’AMAFARANGA AKORESHWA. 2009   
Ese mwabonye amafaranga angana iki  Leta 
igenera ibigo atari imishahara y’abarimu?  
 
Ese mwakoresheje angana iki ku imishahara 
y’abarimu?  
 
 
Ese inkunga y’inyongera mwahawe n’akarere 
ingana iki?  
 
 
Ese ishuli ryahawe ibitabo byishyuwe na leta? Niba 
aribyo byaguzwe angahe  hanatangwa ibitabo 
bingahe buri mwaka? 
 
Ese iyi nkunga y’inyongera yari 
iyiki?mwabigaragaza birambuye munerekana 
ayegenewe ibikorwa bitandukanye? ( urugero ayo 
gusana, gufasha imiryango itishoboye nibindi) 
 
 
 
  
AMAKURU AJYANYE N’AMAFARANGA AKORESHWA. 2008   
Ese mwabonye amafaranga angana iki  Leta 
igenera ibigo atari imishahara y’abarimu?  
 
Ese mwakoresheje angana iki ku imishahara 
y’abarimu?  
 
Ese inkunga y’inyongera mwahawe n’akarere 
ingana iki?  
 
Ese ishuli ryahawe ibitabo byishyuwe na leta? Niba 
aribyo byaguzwe angahe  hanatangwa ibitabo 
bingahe buri mwaka? 
 
90 
 
Ese iyi nkunga y’inyongera yari 
iyiki?mwabigaragaza birambuye munerekana 
ayegenewe ibikorwa bitandukanye? ( urugero ayo 
gusana, gufasha imiryango itishoboye nibindi) 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Ese ku mwaka , abakozi ba Minisiteri y’Imari nigenamigambi basura akarere 
kangahe bigamije gukurikirana no  kugenzura, kugirango basesengure? (ca 
akaziga kuri kimwe) 
a. Agaciro k’amafaranga( niba amafaranga yarakoreshejwe neza)   
b. Ikurikizwa ry’amabwiriza    
c. Ikoreshwa ry’amafaranga   
15. Ese mu mwaka 2010 amashuli yo mu karere kanyu yaba yarabonye amafaranga  
yo gukoresha mubukorwa by’ishuli bya buri munsi (atari imishahara y’abarimu) 
16. Utekereje mu karere kose, amashuli yose yaba yarabonye umubare ukwiye 
w’amafaranga agenewe gufasha ishuli mu ibikorwa bya buri munsi atangwa na 
Minisiteri y’Imari nigenamigambi? 
i) Yego  
 
ii) Oya  
 
(Niba igisubizo ari “yego” ubwo jya ku ikibazo 18. Niba ari “Oya” noneho baza ikibazo 
gikurikira.) 
17. Ese habaye  igabanuka ringana iki mu amafaranga yabonetse?  
18. Ese haba hari ishuli mu karere kanyu rikererwa kubona amafaranga agenewe 
gufasha ishuli mu ibikorwa bya  buri munsi atangwa na Minisiteri y’imari 
n’igenamigambi.? (ca akaziga kuri kimwe)   
1. Oya    
 
2. Yego, ariko kugeza ku ibyumweru bibiri    
 
3. Yego,  binashobora no kugeza ku amezi abiri    
 
4. Yego , bishobora no kurenga amezi abiri    
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AMAKURU AJYANYE N’IREME RY’UBUREZI. 
19. Dushishikajwe no kumenya imyumvire yanyu ku icyagira “ishuli ryiza” n’ 
“uburezi bwiza” ku abanyeshuli banyu. Mu magambo yanyu, wasobanura ute 
mu incamake uko utekereza ishuli  ryiza  riba rimeze?( iki ni ikibazo gifunguye 
kandi ntugomba gushakisha ibisubizo by’umwihariko , ariko ugomba kwandika 
niba ashidikanya). 
 Ni izihe mbogamizi z’ingenzi mwatubwira muhura nazo mu ugutanga uburezi bwiza ku 
abanyeshuli?Ese mwadusobanurira impamvu  ibi ari ingenzi? 
 
 
imbogamizi ya 1:   -------------------------------- 
 
 
imbogamizi ya 2:  --------------------------------- 
 
20. Noneho twifuzaga kubabaza  icyo mwakenera cyane cyateza imbere ishuli 
ryanyu rikaba ishuli ryiza. Utekereje ku ibintu bikurikira, mushobora 
kubitondeka mukurikije uko mubona bimeze neza ku ishuli ryanyu muri iki 
gihe. (1 ni aho wumva ko hakewe kongerwa ingufu gake, naho 5 ni aho wumva 
ko hakewe gushyirwa ingufu cyane) 
   
 
 1.  2. 3. 4. 5. simbizi 
Guha abanyeshuli ahantu hatekanye  
bigira 
      
Kugira abarimu bashoboye kwigisha 
neza mucyongereza 
      
Gutanga ibikorwa bitandukanye 
urugero ibibuga n’umwanya wo gukina 
      
Kugira abarimu bumwuga kandi bafite 
ubushake  
      
Kugira abarimu bahembwa bikwiye       
 Kugira ingunga imwe gusa ku umunsi       
Gushyiraho umuco n’umwuka mwiza 
abakobwa bisangamo  
      
Kugira ibitabo byiza bikoreshwa 
nabanyeshuli  
      
Kugira ibikoresho by’ibanze byo 
kwigishirizamo urugero Ibinyabuzi  
      
Kwita cyane ku ugusoma no kwandika       
Kugira umubare muto wa abanyeshuli 
ku umwarimu 
      
Kugira ubuyobozi n’imicungire byiza 
by’ishuli  
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Kugira ukwigisha gushingiye ku 
amakuru y’uko buri munyeshuli 
amenya.l  
      
Kugira ibikoresho by’ibanze, nk’intebe 
z’abanyeshuli zihagije. 
      
Kwigisha integanyanyigisho ngari 
n’amasomo menshi.  
      
Kugira imyigire ishingiye ku 
abanyeshuli.  
 
 
     
Gukorana neza n’ababyeyi n’abaturage       
Aho abanyeshuli bafite amahirwe yo 
gukina no kwidagadura. 
      
 
21. Dushishikajwe no kumenya uko musesengura imikorere no kujyambere 
by’ishuli ryanyu. Ese mushobora gutondeka ibipimo bishoboka bitandukanye 
by’imikorere myiza y’ishuli ryanyu,aho ikingenzi cyane kiza mbere, icyakabiri 
k’ingenzi kikaza k’umwanya wa kabiri, icya gatatu cy’inngenzi kikaza 
k’umwanya wa gatatu , gutyo gutyo.) 
  
 umwanya  
Amanota y’ibizamini by’umwaka wa 6    
 Ese ni abanyeshuli bangahe barangiza umwaka wa 6 bazi neza 
icyongereza n’imibare  
 
Umubare w’abanyeshuli barangiza umwaka wa 3 bazi neza  
ikinyarwanda  
 
 
Igisubizo kiza kijyanye n’ishuli bivuye mu ababyeyi  
Ibisubizo byigenzura  biturutse mu ubugenzuzi bw’amashuli ba Leta   
Impuzandengo y’ingano y’ishuli abanyeshuli bigishirizwamo.  
 Ikigereranyo cy’abanyeshuli barangiza umwaka wa 6 bafite imyaka 12 
no munsi yayo.  
 
 
Ikigereranyo cy’abarimu babifitiye ubumenyi.   
 Urutonde rw’ibikorwa,  nk’ibibuga n’amahirwe yo gukina bitangwa 
n’ishuli. 
 
 
 
22. Ese haba hari ibindi bipimo kimwe nk’ibyo haruguru, waba ukoresha mu 
ugupima imikorere y’ishuli ryanyu?(mushobora kubigaragaza aha hepfo) 
  
23. Ese mwagaragaza buryo ki mwemeranya nizi nteruro zikurikira? Mushobora 
guhitamo kwemera bikomeye, kwemera bigereranije, kutemera bigereranije no 
kutemera bikomeye. 
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Ishuli ryange ryibanda bikomeye ku ugusoma no kwandika( mu 
ikinyarwanda) n’imibare mu umwaka wa 1 – mu umwaka wa 3    
   
Abarimu bo ku ishuli ryacu bakungukira mu ukubona 
ibikoresho byo kwigishirizaho bijyanye nigihe –urugero 
“imfashanyigisho” 
   
 Ku ishuli ryacu duha agaciro kwemerera abanyeshuli gukina 
kimwe nko kwiga ibyo mu ishuli  
   
Mu ishuli ryacu, kwibanda ku ugusoma no kwandika ( mu 
icyongereza) n’imibare  byabaye ngombwa cyane mu myaka 
ya vuba.  
   
Andi mashuli nzi aha agaciro kwemerera abana gukina kimwe 
n’andi masomo. 
   
Ubushake n’ubwitange byange bwite ku kazi  birahanitse. 
 
   
Dutekereje  ku abayobozi b’amashuli muri rusange, ubushake 
n’ubwitange  ku akazi byabo birahanitse 
   
Mu ubunararibonye bwange, nagize inkunga ihagije kumfasha 
gutera imbere mu akazi.  
   
Abayobozi b’amashuli bahembwa bihagije bibatera gutanga 
uburezi bwiza ku abanyeshuli babo.  
   
Abarimu bange bakeneye andi mahugurwa menshi mu 
Icyongereza.  
 
   
Abarimu bange bakeneye amahugurwa arenzeho ku  imyigire 
ishingiye k’umunyeshuri.  
   
Isomo ryo kwihangira imirimo ni ingenzi ku ishuli ryange. 
 
   
Amahugurwa y’abayobozi b’amashuli yagaragajwe nk’ingenzi 
bihagije.  
   
Abayobozi b’amashuli barubashywe bihagije aho batuye.  
 
   
 
24. Utekereje kuri ubu bwoko bw’ibipimo by’imikorere myiza y’amashuli, kuri ubu 
waba ufite uburyo bo gushyira mu myanya amashuli akora neza cyane nakora 
nabi cyane mu karre kawe? 
 
i) Yego 
 
ii) Oya 
 
94 
 
25. Nanone utekereje ku imikorere myiza yamashuli mu gace kanyu, ese waba uzi 
neza amashuli ameze nabi kurusha ayandi. Mu yandi magambo mwaba muzi 
neza amashuli afite imikorere mibi kurusha ayandi? 
  
i) Yego 
 
ii) Oya 
 
(Niba batagaragaza amashuli afite intege nke kurusha ayandi, jya ku ikibazo 29) 
 
26. Niba ufite imyumvire inoze ku icyo amashuli afite intege nke aricyo ubihitamo 
ute? (Aha twitaye ku ukumenya niba iki ari igipimo gikomeye cyangwa ari ugupfa 
guhitamo) 
  
27. Ni izihengamba mukunze gufata kenshi muguteza imbere ishuli?Mushobora 
kwerekana nibz mwarigeze mukoresha zimwe mungamba zikurikira mu 
umwaka ushize no mu imyaka itanu ishize..  
 Byakoreshej
we mu 
umwaka 
ushize    
Byakoresh
ejwe mu 
imyaka 
itanu 
ishize    
Ntibyakores
hejwe 
Twahinduye umuyobozi w’ikigo   
 
 
Twihaye intego zumwihariko zo kwiteza imbere 
ishuli rigomba kugeraho  
  
 
 
Twatanze amafaranga y’inyongera yo gufasha ishuli   
 
 
Twagiranye ibiganiro bitaziguye n’umuyobozi 
w’ishuli 
  
 
 
Twateguriye amashuli  inkunga y’inyongera ivuye 
mu akarere 
  
 
 
Twateguye imfashanyo ituritse mu irindi shuli 
gufasha ishuli  
  
 
 
Twateguye inkunga iturutse ahandi hantu gufasha 
ishuli 
  
 
 
Twafunze ishuli    
 
 
 
28. Ese mwagaragaza buryo ki mwemeranya nizi mvugo zikurikira? Mushobora 
guhitamo kwemera bikomeye, kwemera bigereranije, kutemera bigereranije no 
kutemera bikomeye. 
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Amashuri yo mu karere kange yita bikomeye ku ikinyarwanda n’imibare 
by’umwaka wa1 ubanza – umwaka wa 3 ubanza.    
   
Amashuli yo mu karere kange aha agaciro kwmerera abana gukina kimwe 
nandi masomo.  
   
Urwego rw’umushahara w,abarimu ruriho ubu rutuma benshi muri bo 
bashaka kuva mu umwuga. 
   
Utekereje ku abarimu byaba bikwiye kwiturwa izamurwa ry’ umushahara 
bishingiye ku imikorere – abarimu bakora neza bakwiye kubona inyongera 
ku umushahara. 
   
Byaba ari byiza kurushaho  igice kinini cy’umushahara w’abarimu 
kishyuwe nk’agahimbazamusyi k’imikorere, ariko nta mwarimu usigajwe 
inyuma. 
   
Hari ubushobozi buhagije ku urwego rw’akarere bwo gufasha no kwita ku 
amashuli yahoo ntuye. 
   
Mu karere kange abarimu bakeneye inkunga irenzeho mu ukwiga 
icyongereza kugirango bashobore kwigisha neza mu icyongereza. 
   
Abarimu bo mu karere kanjye bakeneye amahugurwa arenzeho ku 
imyigire ishingiye ku umunyeshuli.  
   
Kwibanda ku icyongereza n’imibare mu mashuli yo mukarere kanjye 
byabaye ingenzi mu myaka ya vuba.  
   
 
29. Dushishikajwe no kumenya imyumvire yanyu ku integanyanyigisho ya 
Leta.Kimwe nkikibazo cyo haruguru mushobora kugaragaza buryo ki 
mwemeranya cyangwa mutemeranya n’mvugo zikurikira. Mushobora 
guhitamo kwemera bikomeye, kwemera bigereranije, kutemera n’unahakane, 
kutemera bigereranije no kutemera bikomeye   
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Nfite ubumenyibuhagije ku integanyamasomo ya Leta 
 
   
Abarimu bo mu akarere kange bakungurwa no kubona 
ikidanago kirambuye cyo kubafasha. 
   
Amashuli yo mu karere kange agira ibitabo bihagije byo 
kubafasha kwigisha integanyamasomo. 
   
Amashuli yo mu akarere kange abona ibikoresho byiza 
n’amakuru bibafasha kwigisha integanyamasomo ya leta.  
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Imbonera hamwe y’umuyobozi w’ishuli 
 
GUTANGIRA 
Muzakenera kwisobanuraho nk’abashakashatsi bakorera ikigo cyubushakashatsi kigenga 
IPAR-Rwanda bakora ubushakashatsi buterwa inkunga n’ikigo ny’Africa gishinzwe kongera 
ubushobozi kuri politike y’uburezi.Uzakenera kubasobanurira ko  hari ibintu bibiri ubu 
bushakashatsi buzibandaho - mbere nambere  amafaranga akoreshwa mu amashuli abanza 
n’icya kabiri ireme ry’ uburezi mu amashuli abanza..  
 
Sobanura ko IPAR-Rwanda yahisemo ahantu habiri mu gihugu bagereranye amakuru 
atandukanye azava aha hantu hatandukanye 
    
Nanone vuga ko twizeye ko ibizava muri ubu bushakashatsi  bizatuma  Leta  igera ku intego  
zayo z’ ireme ry’uburezi kubana bose m’uRwanda  
 
GUSABA KUGIRANA IKIGANIRO 
 
Mbere yuko utangira   banza usome urupapuro rwiBefore you start read out the ‘Informed 
Consent Statement’.  
 
Mwaramutse/ mwiriweho amazina yange ni ...................................... nkorera  ikigo 
cyubushakashatsi nisesengura rya politiki IPAR-Rwanda gikorera iKigali.Turakora 
ubushakashatsi buterwa inkunga n’ikigo nyafirika gishinzwe kongera ubushobozi.Ubwo 
bushakashatsi burakorwa ku ibintu bibiri mu uburezi bwibanze. Icyambere ni amafaranga 
akoreshwa  mu uburezi bwibanze ikindi ni  ibiki bifite  uruhare  mu ukugira ishuli “ryiza” na 
uburezi “bwiza”  kubana  m’uRwanda. Turakora ubu bushakashatsi kuko dushaka kumenya 
birenzeho  ibyerekeye amashuli m’uRwanda kugirango dufashe Leta kurushaho kuyateza 
imbere. Ubushakashatsi bwacu buzageza kuri Leta n’abandi amakuru ajyanye n’amashuli 
aturutse mu imyumvire y’abayakoresha n’abayakoramo. IPAR ishishikajwe kugaragaza 
ingamba n’inama byafasha guverinoma y’Urwanda guteza imbere ibikorwa by’ uburezi. 
Ibitekerezo byanyu bizaba ari ingirakamaro  ,twanifuzaga cyane ko mwemera kugira 
uruhare.Ntabwo tuzashyira amazina yanyu ku urutonde rw’ibibazwa kandi tuzakora raporo 
yacu ku uburyo utamenyekana . Gusubiza ibibazo byacu ntibiri bugutware igihe kirenze 
isaha..  
 
Ese mwishimiye kudufasha  mugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi? 
 Yego/Oya  
 Umukono -------------------------------------- (Ugize ikipe ya IPAR)           Italiki  ------------------ 
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AMAKURU AJYANYE N’UBUYOBOZI  
 
1.  Umubare w’ibanga w’itsinda 
2. Aho uherereye (ca akaziga hamwe) 
v) Kigali 
vi) icyaro 
3. Nimero y’ishuli  
 
IBIJYANYE N’UBAZWA 
 
4. Igitsina (ca akaziga kuri  kimwe) 
v) Gabo 
vi) Gore 
 
5. Imyaka (isabukuru aherutse kugira) 
 
----------------------------- imyaka 
 
6. Ese ni ikihe cyiciro cy’amashuli gisumba ibindi warangije? (ca akaziga kuri kimwe) 
     
x) Impamyabumenyi y’icyiciro cya mbere cy’amashuri yisumbuye       
xi) Yarangije amashuli yisumbuye harimo no  kwiga ku ikigo nderabarezi  
xii) Amashuli makuru  
xiii) Ibindi   --------------------------- 
 
7. Ugereranije waba umaze imyaka ingahe wigisha? 
 
8. Ugereranyije waba warangije ni muwuhe mwaka warangije kwiga amashuli 
y’ubwarimu?  
 
9. Niba warize kaminuza, waminuje murihe somo? 
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10. Waba warigeze ugira itezambere ry’umwuga rihoraho rifagusha guteza imbere 
ubumenyi bwawe nk’umwarimu kuva aho urangirije kwiga ? 
iii) Yego  
iv) Oya 
 
Niba ari yego, mushobora kutubwira ubumenyi, amahugurwa, amasomo wahawe 
nk’umwarimu kuva aho urangirije amashuli? (Andika birambuye) 
 Icyo mwahuguwemo Byari ryari Byamaze igihe kingana iki? 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
 
 
  
3  
 
 
  
4  
 
 
  
 
11. Ese umushahara ukugeraho ungana iki? 
12. Dushishikajwe no kumenya buryo ki ababyeyi (cyangwa  abarezi , urugero abaye ari 
imfubyi) bafasha ikigo batanga inkunga y’amafaranga.Nizihe  nzira zitandukanye 
ababyeyi batangiramo amafaranga yo gufasha ikigo?buryo ki mubukurikira ababyeyi  
Mushobora kugaragaza mu ibikurikira ibijyanye n’ishuli ryanyu? (kosora)   
a. Agahimbazamusyi gatangwa n’ababyeyi  
b. Amafaranga atangwa ku imyigire mu akarere cyangwa k’umurenger  
c. Amafaranga y’ubwishingizi ku ishuli  
d. Amafaranga atanditse/ ategenwe yishyurwa mu ikigo.  
e. Amafaranga ahabwa abarimu b’umwihariko. 
f. Ibindi   ----------------------------- 
13. Ese mwaduha amakuru ku agaciro k’amafaranga atandukanye atangwa n’ababyeyi? 
Watugaragariza niba bayatangaburi kwezi,bur’ igihembwe cyangwa buri mwaka? 
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14. Niba hari ikigero cy’amafaranga, ninde wanzura uburyo ayo mafaranga agenwa? Ni 
ihuriro ry’ababyeyi n’abarimu? Niba atari byo ni inde wanzura ayo ababyeyi bagomba 
gutanga? 
  Ese ababyeyi/ abahagarariye ababyeyi batanga amafaranga angana? Cyangwa bamwe – 
urugero abatishoboye batanga ari munsi?   
 
a. Yego  
b. Oya 
 
 (Niba ari “yego” baza ibibazo bibiri bikurikira. Niba ari oya, komeza ku ikibazo 17.) 
  
15. Niba hari ababyeyi/abahagarariye ababyeyi batanga make ku ay’abandi  
dushishikajwe no kumenya amakuru kuri byo. Mbere ya byose, ababyeyi 
batandukanye batanga angahe? (ushobora kubaza amakuru arambuye kuri iki kibazo 
harimo n’ibyiciro bitandukanye  byishyurwa, n’umubare w’ababyeyi batanga ibyiciro 
bitandukanye?- ushobora gukoresha imbonerahamwe ikurikira  kugirango ubone 
ibisubizo) 
  
 Urwego rw’amafaranga 
atangwa.( garagaza niba 
ku umwaka. nibindi) 
 Umubare w’ababyeyi 
muri iki kigo batanga hafi 
uyu mubare. 
Ni ikihe kigero cyo hasi 
cy’amafaranga atangwa 
  
Ni ikihe kigero cyo hejuru 
cy’amafaranga atangwa.  
  
Ese mugereranya ko impuzandego 
y’amafaranga atangwa iba iyihe?   
  
 
16. Ese amafaranga atangwa ni amwe muri mwaka/icyiciro? Niba atari byo, atandukana 
ate? 
 
17. Dushishikajwe nanone no kumenya imyumvire yawe ku uburyo ibyiciro bitandukanye 
by’amafaranga atangwa nababyeyi/abahagarariye ababyeyi bigenwa.? Urugero, ese 
ihuriro ry’abarimu n’ababyeyi rigaraza ababyeyi/ abahagarariye ababyeyi bakwiye 
gutanga make? (Dukeneye amakuru yuzuye ashoboka nanone baza  ibibazo 
byerekeranye  kugirango usobanukirwe.)  
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18. Habaho ngaruka ki iyo umubyeyi/ uhagarariye umubyeyi adatanze uruhare rwe ku 
ikiguzi cy’ishuli?  
 
19. Dukeneye kumenya niba hari amafaranga agenwe yo gufasha ingo zikennye kurusha 
izindi(zaba ari izikuriwe n’ababyeyi cyangwa n’abana) muri aka gace, urugero ziturutse 
mu miryango itegamiye kuri leta, amatsinda rusange, cyangwa amatsinda 
y’amadini?Dukeneye kumenya  byumwihariko imfashanyo y’amafaranga ihabwa ingo 
kugirango ibafashe  gutanga amafaranga agenwa n’ishuli, urugero, kugura 
umwambaro w’ishuli. (mushobora gushyiramo nubwoko bwikigo nizina ryacyo, ingano 
yinkunga  batanga? Ni ikihe kigereranyo cyangwa umubare w’ababyeyi bafasha buri 
mwaka)  
 
Ubwoko bwikigo (hariho n’amazina)  
 
----------------------------- 
 
Ese hatangwa imfashanyo y’amafaranga ingana iki?( niba ari kumwaka cyangwa 
kukwezi)  
 
----------------------------- 
 
Ni ababyeyi bangahe bafashwa buri mwaka(byaba ikigereranyo cyangwa umubare) 
 
----------------------------- 
 
20. Dushishikajwe no kumenya ububasha ababyeyi bagira, binanyujijwe mu ihuriro 
ry’ababyeyi n’abarimu ku imikoresherezwe y’amafaranga batanga. Mwadusobanurira 
inshingano y’ababyeyi n’abahagarariye ababyeyi( urugero ku impfubyi)  mu ikoreshwa 
ry’amafaranga batanga? (harimo no gusesengura ufite ububasha bwo hejuru , niba ari 
umuyobozi w’ikigo cyangwa ababyeyi  nanone kandi niba inkunga y’ababyeyi igenerwa 
by’umwihariko agahimbazamusyi k’abarimu) 
 
21. Dushishikariye kumenya imyumvire yawe ku ukuba ababyeyi batanga uruhare rw’ 
amafaranga mu mashuli abanza. Mushobora kugaragaza buryo ki mwemeranya 
cyangwa mutemeranya n’interuro zikurikira. Mushobora guhitamo kwemera 
bikomeye, kwemera bigereranije, kutemera bigereranije no kutemera bikomeye.   
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Ababyeyi kuba bagira uruhare rw’amafaranga mu 
amashuli abanza ni ikintu kiza.  
   
Ikigero cy’uruhare rw’ababyeyi kiriho ubu 
kibonwa na benshi mu ababyeyi 
   
Hari umubyeyi w’umutindi kuburyo atakwishyura 
amafaranga y’ishuli azafashwa.  
   
Kwishyura amafaranga y’ishuli ni byiza kuko biha 
ababyeyi ijambo ku imicungire y’ishuli 
   
 
22. Ni nde ufite ijambo rikuru mu ukwemeza ingengo y’imari?   (kosora igisubizo) 
a. Umuyobozi mukuru w’ikigo  
 
b. Umuyobozi mukarere  
 
c. Ababyeyi   
23. Watubwira birenzeho ku uruhare  rw’ababyeyi mukwemeza uburyo inkunga 
ikoreshwa?(Uzakenera no kwandika uburyo bunyuranye ababyeyi bagiramo uruhare mu  
igikorwa cyo kugena ingengo y’imari) 
 
AMAKURU AJYANYE N’IREME RY’UBUREZI 
 
24. Dushishikajwe no kumenya imyumvire yanyu ku icyagira “ishuli ryiza” n’ “uburezi 
bwiza” ku abanyeshuli banyu. Mu magambo yanyu, wasobanura ute mu incamake uko 
utekereza ishuli ryiza riba rimeze? (iki ni ikibazo gifunguye kandi ntugomba gushakisha 
ibisubizo by’umwihariko , ariko ugomba kwandika niba ashidikanya). 
 
25. Ni izihe mbogamizi z’ingenzi mwatubwira muhura nazo mu ugutanga uburezi bwiza ku 
abanyeshuli? Ese mwadusobanurira impamvu  ibi ari ingenzi? 
 
  
imbogamizi ya 1:   -------------------------------- 
 
imbogamizi ya 2:  --------------------------------- 
 
26. Noneho twifuzaga kubabaza  icyo mwakenera cyane cyateza imbere ishuli ryanyu 
rikaba ishuli ryiza. Utekereje ku ibintu bikurikira, mushobora kubitondeka mukurikije 
uko mubona bimeze neza ku ishuli ryanyu muri iki gihe. (1 ni aho wumva ko hakewe 
kongerwa ingufu gake, naho 5 ni aho wumva ko hakewe gushyirwa ingufu cyane)  
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 1.  2. 3. 4. 5. simbizi 
Guha abanyeshuli ahantu hatekanye  bigira       
Kugira abarimu bashoboye kwigisha neza 
mucyongereza 
      
Gutanga ibikorwa bitandukanye urugero ibibuga 
n’umwanya wo gukina 
      
Kugira abarimu bumwuga kandi bafite ubushake        
Kugira abarimu bahembwa bikwiye       
 Kugira ingunga imwe gusa ku umunsi       
Gushyiraho umuco n’umwuka mwiza abakobwa 
bisangamo  
      
Kugira ibitabo byiza bikoreshwa nabanyeshuli        
Kugira ibikoresho by’ibanze byo kwigishirizamo 
urugero Ibinyabuzi  
      
Kwita cyane ku ugusoma no kwandika 
 
 
 
     
Kugira umubare muto wa abanyeshuli ku 
umwarimu 
      
Kugira ubuyobozi n’imicungire byiza by’ishuli        
Kugira ukwigisha gushingiye ku amakuru y’uko 
buri munyeshuli amenya.l  
      
Kugira ibikoresho by’ibanze, nk’intebe 
z’abanyeshuli zihagije. 
      
Kwigisha integanyanyigisho ngari n’amasomo 
menshi.  
      
Kugira imyigire ishingiye ku abanyeshuli.  
 
 
 
     
Gukorana neza n’ababyeyi n’abaturage       
Aho abanyeshuli bafite amahirwe yo gukina no 
kwidagadura. 
      
 
 
27. Dushishikajwe no kumenya uko musesengura imikorere no kujyambere by’ishuli 
ryanyu. Ese mushobora gutondeka ibipimo bishoboka bitandukanye by’imikorere 
myiza y’ishuli ryanyu,aho ikingenzi cyane kiza mbere, icyakabiri k’ingenzi kikaza 
k’umwanya wa kabiri, icya gatatu cy’inngenzi kikaza k’umwanya wa gatatu , gutyo 
gutyo.)  
 Ranking   
Amanota y’ibizamini by’umwaka wa 6    
 
 Ese ni abanyeshuli bangahe barangiza umwaka wa 6 bazi neza 
icyongereza n’imibare  
 
Umubare w’abanyeshuli barangiza umwaka wa 3 bazi neza  
ikinyarwanda  
 
 
Igisubizo kiza kijyanye n’ishuli bivuye mu ababyeyi  
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Ibisubizo byigenzura  biturutse mu ubugenzuzi bw’amashuli ba Leta   
 
Impuzandengo y’ingano y’ishuli abanyeshuli bigishirizwamo.  
 
 Ikigereranyo cy’abanyeshuli barangiza umwaka wa 6 bafite imyaka 
12 no munsi yayo.  
 
 
Ikigereranyo cy’abarimu babifitiye ubumenyi.   
 
 Urutonde rw’ibikorwa,  nk’ibibuga n’amahirwe yo gukina bitangwa 
n’ishuli. 
 
 
 
28. Ese mwagaragaza buryo ki mwemeranya nizi nteruro zikurikira? Mushobora guhitamo 
kwemera bikomeye, kwemera bigereranije, kutemera bigereranije no kutemera 
bikomeye.  
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Ishuli ryange ryibanda bikomeye ku ugusoma no 
kwandika( mu ikinyarwanda) n’imibare mu umwaka 
wa 1 – mu umwaka wa 3    
   
Abarimu bo ku ishuli ryacu bakungukira mu ukubona 
ibikoresho byo kwigishirizaho bijyanye nigihe –
urugero “imfashanyigisho” 
   
 Ku ishuli ryacu duha agaciro kwemerera abanyeshuli 
gukina kimwe nko kwiga ibyo mu ishuli  
   
Mu ishuli ryacu, kwibanda ku ugusoma no kwandika ( 
mu icyongereza) n’imibare  byabaye ngombwa cyane 
mu myaka ya vuba.  
   
Andi mashuli nzi aha agaciro kwemerera abana gukina 
kimwe n’andi masomo. 
   
Ubushake n’ubwitange byange bwite ku kazi  
birahanitse. 
 
   
Dutekereje  ku abayobozi b’amashuli muri rusange, 
ubushake n’ubwitange  ku akazi byabo birahanitse 
   
Mu ubunararibonye bwange, nagize inkunga ihagije 
kumfasha gutera imbere mu akazi.  
   
Abayobozi b’amashuli bahembwa bihagije bibatera 
gutanga uburezi bwiza ku abanyeshuli babo.  
   
Abarimu bange bakeneye andi mahugurwa menshi 
mu Icyongereza.  
   
Abarimu bange bakeneye amahugurwa arenzeho ku     
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imyigire ishingiye k’umunyeshuri.  
Isomo ryo kwihangira imirimo ni ingenzi ku ishuli 
ryange. 
 
   
Amahugurwa y’abayobozi b’amashuli yagaragajwe 
nk’ingenzi bihagije.  
   
Abayobozi b’amashuli barubashywe bihagije aho 
batuye.  
 
   
 
UMUBARE N’IMYAKA Y’ABANYESHULI  
 
29. Dushishikajwe n’umubare wabanyeshuli bo ku ikigo cyanyu bari mu ikigero k’imyaka 
itandukanye.Mushobora kuzuza  mbonerahamwe ikurikira ibaza umubare 
w’abanyeshuli muri buri mwaka ku uburyo burambuye, harimo (a) igitsina (b) ni 
abanyeshuli bangahe muri buri mwaka bafite imyaka irenze isanzwe y’uwo mwaka. 
 
Umwaka 
w’ishuli 
Umubare 
w’abakobwa 
Umubare 
w’abahungu  
 Umubare wabarengeje imyaka  
Umwaka wa 1    
Umwaka wa 2    
 Umwaka wa 3    
Umwaka wa 4    
Umwaka wa 5    
Umwaka wa 6    
 
Umubare w’abanyeshuli muri buri mwaka n’umubare w’ibyumba by’amashuli 
 
30. Nanone dushishikajwe n’umubare w’ibyumba by’amashuli  muri buri mwaka 
n’umubare w’abanyeshuli bari muri buri cyumba.Ese mushobora kutwuzuriza 
imbonerahamwe ikurikira? 
 
Umwaka 
w’ishuli 
Umubare w’ibyumba Umubare w’abanyeshuli bari muri buri 
mwaka(andika umubare uri muri buri cyumba 
niba birenze kimwe muri uwo mwaka) 
Umwaka wa 1   
Umwaka wa 2   
 Umwaka wa 3   
Umwaka wa 4   
Umwaka wa 5   
Umwaka wa 6   
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31. Dushishikajwe kandi n’umubare w’abanyeshuli banyu  batsinze ibizamini by’umwaka 
wa 6  bafite imyaka 12 no munsi yayo. Mu imbonerahamwe ikurikira, mwaduha 
amakuru ya buri mwaka mu imyaka 3 ishize, ku abahungu n’abakobwa? 
   
 
 Umubare wabahungu batsinze 
ibizamini by’umwaka wa 6 
bafite imyaka 12 cyangwa 
munsi yayo.  
Umubare wa abakobwa batsinze 
ibizamini by’umwaka wa 6 bafite 
imyaka 12 cyangwa munsi yayo. 
2010   
 
32. Dushishikajwe kandi na umubare w’abanyeshuli batabasha gukomeza 
amashuli.Dukeneye amakuru yabyo kuva mu mwaka 1 kugeza mu wa 6.Utekereje ku 
abanyeshuli barangije umwaka w’amashuli 2009,ni bangahe batashoboye gukomeza 
mu mwaka ukurikira watangiye 2010? Nanone mushobora kuduha imibare mushingiye 
ku ibitsina. (niba ishuli ryanyu rifite amashuli yisumbuye abanza, dukeneye 
kumenyaumubare w’abanyeshuli bashoboye gukomeza muri ayomashuli) 
 
 Umubare w’abakobwa 
batakomeje mu umwaka 
ukurikira muri 2010.  
Umubare w’abahungu 
batakomeje mu umwaka 
ukurikira muri 2010.  
Umwaka wa 1 – 
umwaka wa 2 
  
Umwaka wa 2 – 
umwaka wa 3 
  
Umwaka wa 3 – 
umwaka wa 4 
  
Umwaka wa 4 – 
umwaka wa 5 
  
Umwaka wa 5 – 
umwaka wa 6 
  
Umwaka wa 6 – 
umwaka wa 1 
wisumbuye.  
  
P6 to S1   
S1 to S2   
S2 to S3   
 
 
106 
 
33. Utekereje ku isomo ry’icyongerezabmumwaka wa gatatu ubanza, mwaba mufite 
ibitabo bingahe kuri buri cyumba cy’ishuli? 
  
34. Leta iherutse gutangiza uburyo busya bwokugura ibitabo? Ese mwatubwira niba ibi 
haricyo byafashije mukwihitisha itangwa ry’ibitabo?  
  
35. Ukurikije ubu buro busya bwokugura ibitabo, ubona ibitabo bisarushaho kuba byinshi, 
kuba bike cyangwa kuguma ukobisanzwe? 
a. Bike 
b. Nkibisanzwe  
36. Ikigo cyanyu cyaba gifite abarimu bangahe? 
 
    
37. Nibangahe muri abo barium babifitiye impamyabumenyi?   
 
38. Waduha ikihe kigereranyo mpuzandengo ku imyaka y’abarimu bo mu kigo cyanyu?  
 
39. Ese mwaduka ikigereranyo cy’umushahara w’abarimu ku ishuli ryanyu 
kumpuzandengo? Gerageza kugereranya ushyizemo nandi mafaranga babona harimo 
n’agahimbaza musyi cyangwa n’andi bahabwa n’ababyeyi.   
 
40. Ese ku ishuli ryanyu umushahara muto uhabwa umwarimu ni amafaranga angahe? 
Gerageza kugereranya ushyizemo nandi mafaranga babona harimo n’agahimbaza 
musyi cyangwa n’andi bahabwa n’ababyeyi  
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AMAKURU AJYNYE N’INKUNGA 
 
41. Ubu tugiye kuvuga kumakuru ajyanye n’inkunga ikigo cyanyu kibona.Dukeneye 
kumenya ingano y’amafaranga  yose ishuli ryanyu ribona aturutse abantu 
hatandukanye? Mubyiciro byose byagaragajwe hepfo dukeneye kumenya niba 
mubona amafaranga guturuka aha; niba aribyo ishuli ribona angahe?nangahe ishuli 
ryagombye kubona? Niryari amafaranga atangwa( nikumwaka, ni rimwe mugihembwe, 
ni buri cyumweru na ibindi);niba muhura nubukererwe mukubona ayo mafaranga, niba 
ayo mafaranga afite ibikorwa yagenewe niba aribyo ni ibihe?Iki ni igice 
cy’ububushakashatsi kingenzi kuritwe akaba ari nayo mpamvu dukeneye amakuru 
yuzuye bishoboka. Dukeneye amakuru ya buri umwe mumyaka itatu ishize- 2010, 2009 
n’umwaka wa 2008. Uzakenera gutanga imbonera hamwe yakabiri yerekeranye 
n’amafaranga. 
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Umwaka wa 2010 
 
 
Isooko 
Ese inkunga 
yaturutse 
aha? 
Ese ikigo 
cyabonye 
inkunga  
ingana iki 
iturutse...?  
Ese ikigo 
cyari 
kigenewe 
inkunga 
ingana iki 
iturutse....?  
Ese iyi 
nkunga 
iboneka 
ryari?(mucyu
mweru, mu 
ukwezi, ku 
igihembwe, 
ku umwaka) 
Ese  hari 
ubukererwe 
bungana iki 
mu 
ugushyikira 
iyi nkunga?  
Ese iyi 
nkunga yaba 
yaraje 
iteganyirijwe 
ibikorwa 
runaka?  
Ese niba 
aribyo, 
ayinkunga 
yari 
iteganirijwe 
ikihe 
gikorwa/ibih
e bikorwa?  
Amafaranga Leta itanga atajya 
mumishahara y’abarimu  
       
Imfashanyo y’ubuyobozi 
bw’ibanze. 
       
Igiteranyo cy’amafaranga 
yavuye mu ihuriro ry’abarimu 
n’ababyeyi atanzwe 
n’ababyeyi. 
       
Izindi nkunga zitangwa 
n’ababyeyi ( havuyemo 
amafaranga atangwa ku 
umwambaro w’ishuli) 
       
Insengero, imiryango 
itegamiye kuri leta nandi 
matsinda rusange 
       
Ikusanya mafaranga 
muruhame( fundraising) 
       
Ubundi buryo harimo 
n’uburyo bwa Leta 
       
Imbonera hamwe ya 2: Inkunga ku amashuli   
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Umwaka wa 2009 
 
 
Isooko  
Ese inkunga 
yaturutse 
aha? 
Ese ikigo 
cyabonye 
inkunga  
ingana iki 
iturutse...?  
Ese ikigo 
cyari 
kigenewe 
inkunga 
ingana iki 
iturutse....?  
Ese iyi 
nkunga 
iboneka 
ryari?(mucyu
mweru, mu 
ukwezi, ku 
igihembwe, 
ku umwaka) 
Ese  hari 
ubukererwe 
bungana iki 
mu 
ugushyikira 
iyi nkunga?  
Ese iyi 
nkunga yaba 
yaraje 
iteganyirijwe 
ibikorwa 
runaka?  
Ese niba 
aribyo, 
ayinkunga 
yari 
iteganirijwe 
ikihe 
gikorwa/ibih
e bikorwa?  
Amafaranga Leta itanga atajya 
mumishahara y’abarimu  
       
Imfashanyo y’ubuyobozi 
bw’ibanze. 
       
Igiteranyo cy’amafaranga 
yavuye mu ihuriro ry’abarimu 
n’ababyeyi atanzwe 
n’ababyeyi. 
       
Izindi nkunga zitangwa 
n’ababyeyi ( havuyemo 
amafaranga atangwa ku 
umwambaro w’ishuli) 
       
Insengero, imiryango 
itegamiye kuri leta nandi 
matsinda rusange 
       
Ikusanya mafaranga 
muruhame( fundraising) 
       
Ubundi buryo harimo 
n’uburyo bwa Leta 
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 Umwaka wa 2008 
 
 
Isooko 
Ese inkunga 
yaturutse 
aha? 
Ese ikigo 
cyabonye 
inkunga  
ingana iki 
iturutse...?  
Ese ikigo 
cyari 
kigenewe 
inkunga 
ingana iki 
iturutse....?  
Ese iyi 
nkunga 
iboneka 
ryari?(mucyu
mweru, mu 
ukwezi, ku 
igihembwe, 
ku umwaka) 
Ese  hari 
ubukererwe 
bungana iki 
mu 
ugushyikira 
iyi nkunga?  
Ese iyi 
nkunga yaba 
yaraje 
iteganyirijwe 
ibikorwa 
runaka?  
Ese niba 
aribyo, 
ayinkunga 
yari 
iteganirijwe 
ikihe 
gikorwa/ibih
e bikorwa?  
Imbonerahamwe y’amasomo 
ya leta  
       
Imfashanyo y’ubuyobozi 
bw’ibanze. 
       
Igiteranyo cy’amafaranga 
yavuye mu ihuriro ry’abarimu 
n’ababyeyi atanzwe 
n’ababyeyi. 
       
Izindi nkunga zitangwa 
n’ababyeyi ( havuyemo 
amafaranga atangwa ku 
umwambaro w’ishuli) 
       
Insengero, imiryango 
itegamiye kuri leta nandi 
matsinda rusange 
       
Ikusanya mafaranga 
muruhame( fundraising) 
       
Ubundi buryo harimo 
n’uburyo bwa Leta 
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42. Niba ikigo cy’ishuli cyanyu kibona inkunga iturutse mu insengero, imiryango itegamiye kuri Leta n’andi matsinda rusange, 
mwaduha amazina n’addresse byabo. 
43. Niba ikigo cy’amashuri cyanyu kibona izindi nkunga za Leta, mwatubwira izo ari zo?  
*** DRAFT: NOT FOR FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF QUOTATION *** 
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44. Nk’aho ikigo gikura inkunga, nanone dukeneye kumenya uburyo ki ikigo gikoresha iyo 
nkunga? Mu ayandi magambo, ikigo gikoresha amfaranga yacyo mu ibiki? Mushobora 
kugaragaza muri iyi mbanerahamwe ikurikira ingano y’amafaranga mukoresha muri 
buri kimwe muri ibi bikurikira? (Mu imyaka itatu ishize, kandi imibare igomba kuba 
igaragaza amafaranga ,Atari ikigereranyo cy’ingengo y’imari– 2008, 2009 and 2010) 
 
Igikorwa Umwaka wa 
2008 
Umwaka wa 
2009 
Umwaka wa 
2010 
Umushahara fatiro w’abarimu 
(Dukeneye  kumenya amafaranga  Leta 
itanga atajya mumishahara y’abarimu 
cyangwa atangwa n’ababyeyi 
akoreshwa mu imishahara y’abarimu- 
Atari ayo leta itanga kumishahara 
bwite y’abarimu 
   
Imishahara  y’abandi bakozi batari 
abarimu.  
   
Ibikoresho byo kwigishirizaho. (harimo 
ibitabo,impapuro n’amakaramu 
n’ibindi) 
   
Agahimbazamusyi k’abarimu     
Ibikoresho remezo (amazi n’umuriro. 
nibindi) 
   
Gusana inyubako (Dukeneye  kumenya 
niba ari  amafaranga  Leta itanga 
atajya mumishahara y’abarimu 
cyangwa atangwa n’ababyeyi ).  
   
Ubukode bw’inyubako yanyu      
Andi mafaranga akoreshwa mu 
ubuyobozi.  
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45. Ese mutanga amafaranga menshi kumunyeshuli yanyuma abanza? Niba aribyo 
mwaduha ikigereranyo cy’uburyo arutanwa- ntabwo dushaka umubare nyawo?  
 
46. Niba mufite amashuli y’imyaka icyenda, ese mwaba mutanga amafaranga meshi 
kumunyeshuli mumashuli atatuyisumbuye (S1- S3) kurusha mumyaka itatu y’amashuli 
abanza(P1 -P3) ? niba aribyo, mwatugereranyiriza itandukaniro? Dukeneye umubare 
nyawo.  
GAHUNDA Y’IBIGANIRO 
 
Ihuriro Ry’ababyeyi n’abarimu 
 
GUTANGIRA  
Muzakenera kwisobanuraho nk’abashakashatsi bakorera ikigo cyubushakashatsi kigenga 
IPAR-Rwanda bakora ubushakashatsi buterwa inkunga n’ikigo ny’Africa gishinzwe kongera 
ubushobozi kuri politike y’uburezi.Uzakenera kubasobanurira ko  hari ibintu bibiri ubu 
bushakashatsi buzibandaho - mbere nambere  amafaranga akoreshwa mu amashuli abanza 
n’icya kabiri ireme ry’ uburezi mu amashuli abanza..  
 
Sobanura ko IPAR-Rwanda yahisemo ahantu habiri mu gihugu bagereranye amakuru 
atandukanye azava aha hantu hatandukanye 
    
Nanone vuga ko twizeye ko ibizava muri ubu bushakashatsi  bizatuma  Leta  igera ku intego  
zayo z’ ireme ry’uburezi kubana bose m’uRwanda  
 
GUSABA KUGIRANA IKIGANIRO 
 
Mbere yuko utangira   banza usome urupapuro rwiBefore you start read out the ‘Informed 
Consent Statement’.  
 
Mwaramutse/ mwiriweho amazina yange ni ...................................... nkorera  ikigo 
cyubushakashatsi nisesengura rya politiki IPAR-Rwanda gikorera iKigali.Turakora 
ubushakashatsi buterwa inkunga n’ikigo nyafirika gishinzwe kongera ubushobozi.Ubwo 
bushakashatsi burakorwa ku ibintu bibiri mu uburezi bwibanze. Icyambere ni amafaranga 
akoreshwa  mu uburezi bwibanze ikindi ni  ibiki bifite  uruhare  mu ukugira ishuli “ryiza” na 
uburezi “bwiza”  kubana  m’uRwanda. Turakora ubu bushakashatsi kuko dushaka kumenya 
birenzeho  ibyerekeye amashuli m’uRwanda kugirango dufashe Leta kurushaho kuyateza 
imbere. Ubushakashatsi bwacu buzageza kuri Leta n’abandi amakuru ajyanye n’amashuli 
aturutse mu imyumvire y’abayakoresha n’abayakoramo. IPAR ishishikajwe kugaragaza 
ingamba n’inama byafasha guverinoma y’Urwanda guteza imbere ibikorwa by’ uburezi. 
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Ibitekerezo byanyu bizaba ari ingirakamaro  ,twanifuzaga cyane ko mwemera kugira 
uruhare.Ntabwo tuzashyira amazina yanyu ku urutonde rw’ibibazwa kandi tuzakora raporo 
yacu ku uburyo utamenyekana . Gusubiza ibibazo byacu ntibiri bugutware igihe kirenze 
isaha..  
 
Ese mwishimiye kudufasha  mugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi? 
 Yego/Oya  
 Umukono -------------------------------------- (Ugize ikipe ya IPAR)           Italiki  ------------------ 
AMAKURU AJYANYE N’UBUYOBOZI 
 
1.  Umubare w’ibanga w’itsinda 
 
2. Aho uherereye (ca akaziga hamwe) 
vii) Kigali 
viii) icyaro 
 
3. Nimero y’ishuli  
 
 
IBIJYANYE N’UBAZWA 
 
4. Igitsina (ca akaziga kuri  kimwe) 
vii) Gabo 
viii) Gore 
 
5. Imyaka (isabukuru aherutse kugira) 
 
----------------------------- imyaka 
 
 
6. Ese ni ikihe cyiciro cy’amashuli gisumba ibindi warangije? (ca akaziga kuri kimwe) 
     
i) Ntayo, sinigeze niga  
ii) Sinarangije amashuli abanza  
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iii) Impamyabumenyi y’amashuli abanza  
iv) Sinarangije amashuli yisumbuye  
v) Impamyabumenyi y’ icyiciro cyambere cy’amashuli Yisumbuye leaving certificate 
vi) Nize amashuli yisumbuye  
vii) Nize amashuli y’imyuga  
viii) Nize kaminura  
 
7. Ese niwowe muyobozi w’ihuriro ry’ababyeyi n’abarimu cyangwa uri 
umunyamuryango gusa? (ca akaziga hamwe) 
Umuyobozi w’ihuriro ry’abarimu n’ababyeyi    
 
Umunyamuryango w’ihuriro ry’abarimu n’ababyeyi     
 
Ikindi  
 
8. Amashuli amwe  m’urwanda yarubatswe cyangwa yarasanwe- urugero kongera 
ibyumba by’ishuli- binyuze m’umuganda. Ese ababyeyi barerera kw’ishuli ryanyu 
bagira uruhare  mubikorwa byubwubatsi nkibi?  
 
--------------------------------- 
 
9. Ese mwaduha ubusobanuro burambuye birenzeho kucyo ababyeyi bakoze  n’igihe 
bagikoreye?  
 
Ese niki ababyeyi bafashijemo?   
 
Byari muwuhe mwaka?   
 
10. Ihuriro ry’ababyeyi n’abarimu riterana nyuma yigehe kingana iki? (ca akaziga 
hamwe) 
Rimwe mu icyumweru kumpuzandengo   
Rimwe muri buri byumweru bibiri kumpuzandengo   
Rimwe mu kwezi  
Munsi ya rimwe mu kwezi  
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11. Ese nawe waba uri umunyamuryango wa njyanama y’ishuli? ? (ca akaziga hamwe)  
Yego  
Oya   
 
12. Ese mwadusobanurira uruhare rw’ihuriro ry’abarimu n’ababyeyi ku ishuli ryanyu? 
Nihe rifata ibyemezo? 
  
13. By’umwihariko mwatubwira birenzeho k’uruhare niba ruhari rw’inama y’ababyeyi 
n’abarimu ku  imikoreshereze y’amafaranga leta igenera amashuli Atari imishahara 
y’abarimu (Dukeneye amakuru yuzuye ashoboka kuruhare rw’ababyeyi, ikoreshwa 
ry’amafaranga barijyaho inama n’umuyobozi w’ishuli? Ese ikoreshwa 
ryayamafaranga rigaragarizwa ababyeyi kugirango batangeho ibitekerezo?) 
  
14. Ese mwadusobanurira uruhare rw’ihuriro ry’abarimu n’ababyeyi mugusyiraho 
abarimu n’abayobozi b’ishuli? 
    
AMAKURU AJYANYE N’AMAFARANGA AKORESHWA  
 
15. Dushishikajwe no kumenya buryo ki ababyeyi ( cyangwa  abarezi , urugero abaye 
ari imfubyi) bafasha ikigo batanga inkunga y’amafaranga.Nizihe  nzira 
zitandukanye ababyeyi batangiramo amafaranga yo gufasha ikigo?buryo ki 
mubukurikira ababyeyi  Mushobora kugaragaza mu ibikurikira ibijyanye n’ishuli 
ryanyu? (kosora) 
   
Agahimbazamusyi gatangwa n’ababyeyi  
a. Amafaranga atangwa ku imyigire mu akarere cyangwa k’umurenger  
b. Amafaranga y’ubwishingizi ku ishuli  
c. Amafaranga atanditse/ ategenwe yishyurwa mu ikigo.  
d. Amafaranga ahabwa abarimu b’umwihariko. 
e. Ibindi   ----------------------------- 
 
 
*** DRAFT: NOT FOR FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF QUOTATION *** 
 
117 
 
16. Ese mwaduha amakuru ku agaciro k’amafaranga atandukanye atangwa 
n’ababyeyi? Watugaragariza niba bayatangaburi kwezi,bur’ igihembwe cyangwa 
buri mwaka? 
    
17. Niba hari ikigero cy’amafaranga,  ninde wanzura uburyo ayo mafaranga agenwa? 
Ni ihuriro ry’ababyeyi n’abarimu? Niba Atari byo ninde wanzura ayo ababyeyi 
bagomba gutanga?  If not who does decide what level the parental contribution 
should be? 
 
18. Ese ababyeyi/ abahagarariye ababyeyi batanga amafaranga angina ku imyigire? 
Cyangwa bamwe – urugero abatishoboye batanga ari munsi?  
 
a. Yego    
 
b. Oya 
 (Niba ari “yego” baza ibibazo bibiri bikurikira. Niba ari oya, komeza ku ikibazo x.) 
  
19. Niba hari ababyeyi/abahagarariye ababyeyi batanga make ku ay’abandi  
dushishikajjwe no kumenya amakuru kuri byo. Mbere ya byose, ababyeyi 
batandukanye batanga angahe? (ushobora kubaza amakuru arambuye kuri iki 
kibazo harimo n’ibyiciro bitandukanye  byishyurwa, n’umubare w’ababyeyi 
batanga ibyiciro bitandukanye?- ushobora gukoresha imbonerahamwe ikurikira  
kugirango ubone ibisubizo..............)  
 
 
 Urwego rw’amafaranga 
atangwa.( garagaza niba 
ku umwaka. nibindi) 
 Umubare w’ababyeyi muri 
iki kigo batanga hafi uyu 
mubare. 
Ni ikihe kigero cyo hasi 
cy’amafaranga atangwa 
  
  Ni ikihe kigero cyo hejuru 
cy’amafaranga atangwa.  
  
 Ese mugereranya ko 
impuzandego 
y’amafaranga atangwa iba 
iyihe?   
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20. Ese amafaranga atangwa ni amwe muri mwaka/icyiciro? Niba atari byo, 
atandukana ate? 
 
21. Habaho ngaruka ki iyo umubyeyi/ uhagarariye umubyeyi adatanze uruhare rwe ku 
ikiguzi cy’ishuli? 
 
22. Dukeneye kumenya niba hari amafaranga agenwe yo gufasha ingo zikennye 
kurusha izindi(zaba ari izikuriwe n’ababyeyi cyangwa n’abana) muri aka gace, 
urugero ziturutse mu miryango itegamiye kuri leta, amatsinda rusange, cyangwa 
amatsinda y’amadini?Dukeneye kumenya  byumwihariko imfashanyo 
y’amafaranga ihabwa ingo kugirango ibafashe  gutanga amafaranga agenwa 
n’ishuli, urugero. ( mushobora gushyiramo nubwoko bwikigo nizina ryacyo, ingano 
yinkunga  batanga? Ni ikihe kigereranyo cyangwa umubare w’ababyeyi bafasha buri 
mwaka, )  
 
Ubwoko bwikigo (hariho n’amazina)  
 
 
Ese hatangwa imfashanyo y’amafaranga ingana iki?( niba ari kumwaka cyangwa 
kukwezi)  
 
 
Ni ababyeyi bangahe bafashwa buri mwaka(byaba ikigereranyo cyangwa umubare) 
 
 
23. Dushishikajwe no kumenya ububasha ababyeyi bagira, binanyujijwe mu ihuriro 
ry’ababyeyi n’abarimu ku imikoresherezwe y’amafaranga batanga. 
Mwadusobanurira inshingano y’ababyeyi n’abahagarariye ababyeyi( urugero ku 
impfubyi)  mu ikoreshwa ry’amafaranga batanga? (harimo no gusesengura ufite 
ububasha bwo hejuru , niba ari umuyobozi w’ikigo cyangwa ababyeyi  nanone kandi 
niba inkunga y’ababyeyi igenerwa by’umwihariko agahimbazamusyi k’abarimu) 
 
 
24. Dushishikariye kumenya imyumvire yawe ku ukuba ababyeyi batanga uruhare rw’ 
amafaranga mu mashuli abanza. Mushobora kugaragaza buryo ki mwemeranya 
cyangwa mutemeranya n’interuro zikurikira. Mushobora guhitamo kwemera 
bikomeye, kwemera bigereranije, kutemera bigereranije no kutemera bikomeye.   
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N
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Ababyeyi kuba bagira uruhare rw’amafaranga 
mu amashuli abanza ni ikintu kiza.  
 
   
Ikigero cy’uruhare rw’ababyeyi kiriho ubu 
kibonwa na benshi mu ababyeyi 
 
   
Hari umubyeyi w’umutindi kuburyo 
atakwishyura amafaranga y’ishuli azafashwa. 
  
   
Kwishyura amafaranga y’ishuli ni byiza kuko 
biha ababyeyi ijambo ku imicungire y’ishuli 
 
   
 
25. Waba uzi igiteranyo cy’amafaranga yatanzwe n’ababyeyi ku ishuliryanyu 
m’umwaka ushize? Niba aribyo angina iki?  [ntabwo dukeneye umubare nyawo- 
gereranya niba usubza atabizi neza] 
 
26. Ese utekereza ko yaba ari menshi, make cyangwa angina nayatangwaga mumyaka 
itanu ishize? 
 
27. Ese utekereza ko yaba ari menshi, make cyangwa angina nayatangwaga mumyaka 
icumi ishize?  
 
 
AMAKURU AJYANYE N’IREME RY’UBUREZI 
 
28. Dushishikajwe no kumenya imyumvire yanyu ku icyagira “ishuli ryiza” n’ “uburezi 
bwiza” ku abanyeshuli banyu. Mu magambo yanyu, wasobanura ute mu incamake 
uko utekereza ishuli  ryiza  riba rimeze?( iki ni ikibazo gifunguye kandi ntugomba 
gushakisha ibisubizo by’umwihariko , ariko ugomba kwandika niba ashidikanya).  
 
 
29. Ni izihe mbogamizi z’ingenzi mwatubwira muhura nazo mu ugutanga uburezi bwiza 
ku abanyeshuli?Ese mwadusobanurira impamvu  ibi ari ingenzi? 
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imbogamizi ya 1:   -------------------------------- 
 
 
imbogamizi ya 2:  --------------------------------- 
 
 
30. Noneho twifuzaga kubabaza  icyo mwakenera cyane cyateza imbere ishuli ryanyu 
rikaba ishuli ryiza. Utekereje ku ibintu bikurikira, mushobora kubitondeka 
mukurikije uko mubona bimeze neza ku ishuli ryanyu muri iki gihe. (1 ni aho 
wumva ko hakewe kongerwa ingufu gake, naho 5 ni aho wumva ko hakewe 
gushyirwa ingufu cyane)  
 1.  2. 3. 4. 5. simbi
zi 
Guha abanyeshuli ahantu hatekanye  
bigira 
 
      
Kugira abarimu bashoboye kwigisha 
neza mucyongereza 
      
Gutanga ibikorwa bitandukanye 
urugero ibibuga n’umwanya wo gukina 
      
Kugira abarimu bumwuga kandi bafite 
ubushake  
      
Kugira abarimu bahembwa bikwiye  
 
     
 Kugira ingunga imwe gusa ku umunsi  
 
     
Gushyiraho umuco n’umwuka mwiza 
abakobwa bisangamo  
      
Kugira ibitabo byiza bikoreshwa 
nabanyeshuli  
      
Kugira ibikoresho by’ibanze byo 
kwigishirizamo urugero Ibinyabuzi  
      
Kwita cyane ku ugusoma no kwandika 
 
 
 
     
Kugira umubare muto wa abanyeshuli 
ku umwarimu 
      
Kugira ubuyobozi n’imicungire byiza 
by’ishuli  
      
Kugira ukwigisha gushingiye ku 
amakuru y’uko buri munyeshuli 
amenya.l  
      
Kugira ibikoresho by’ibanze, nk’intebe 
z’abanyeshuli zihagije. 
      
Kwigisha integanyanyigisho ngari       
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n’amasomo menshi.  
Kugira imyigire ishingiye ku 
abanyeshuli.  
 
 
     
Gukorana neza n’ababyeyi n’abaturage 
 
      
Aho abanyeshuli bafite amahirwe yo 
gukina no kwidagadura. 
      
 
31. Ese mwagaragaza buryo ki mwemeranya nizi nteruro zikurikira? Mushobora 
guhitamo kwemera bikomeye, kwemera bigereranije, kutemera bigereranije no 
kutemera bikomeye.   
 N
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Ishuli ryange ryibanda bikomeye ku ugusoma no kwandika( 
mu ikinyarwanda) n’imibare mu umwaka wa 1 – mu umwaka 
wa 3    
   
Abarimu bo ku ishuli ryacu bakungukira mu ukubona 
ibikoresho byo kwigishirizaho bijyanye nigihe –urugero 
“imfashanyigisho” 
   
 Ku ishuli ryacu duha agaciro kwemerera abanyeshuli gukina 
kimwe nko kwiga ibyo mu ishuli  
 
   
Mu ishuli ryacu, kwibanda ku ugusoma no kwandika ( mu 
icyongereza) n’imibare  byabaye ngombwa cyane mu myaka 
ya vuba.  
   
Andi mashuli nzi aha agaciro kwemerera abana gukina kimwe 
n’andi masomo. 
   
Ubushake n’ubwitange byange bwite ku kazi  birahanitse. 
 
   
Dutekereje  ku abayobozi b’amashuli muri rusange, 
ubushake n’ubwitange  ku akazi byabo birahanitse 
 
   
Mu ubunararibonye bwange, nagize inkunga ihagije 
kumfasha gutera imbere mu akazi.  
 
   
Abayobozi b’amashuli bahembwa bihagije bibatera gutanga 
uburezi bwiza ku abanyeshuli babo.  
 
   
Abarimu bange bakeneye andi mahugurwa menshi mu 
Icyongereza.  
 
   
Abarimu bange bakeneye amahugurwa arenzeho ku  imyigire 
ishingiye k’umunyeshuri.  
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Isomo ryo kwihangira imirimo ni ingenzi ku ishuli ryange. 
 
   
Amahugurwa y’abayobozi b’amashuli yagaragajwe nk’ingenzi 
bihagije.  
   
Abayobozi b’amashuli barubashywe bihagije aho batuye.  
 
   
 
32. Dushishikajwe no kumenya uruhare rwawe mu miyoborere y’ishuli. Mu yandi 
magambo, ni ibihe byemezo  byerekeranye n’ishuli Ihuriro ry’ababyeyi nabarimu 
rigiraho ijambo?  (Mukosore  mubintu biri hepfo ibyo afiteho ijambo) 
 Kosora niba ihuriro 
ryabarimu 
n’abanyeshuli 
ribifiteho ijambo.  
Ibyemezo bijyanye nibikorwaremezo by’ishuli – urugero uburyo bwo 
gutunganya ibyumba by’amashuli nibibuga byo gukiniraho. 
 
Ikoreshwa ry’amafaranga atangwa n’ababyeyi.  
 
 
 Ibyemezo by’abarimu ki bagomba guhabwa akazi.   
 
Ibyemezo byo gushyiraho umuyobozi w’ikigo mushya.  
 
 Gusesengura uko abarimu bakora neza mu kazi kabo  
 
Ibyemezo byo kugenera uduhimbazamusyi ku abarimu beza.   
 
 
33. Ese haba hari uburyo ihuriro ry’abarimu n’abanyeshuli bugira ijambo ku ishuli? 
Mushobora kubugaragaza  aha hepfo? (Mushyiramo amakuru yose ahagije bishobok 
 
34. Ese mwagaragaza buryo ki mwemeranya nizi nteruro zikurikira? Mushobora 
guhitamo kwemera bikomeye, kwemera bigereranije, kutemera bigereranije no 
kutemera bikomeye 
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Ababyeyi bose bo ku ikigo cyange bagira uruhare runini mu 
imicungire y’ishuli.     
   
Ababyeyi bo ku ikigo cyange bumva bagira uruhare rurenzeho  
ku imicungire y’ishuli. 
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Ababyeyi bakwiye guhabwa ubushobozi bwo guhitamo abarimu 
bo guha akazi. 
   
Byaba ari ingirakamaro ku ababyeyi bahawe amakuru ku 
imikorere y’ishuli – urugero amakuru ku abanyeshuli bari mu 
icyumba cyishuli n’amanota y’ibizamini.comes. 
   
Ababyeyi bazi uko ishuri rihagaze kurusha Leta y’Urwanda 
 
   
Ku ishuli ryange ,muri rusange ireme ry’uburezi niryiza.  
 
   
Ku ishuli ryange , ibikoresho n’imitungo bigenewe abanyeshuli 
bihari nibyiza. 
   
 
 
35. Nayahe makuru ababyeyi bakura ku ishuli kuburyo ishuli rikora neza  (ca akaziga 
kugisubizo gikwiye) 
 
a. Amanota y’ibizamini bisoza amashuli abanza  
b. Amanota y’ibizamini bisoza amashuli abanza ugereranije n’andi mashuli 
c. Ingano y’icyumba cy’ishuli?   
d. Ingano y’icyumba cy’ishuli ugereranije n’andi mashuli?  
e. Ibindi: 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
36. Nayahe makuru ababyeyi bakura k’uburezi  ishuli rigomba gutanga,  (ca akaziga 
kugisubizo gikwiye) 
a. Amakuru kumubare w’ibitabo bizaboneka?  
b. Amakuru ku ingenga masomo – urugero ni amasaha angahe azakoreshwa 
mugusoma no kwandika? 
c. Amakuru kumpamyabumenyi z’abarimu?  
d. Ibindi: 
 
---------------------------------- 
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Annex 3: School Profile  
 
Below is a copy of the school profile filled out in each school by the Research Assistants.  
 
SCHOOL PROFILE 
 
Area:  
School Number:  
 
Is the physical infrastructure of the school – the quality of the buildings – in good repair?  
If not can you briefly describe any of the problems you see?   
 
 
Do you think that the school feels safe for children?  If not can you briefly explain what 
you think the problems are?  
 
 
In the classrooms can you see any learning guides and materials – for example maps and 
other information – on the walls?   
 
 
If you see any lessons being taught, can you describe the approach you witness?  In 
particular how much of the teaching was the teacher talking to the whole class?  And how 
much group work was there?  
 
 
Does the school have electricity? 
 
 
Did you see any computers in the school? (This includes in schools with no electricity). 
 
 
In any classrooms you saw did there appear to be sufficient desks? If not can you give 
some more detail on the scale of the problem?  
 
 
What were the basic teaching aids like, for example any equipment being used to teach 
science? 
 
 
*** DRAFT: NOT FOR FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF QUOTATION *** 
 
125 
 
 
How would you describe the toilets?  For example, were they clean?  Were there clearly 
different toilets for girls and boys?      
 
 
When you talked to the teachers, how would you rate their English speaking? Was it 
fluent?  If not would you rate it as poor, intermediate or good? 
 
 
And the same for head teachers – how would you rate their English?     
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